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THE LEGACY OF THE 
STUBBORN AND REBELLIOUS SON 
Irene Merker Rosenberg* 
Yale L. Rosenberg** 
J. INTRODUCTION 
If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, that will not hearken 
to the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and though they 
chasten him, will not hearken unto them; then shall his father and 
his mother lay hold on him, and bring him out unto the elders of 
his city, and unto the gate of his place; and they shall say unto the 
elders of his city: "This our son is stubborn and rebellious, he doth 
not hearken to our voice; he is a glutton, and a drunkard." And 
all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die; so 
shalt thou put away the evil from the midst of thee; and all Israel 
shall hear, and fear. 
Deuteronomy 21:18-21 
IN twentieth century America, as in Biblical ,times, parents1 unable to subdue their disobedient children are authorized to invoke the 
coercive power of the state.2 As recently as 1971, for example, the 
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1. Although statutes authorizing proceedings against disobedient children gener-
ally permit any interested adult to commence such actions, a substantial portion of 
these cases are initiated by parents. See notes 26-27 infra and accompanying text. 
2. While the punishment of such children has decreased in severity, on a given 
census day, June 30, 1971, there were 57,239 children in juvenile detention and cor-
rectional facilities in this country, of whom 44,140 were boys and 13,099 were girls. 
Approximately 70 per cent of the girls and 23 per cent of the boys, one third of the 
total, were held on the basis of noncriminal offenses such as truancy and incorrigi-
bility. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE .ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
CHILDREN IN CUSTODY 6-9 (1971). "In fiscal 1971, public juvenile detention and 
correctional facilities admitted over 600,000 persons . • •. " Id. at 8. Moreover, the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) recently estimated that "[b]e-
fore, during and after the adjudication process, one-half of [juvenile noncriminal] 
status offenders spend time in a detention center. In addition, a large number of 
status offenders are either detained or sentenced to serve time in city and county 
jails." LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE .ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
PROGRAM ANNOUNCEMENT: DEINS11TUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 4 
(1975) [hereinafter LEAA ANNOUNCEMENT ON DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION]. "Re-
ports of abuse, rape and suicide do not deter us from placing juveniles in jails under 
conditions that are more punitive and harmful for them than for adults." M. LEVIN, 
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE CORRECTIONS, UNDER LocK AND KEY: JUVE-
NILES IN JAILS AND DETENTION 1 (1974). 
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected constitutional chal-
lenges to the state's "stubborn child" law, 3 which at the time of its 
original enactment in 1646 was patterned after the above-quoted 
verse from Deuteronomy.4 The court upheld an adjudication that an 
adolescent girl who refused to submit to a medical examination, used 
vulgar language, slammed doors, and stayed outside the home "prob-
ably talking with the boys," was a "stubborn child" within the mean-
ing of the statute. 5 
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes that give 
their courts jurisdiction over two forms of misconduct by children: 
criminal law violations and so-called status offenses. The latter are 
behavior patterns or activities of a noncriminal nature, such as incor-
rigibility, truancy, and running away from home, that are defined 
to apply only to minors. Many statutes include both penal law 
violations and noncriminal status offenses within their definitions 
of juvenile delinquency. 6 Others limit delinquency to criminal viol-
The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's most recent census report 
does, however, indicate that the total number of children in juvenile detention and 
correctional facilities, as well as the number of those who have committed noncrim-
inal acts, is decreasing. As of June 30, 1973, the total number incarcerated was 
45,694, (a decrease of 11,545 since June 30, 1971) of whom 4551 were guilty of 
noncriminal offenses. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. 
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN IN CuSTODY (Advance Report) 11 (1975). These sta-
tistics may be misleading, however, since it appears that the LEAA classifies as "de-
linquent" any child who is so labeled under state law. Id. at 3. As pointed out in 
notes 6-13 infra and accompanying text, many states define delinquency to include 
status offenses such as disobedience, and, even in some of those jurisdictions estab-
lishing a separate category for status offenders, the latter may be subsequently ad-
judicated delinquent if they persist in being disobedient in violation of a court order. 
Thus, the actual number of incarcerated status offenders may be substantially larger. 
3. Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 270 N.E.2d 389 (1971). 
4. The 1646 Massachusetts Bay Colony legislation, which also mandated the 
death penalty, follows the language in Deuteronomy. See Katz and Schroeder, Dis-
obeying a Fathers Voice: A Comment on Commonwealth v. Brasher, 57 MASS, L.Q, 
43 (1972). See also Sidman, The Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law: Law and Order 
in the Home, 6 FAM. L.Q. 33 (1972). Although the "stubborn child" statute was 
repealed in 1973, MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 272, § 53, as amended, Nov. 21, 1973, dis-
obedient children in Massachusetts remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court 
and are subject to sanction as "children in need of services." See MASS, ANN. LAws 
ch. 119, § 39E (1975). 
5. Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, -, 270 N.E.2d 389, 395 (1971). 
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(7) (1974): "'Delinquent child' 
means a child who commits an act which if committed by an adult would constitute 
a crime, or who is uncontrolled by his custodian or school authorities or who habitu-
ally so deports himself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or 
others." 
Ten other jurisdictions have similar statutes classifying status offenders as 
juvenile delinquents. See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(3) (1959); CONN. GEN, STAT. 
ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 31-5-7-4.1 (Bums Cum. Supp. 
1975); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.2(13) (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN, § 260,015(5) 
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ations and provide a separate category for status offenses. 7 These 
(Cum. Supp. 1975); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 43-21-5(g) (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 169:2 (Supp. 1973); PA. STAT . .ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2) (Cum. Supp. 
1975); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103(9) (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-4 (1966). 
In addition, in ten states, both children who commit criminal acts and those guilty 
of status offenses are grouped together, without being labeled "delinquent" or "incor-
rigible"; instead, they are merely designated as children within the "jurisdiction" of 
the court. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 571-11(1), (2) (Supp. 1974); !DAHo CODE§ 16-
1803 (Cum. Supp. 1974); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 208.020 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ME. 
REV. STAT . .ANN. tit. 15, § 2552 (Supp. 1975); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.2 
(Cum. Supp. 1975); Mo. REV. STAT. § 211.031 (1959); NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.040 
(1971); ORE. REV. STAT. § 419.476 (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-77 (1953); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158 (1975). 
7. One of the first state statutes creating a separate status offender category, N.Y. 
FAMILY CT. Acr § 712 (McKinney 1962), originally provided: 
(a) "Juvenile Delinquent" means a person over seven and less than sixteen 
years of age who does any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a 
crime. 
(b) "Person in need of supervision" means a male less than sixteen years of age 
and a female less than eighteen years of age who is an habitual truant or who 
is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful 
control of parent or other lawful authority. 
The age differential between boys and girls was held unconstitutional in In re 
Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972). The statute 
has also been amended to clarify the definition of truancy. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr 
§ 712(b) (McKinney 1975). 
Twenty-nine other jurisdictions classify status offenders separately from delin-
quent children. ALAS. STAT. § 47.10.290(7) (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
8-201(12) (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-403(3) (Supp. 1975); CAL. WELP. & 
INSTNS. CODE§ 601 (West Supp. 1976); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 19-1-103 (1973); 
D.C. COD!, ANN. § 16-2301(8) (Supp. 1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(g) (Supp. 
1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
38-802(c), (d), (e), (f) (1973); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 13: 1569(15) (West Supp. 
1975); MD. ANN. CODE § 3-801(f) (1974); MASS . .ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39E 
(1975); MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-1203(13) (Cum. Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 43-201(5) (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 4-45 (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-14-3(M) (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(5) (1969); 
N.D. CENT. CODE§ 27-20-02(4) (1974); Omo REV. CODE ANN.§ 2151.022 (Cum. 
Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § ll0l(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN.§ 14-l-3(G) (1969); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 26-8-7.1 (Supp. 1974); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-202 (Cum. Supp. 1974); TEX. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 51.03(b) 
(Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 632(12) (Cum. Supp. 1975); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 13.04.010 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.12(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 14-115.2(n) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Prior to July 1975, Florida law pro-
vided a separate PINS classification, which included truants, runaways and persist-
ently disobedient children. FLA. LAws c. 26880, § 1 (1951), c. 29615, § 33 (1955). 
By legislation effective July 1, 1975, the PINS statute was repealed, and truants and 
runaways have instead been classified as dependent children. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
39.01(10) (Cum. Ann. Supp. 1975). A separate provision states that "an ungovern-
able child" is one who persistently disobeys parental demands and is beyond parental 
control, and further specifies that 
The first time a child is adjudicated as ungovernable, he may be defined and 
treated as a dependent child . . . for the second and subsequent adjudications 
for ungovernability, the child may be defined and treated as a delinquent child. 
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 39.01(10) (Cum. Ann. Supp. 1975). The amended statute elim-
inates all references to PINS and, notwithstanding the above quoted provision, it does 
not provide for adjudication as an ungovernable. The section defining "adjudicatory 
hearing" is limited to adjudications of delinquency or dependency. FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 39.01(27) (Cum. Ann. Supp. 1975). See generally Gilman, How To Retain Juris-
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statutes describe offenders within this category in ostensibly less oir 
probrious terms,8 such as unruly, wayward, undisciplined or incorri-
gible children, 9 or as persons, children, minors, youths, or juveniles "in 
need of supervision,"10 phrases from which the popular acronyms 
"PINS," "CHINS," "MINS," "YINS," and "JINS" are derived.11 
Even in statutes with separate categorizations for status offenses, 
however, the two forms of misconduct overlap, since some status-
offense statutes proscribe not only noncriminal behavior, but also 
certain forms of criminal conduct, such as violations of city ordi-
nances and minor midemeanors.12 Similarly, some statutes define 
delinquency to include both penal law violations and acts that are 
basically status offenses, such as the breach of a condition of proba-
tion by a child previously adjudicated incorrigible.13 Unless other-
wise noted, this article will use the term "delinquency" to denote acts 
diction over Status Offenses-Change Without Reform in Florida, 22 CRIME AND 
DELINQ. 48 (1976). 
8. "[N]ot surprisingly . • . there is indication that a new sort of stigma is at-
taching to being labeled a person or minor in need of supervision. That result is 
probably unavoidable as long as any sort of -official action is taken. And action by 
a court-however benign-is likely to be the most severely and permanently labeling 
of all." THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YoUTII CRIME 26 
(1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
9. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-201(12) (1974) (incorrigible); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 24A-401(g) (Supp. 1975) (unruly); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(G) (1969) 
(undisciplined); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-3 (G) (1969) (wayward). The Uni-
form Juvenile Court Act describes status offenders as unruly children. UNIFORM 
JUVENILE COURT ACT§ 2(4). 
Kansas has an elaborate statutory labeling process, based on the seriousness of 
the child's offense and/or the number of times it has been repeated. Thus, a child 
may be classified as either "truant," "traffic offender," "wayward," "miscreant," or 
"delinquent." KAN. STAT. ANN.§§ 38-802(b), (c), (d), (e), (f) (1974). 
10. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (minor); 
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1203(13) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (youth); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A: 4-45 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (juvenile); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-3(M) 
(Supp. 1973) (child). 
11. See NEWSWEEK, Sept. 8, 1915, at 66, col. 3; Editorial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 
1975, at 34, col. 2 (late city ed.). 
12. Tux. FAM. CODE ANN.§§ 51.03(b)(l)(A), (B) (Supp. 1975). 
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-278(2) (1969) states: "'Delinquent child' includes 
any child who has committed any criminal offense under State law or under an or-
dinance of local government, including violations of the motor vehicle laws or a child 
who has violated the conditions of his probation under this article." N.C. GEN, 
STAT. § 7A-278(5) (1969) establishes a separate category dealing with the "undis-
ciplined child," who is defined as "any child who is unlawfully absent from school 
or who is regularly disobedient to his parents • • . and beyond their disciplinary con-
trol, or who is regularly found in places where it is unlawful for a child to be, or 
who has run away from home." Thus, a child who has been adjudicated undisci-
plined on the basis of truancy and who subsequently violates a condition of probation 
by further truancy may be adjudicated a delinquent. See In re Dowell, 17 N.C. App. 
134, 193 S.E.2d 302 (1972). 
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that would constitute crimes if committed by aDi adult, and the 
acronym "PINS" and variant terms such as "incorrigibility" and 
"supervision" to refer only to cases involving noncriminal behavior. 
The juvenile court also has jurisdiction over actions that pertain to 
"neglected" or "dependent" children,14 in which the parent is charged 
with misconduct or an inability to care properly for the child. In 
many jurisdictions, the behavior that is a ground for finding neglect 
or dependency is also proscribed by the PINS law.15 Thus, depend-
ing upon whether fault is assigned to the parent or to the child, 
truancy can be the basis for either a neglect or a PINS finding.16 This 
interrelationship between the PINS and neglect jurisdictions is illus-
trated inferentially by statutes in a number of states that classify 
runaways as PINS only when they leave home "without just cause,"17 
and is more directly demonstrated by a New York statute that permits 
substitution of a neglect charge at any stage of a PINS proceeding18 
and by Arizona legislation that treats as "dependent" a child under 
eight who commits a delinquent or PINS act.19 
A disturbing feature of many PINS statutes is the absence of a 
lower limit on the age of children over whom jurisdiction may be 
exercised. While a few states do prescribe lower age limits for PINS 
children, 20 most define "child" simply as a person under the age of 
eighteen, seventeen, or sixteen.21 The New York statute, for exam-
14. For example, MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 260.015(6)(a) (1971) defines a "depend-
ent child" to include, inter alia, one "who is without a parent, guardian or other cus-
todian ••. ," while section 260.015(10) defines a "neglected child" as one who, inter 
alia, "is abandoned by his parent, guardian, or other custodian" or "is without proper 
parental care because of the faults or habits of his parents, guardian, or other cus-
todian." 
15. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.12 (Cum. Supp. 1975), which includes as a 
child "in need of supervision" one who "habitually so deports himself as to injure 
or endanger the morals or health of himself or others," with Wis. STAT. ANN. § 
48.13(1){f) (1957), which describes a "neglected" child as one whose "occupation, 
behavior, condition, environment or associations are such as to injure or endanger 
his welfare or that of others." 
16. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (1975) (includes in its definition 
of "delinquent" child one "who has been habitually truant" and defines a "neglected" 
child as one who "is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, 
emotionally, or morally ... " [emphasis added]). 
17. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(g)(4) (Supp. 1975). 
18. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 716(b) (McKinney 1975). The same section per-
mits substitution of a neglect petition in a delinquency case. 
19. Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-201(10)(c) (1974). 
20. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(1)(A) (1975) (setting lower age 
limit of ten for PINS and delinquents); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1103(9) (1962) (set-
ting lower age limit of seven for "delinquent" children, the definition of which in-
cludes status offenders). 
21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(3) (1959) (under 16); HAWAII REV. SrAT. 
§ 571-2(5) (Supp. 1974) (less than 18); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:1569(3) (West 
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ple, sets no minimum age for PINS, although it requires that a child 
be over seven before- he or she can be adjudicated a delinquent. 22 
Whether categorized separately or included within the definition 
of delinquency, PINS conduct may be described either with particu-
larity or with vague conclusory terms; some statutes combine specific 
and vague proscriptions. A relatively precise Texas statute enumer-
ates four types of misconduct that are the exclusive bases for a PINS 
adjudication: (1) three violations of municipal penal ordinances or of 
laws defining low-grade misdemeanors; (2) truancy for a specified 
number of days; (3) leaving home for a substantial length of time or 
without intent to return; or ( 4) violation of state laws prohibiting 
driving while intoxicated. 23 In contrast, the more general Alabama 
statute defines a "delinquent child" as a criminal law violator, or as 
one "who is beyond the control of his parent . . ., incorrigible . . . 
guilty of immoral conduct; ... [or] leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or 
immoral life."24 More typically, Arizona combines somewhat specific 
prohibitions against habitual truancy and running away from home 
with vague proscriptions against disobeying reasonable parental or-
ders or habitually deporting oneself so as to injure or endanger one's 
morals or health.25 
In most jurisdictions, any person having knowledge of relevant 
facts can refer a child to court on a PINS charge;26 typically, the 
Supp. 1975) (less than 17). Cf. In re Joyner, 358 Mass. 60, 260 N.E.2d 664 (1970) 
(reversing "stubborn child" adjudication against 18-year-old girl sentenced to ten days 
in correctional facility for disobeying her parents' orders not to see her intended hus-
band). 
22. N.Y. FAMILY Cr. ACT § 712(a), (b) (McKinney 1975). The lower age 
limit of seven in delinquency cases apparently stems from the conclusive common-
law presumption that a child under that age was incapable of committing a crime. 
Between the ages of seven and fourteen, there was a rebuttable presumption of in-
capacity. See generally F. LUDWIG, Youm AND TIIE LAw 17-18 (1955). There is 
a split in the courts as to whether these presumptions are to be used in juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. Compare In re E.P., 291 S.2d 238 (Fla. App. 1974) (presump-
tion available to 12-year-old child accused of manslaughter), with Borders v. United 
States, 256 F.2d 458, 459 (5th Cir. 1958) (prosecution not required to prove that 
12-year-old who derailed freight train was of sufficient maturity to understand the 
nature and consequences of his conduct). See In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 
P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970) (penal law codification of common-law presump-
tion was applicable in delinquency actions, but suggesting that it would not be avail-
able in PINS cases); accord, In re Michael B., 44 Cal. App. 3d 443, 118 Cal. Rptr. 
685 (1975). In those jurisdictions where the defense of infancy is available to delin-
quents and where PINS children can be sent to the same state institutions as delin-
quents, the infancy defense should be available to PINS. 
23. TEX. FAM. CoDEANN. § 51.03(b) (Supp. 1975). 
24. ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(3) (1959). 
25. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201(12) (1974). 
26. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-61 (1975); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 211.081 
(1962). Some states require that the complainant be an adult. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 38-816 (1974). 
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referring party is either a parent, guardian, or custodian, or a school, 
police or welfare official. 27 Over half of the states require that before 
a petition is filed, the complainant and the child must utilize a process 
known as "informal adjustment" or "probation intake."28 Its pur-
pose is to assure that formal juvenile court intervention is reserved 
exclusively for those children considered to be in need of judicial help 
because of the seriousness of their offenses or the severity of their 
maladjustment. 29 In general, the options available to an intake 
department are outright dismissal of the case, dismissal with referral 
to community agencies, informal supervision of the child, or the filing 
of a formal PINS petition or complaint. 30 
In some states, the parties may refuse to participate in the estab-
lished intake procedure;31 moreover, a number of jurisdictions allow 
27. For example, a recent New York survey discloses that parents or parental sur-
rogates initiated 59 per cent of all PINS actions, 25 per cent were brought by school 
officials, and the remaining 16 per cent were instituted by other parties, such as unre-
lated individuals and police. See ADMIN. Bo. OF N.Y. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, RE-
PORT FOR JUDICIAL YEAR 1972-73, at 331 (1974). Another such study, involving 316 
PINS children in New York City who were removed from their homes by court ac-
tion, found that 65 per cent of the PINS petitions in the survey were filed by the 
children's mothers. See OFFICE OF CHILDREN'S SERVICES OF TiiE NEW YORK JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE, THE PINS CHILD, A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS 44 (1973) [hereinafter 
THE PINS CHILD, A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS]. See also LEAA ANNOUNCEMENT ON 
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 2, at 7-8. 
28. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CoDB §§ 653, 654 (West Supp. 1976); PA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-304 (Cum. Supp. 1975). 
In addition to such juvenile court diversionary processes, "[a]cross the country, 
it is clear, discretionary action by the police in screening juvenile offend~rs accounts 
for the removal of significant numbers from the formal juvenile justice system." 
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 12. The Task Force notes, however, a special 
data analysis of the Chicago Youth Division, which discloses that in 1965 the police 
adjusted cases for every juvenile criminal offense category except murder (e.g., armed 
robbery 30.5 per cent adjusted), but were able to adjust incorrigibility charges in only 
19.5 per cent of the cases. Id. at 12 n.60. 
29. A New York Family Court judge has explained the purpose of the intake pro-
cedure as follows: "[P]robation intake is a hallmark of the juvenile justice system. 
Its purpose is to screen from the Court those youngsters who, because of age, lack 
of prior record, good adjustment at home and in the community or other factors could 
derive no benefit from court involvement and, indeed, might be damaged by it." In 
re Charles C., 371 N.Y.S.2d 582, 585 (Fam. Ct. 1975). See also TASK FoRCE RE-
PORT, supra note 8, at 14-18, 21; E. WAKIN, CHILDREN WITHOUT JUSTICE 40-42 
(1975). 
The statutes themselves often describe the purpose of the intake procedure in 
vague, general terms. See, e.g., Aus. STAT. § 47.10.020 (1975) ("to determine 
whether the interests of the public or of the minor require that further action be 
taken"); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr § lO(a) (2). 
30. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CoDE § 654 (West Supp. 1976); MoNT. REV. 
CODES ANN. § 10-1209 (Cum. Supp. 1975); TASK FORCE REPORT, -supra note 8, at 
15. Another form of adjustment, which generally takes place after the filing of a 
petition, but prior to an adjudication, is the entry of a consent decree. See D.C. 
CODE ANN.§ 16-23'14 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 50-305 (Cum. Supp. 1975). 
31. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 24A-1001(3) (Supp. 1975); Mo. CTs. & JUD. PRO. 
CODE ANN. § 3-810(e) (Supp. 1975); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr § 10(a)(3). 
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the complainant to file a petition against the child even though the 
probation department recommends that the matter be informally 
adjusted. 32 The net effect of these provisions is to give the parent or 
other complaining party access to the court notwithstanding the con-
trary opinion of probation personnel, as well as power to bypass 
community resources. 33 
After the petition is filed, the court is usually required to decide 
whether the child is to be released in the parent's custody or remanded 
to a facility pending the adjudicatory hearing. 34 Statutory bases 
for remand generally include a necessity for protection of the child or 
the public, a likelihood that the child will abscond or fail to appear in 
court on the return date, an unavailability of proper supervision at 
home, and, finally, a probability that the child will commit a criminal 
act before trial. 35 In practice, the determining factor may instead be 
32. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-8(3) (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y. FAM-
ILY CT. ACT § 734(b) (McKinney 1975) ("The probation service may not prevent 
any person who wishes to file a petition under this article from having access to the 
court for that purpose"). 
In some states, the complainant's access to court is limited by requirements that 
the judge authorize the filing of each petition. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN, 
§ 712A.11 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-11 (1969). In the District of 
Columbia, only designated public officials and representatives of private agencies may 
file PINS complaints. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2305(b) (1973). Under California 
law, if a probation officer declines to file a petition against a juvenile, the person 
initiating the complaint against the child may secure review by the court of the offi-
cer's decision. CAL. WELP. & INSTNS. CODE§ 655 (West 1972). 
33. For a discussion of the dynamics of intake adjustment in the New York Fam-
ily Court, see Note, Ungovernability: The Unjustifiable Jurisdictio11, 83 YALE L.J, 
1383, 1395 (1974) [hereinafter YALE PINS STUDY]. 
34. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-63 (1975); ME. REV, STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 2608 (Supp. 1975). Indeed, children may be held in detention even prior to 
the filing of a PINS petition. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-1209(4)(c), 
10-1212 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Tux. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.02 (1975). 
35. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.171 (subd. 1) (1971); N.Y. FAMILY CT, 
ACT§ 739(a) (McKinney 1975): UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT§ 14. Some state 
statutes do not prescribe grounds for remanding the child, and consequently such de-
cisions appear to be left entirely to the discretion of individual judges, See, e.g., 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-63 (1975); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2608 (Supp. 
1975) (also authorizes jail detention of children provided they are segregated from 
adult criminal offenders). 
The New York statute permits interim detention of both PINS and delinquents 
if the court finds that there is either a "substantial probability" that the child will 
not retum to court or a "serious risk" that the juvenile may commit a crime. N.Y. 
FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 739(a), (b) (McKinney 1975). In People ex rel. Waybum v. 
Schupf, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1976, at 1, col. 6, the New York Court of Appeals upheld 
the constitutionality of the above preventive detention provision. See also Moss v. 
Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1976), holding unconstitutional the Florida juvenile 
court procedure for pre-trial detention of juvenile delinquents on the ground that it 
failed to provide for a probable cause hearing. The decision does not appear to apply 
to PINS cases. 525 F.2d at 1260 n.1. 
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the parent's willingness to take the child home. 36 In many jurisdic-
tions, PINS and delinquent children who are detained during this 
interim period are placed in the same facilities, which are likely to be 
secure. 37 Interim detention may continue until the conclusion of the 
dispositional hearing; thus, both alleged and adjudicated PINS and 
36. A study of the New York Family Court indicates that approximately 50 per 
cent of the interim PINS detentions are based on parental refusal to take the child 
home. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1396-97. Another survey disclosed 
that 20 per cent of the parents refused to take their children home. THE PINS 
CHILD, A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 44. But see In re Norman c., 
74 Misc. 2d 710, 345 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Fam. Ct. 1973), holding that secure detention 
for a child accused of delinquency solely on the ground that he bad no parent to 
whom he could be paroled constituted a clenial of equal protection. Some jurisdic-
tions have attempted to provide alternatives to interim detention of PINS children 
in secure facilities. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2313(b) (1973) (permitting de-
tention in foster homes, group homes and youth shelters). 
Pursuant to section 223(a){12) of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preven-
tion Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(12) (Supp. IV), the Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Administration has set aside 8.5 million dollars for grants to public and private 
agencies that have formulated programs to divert PINS children from detention and 
correctional facilities. See News Release accompanying LEAA ANNOUNCEMENT ON 
DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 2. 
37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 379 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-226 
(A) (Supp. 1975); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.34 (Page Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 11, § 50-311 (Cum. Supp. 1975). The Alabama statute authorizes interim 
detention of delinquent children in jail but segregated from adult prisoners, "provided 
no other arrangement for holding the child can be made." The term "delinquent" 
is defined so as to include status offenders. ALA. CODE, tit. 13, § 350(3) (1958). 
In the District of Columbia, PINS children can be placed in secure detention so 
long as they are not commingled with adjudicated delinquents. D.C. CODE ANN. § 
16-2313(b) (1973). In Georgia, neglected and PINS children may only be detained 
in shelter care facilities; however, such facilities may also house delinquents. GA. 
CODE ANN. § 24A-1403(b) (Supp. 1975). Since June 30, 1975, Louisiana has pro-
hibited the holding of PINS children in detention facilities. LA. REv. STAT. § 
13:1578.1 (West Supp. 1975). 
See Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), 359 F. Supp. 478 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (determining that PINS children held in secure interim detention 
facilities for more than 30 days are entitled to treatment, but rejecting claim that 
secure detention of PINS with delinquents violates equal protection); People ex rel. 
Kaufmann v. Davis, App. Div., 2d Dept, N.Y.L.J., May 19, 1976, at 19, col. 6 (hold-
ing that commingling of PINS child with delinquents in secure interim detention fa-
cility was not unconstitutional, where PINS child was detained 15 days, had previ-
ously run away from nonsecure facility, and was assaultive). Cf. Swansey v. Elrod, 
386 F. Supp. 1138, 1141-42 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (discussing internal separation of delin-
quents and PINS remanded to the same juvenile detention center, in connection with 
determination as to propriety of keeping juveniles waived over to criminal court in 
the same facility); Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974), reversing trial 
court's dismissal of a class action to enjoin allegedly unconstitutional arrest and jail-
ing practices by juvenile officials. Plaintiff, a 16-year-old boy, was arrested for viola-
tion of a curfew ordinance, taken to the county jail, and kept there incommunicado 
for five days on the basis of a telephone order by the nonlawyer juvenile court judge. 
"The willingness of the court to order confinement without having seen or heard from 
the boy and without having personally observed his conduct or his character, indi-
cates to us that his order was not merely an isolated act, but instead the usual treat-
ment given to all juveniles arrested for being out after curfew." 506 F.2d at 1355. 
See also Anonymous Juvenile v. Collins, 21 Ariz. App. 140, 517 P.2d 98 (1973). 
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delinquent children may be incarcerated together for extended peri-
ods of time. 88 
Most jurisdictions provide for bifurcated trials or hearings, with 
an adjudicatory or fact-finding hearing to determine innocence or 
guilt as to the charges, and a dispositional hearing to decide what 
treatment, if any, the guilty child requires.39 Many states require that 
evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing be material, relevant 
38. See, e.g., Tl!x. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.0l(h) (1975); Martarella v. Kelley, 
349 F. Supp. 575, 579, 582-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see D.C. CoDB ANN. § 16-2313 
(b) (Supp. 1970). As a matter of practice, children may also be kept in detention 
facilities even after the dispositional hearing pending transfer to a long-term place-
ment facility. See State ex rel. Harris v. Larson, 64 Wis. 2d 521, 219 N.W.2d 335 
(1974). 
39. See, e.g., In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 785-86, 96 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148-
49 (1971), (reversing PINS adjudication because record was unclear as to whether 
the trial judge considered a probation report prior to making a PINS finding against 
the child; the court rejected the prosecutor's argument that bifurcated hearings were 
not required in PINS cases). See also In re Arnold, 12 Md. App. 384, 394, 278 
A.2d 658, 663 (1971) (remanding delinquency case because, inter alia, "the adjudica-
tory hearing ••. and disposition hearing ••. are interwoven"); cf. In re Nawrocki, 
15 Md. App. 252,289 A.2d 846 (1972). 
In some states, a mere finding that the child committed the acts alleged in the 
petition appears sufficient to permit the court to adjudicate the juvenile a PINS and 
proceed to enter a dispositional order. See, e.g., MAss . .ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 390 
(1915); In re A.S., 487 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. App. 1972). 
In other jurisdictions, in addition to determining that the child engaged in the 
misconduct alleged in the petition, the court must, either prior to making a PINS 
adjudication or prior to entering a dispositional order, also find that the minor is in 
need of rehabilitation or treatment. In some of these states, it is unclear whether 
adjudication of the child's status as a PINS takes place prior to or after a separate 
finding that he or she is in need of rehabilitation or treatment. Compare CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-68(a) (1975) and N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr §§ 742, 743, 745(b) 
(McKinney 1975) (PINS adjudication appears to take place only after finding of 
need for rehabilitation or treatment), with LA. REv. STAT. §§ 13:1569(15), (18), 
(19) (West Supp. 1975) (ambiguous as to when the PINS adjudication occurs). In 
jurisdictions in which the adjudicatory hearing has been denominated a fact-finding 
hearing, and the scope of such hearings is limited to determining whether or not the 
child committed the acts alleged in the petition, it seems reasonable to infer that the 
PINS adjudication can be entered only after the finding of a need for rehabilitation 
or treatment has been made. See D.C. CODB ANN. §§ 16-2301(8), (16), (17) 
(1973 ). 
If the finding as to treatment and rehabilitation takes place at the adjudicatory 
hearing, it should be subject to the rules of evidence and quantum of proof require-
ments applicable to adjudicatory hearings. If, however, the finding as to care and 
rehabilitation is made at the dispositional bearing, it may be based on hearsay evi-
dence and a lesser standard of proof. See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text. 
Ambiguities as to the hearing at which the finding of need for care and treatment 
is made and as to the applicable rules of evidence and quantum of proof are removed 
in some states by clearly defined tripartite procedures. In the first phase, the court 
must find, by competent proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the child committed 
the acts alleged. In the second phase, it must find, on the basis of clear and convinc-
ing competent evidence, that the juvenile is in need of care and rehabilitation, while 
in the final phase, the judge may use incompetent evidence, provided it is material 
and relevant, in order to determine the appropriate disposition. See N.M. STAT. ANN, 
§§ 13-14-28(E), (F), (G), 13-14-31(C) (Supp. 1973). 
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and competent. 40 In addition, some jurisdictions incorporate certain 
procedural due process rights, such as the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that are applicable in criminal trials and delin-
quency hearings. 41 
At the dispositional hearing, the rules of evidence are substan-
tially relaxed, permitting the court to receive probation reports and 
other forms of hearsay evidence. 42 Most statutes give the judge 
broad discretion, 43 authorizing such dispositional alternatives as dis-
charge with a warning,44 imposition of a fine,45 probation,46 place-
40. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY Cr. ACT § 744(a) (McKinney 1975); Tux. FAM. 
CODE ANN.§ 54.03(d) (1975). 
Some state statutes merely provide that hearings shall be conducted in an "in-
formal" or "informal but orderly" manner. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155 
(1) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 50-316(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975); UNIFORM JU-
VENILE COURT ACT §§ 24(a), 29(c). See also Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 
142, 198 S.E.2d 633 (1973) (reversing incorrigibility adjudication because trial court, 
over objection, admitted prejudicial hearsay testimony); In re Dudley, 310 S.2d 919 
{Miss. 1975) (reversing adjudication that appears to have been based on noncriminal 
conduct, on the ground that the quantum of inadmissible hearsay testimony was such 
that appellant was effectively denied his right to a fair hearing). 
41. See, e.g., Cor.o. RF.v. SrAT. ANN. § 19-3-106(1) (1973); MAss. ANN. I.Aws 
ch. 119, § 390 (1975). Legislation in some states provides for the exclusion of ille-
gally seized evidence and involuntary confessions in PINS and delinquency cases. 
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-25(C) (Supp. 1973); Tux. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 
54.03(e) (1975). See also notes 117-22 infra and accompanying text. 
42. See, e.g., !LL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972); ORE. RF.v. 
STAT. § 419.500(2) (1974). See also Tyler v. State, 512 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1974) (rejecting delinquent's claim that statute permitting introduction of hearsay ev-
idence at dispositional hearing violated child's sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion and cross-examination, on the ground that the juvenile's attorney had access 
to all written reports considered by the court, and that In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1 (1967), discussed at notes 117-18 infra and accompanying text, is inapplicable 
to post-adjudicative hearings). 
43. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-112 (1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
10, § 937(b)(15) (1974) (the court may "fp]rescribe such other treatment, punish-
ment, or care as in the opinion of the Court would best serve the needs of the child 
and society"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 11, § 50-322 (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("ff]he court 
may make • • • orders of disposition best suited to • . . [the child's] treatment, su-
pervision, rehabilitation, and welfare: .•• "). Compare N.Y. FAMILY Cr. ACT § 
745(b) (McKinney 1975), which requires that the disposition be based on a prepon-
derance of the evidence. 
See also City & County v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157, 511 P.2d 898 (1973) 
(upholding power of juvenile court judge to place child ·in a specified facility); In 
re Debra A., 48 Cal. App. 3d 327, 330, 121 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759 (1975) (reversing 
delinquency disposition upon condition that girl spend five consecutive weekends in 
a detention center facility to be selected by the probation officer, on the ground that 
the judge had improperly delegated his discretion; the court added that "[w]e need 
not determine here whether 'punitive' detention (if made reasonably to effect 'reha-
bilitation') is within the purview of the juvenile court law"). 
44. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 754(a) (McKinney 1975). 
45. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937(b) (11) (1974). 
46. See, e.g., Aluz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 8-241 (A) (2)(b) (1974). 
Any technical violation of rules of probation can result in revocation and institu-
tional placement. See, e.g., In re Green, 203 S.2d 470 (Miss. 1967), cert. denied, 
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ment in a foster home47 or nonsecure residential facility, 48 commit-
ment to a secure industrial or training school, 40 or even detention in 
an adult jail.50 Whereas some states absolutely prohibit placement of 
PINS children together with delinquents in training schools, 01 others 
prohibit only an initial placement, but permit subsequent commin-
gling if the PINS child continues to misbehave. 02 Many jurisdictions, 
however, have imposed no restrictions on the placement of the two 
types of children together in the same facilities. 63 
In many states, PINS children may be institutionalized for limited 
terms, with the possibility of extensions pursuant to court order. 64 In 
392 U.S. 945 (1968) (probation revoked on the basis of one day of truancy and crea-
tion of disturbance of classes at another school); Echols v. State, 481 S.W.2d 160 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (probation revoked for truancy, notwithstanding evidence of 
parent's and child's reasonable beliefs that the latter was lawfully discharged from 
school and had a valid work permit, and even though the child was employed), But 
see In re D.E.P., 512 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (reversing probation revo-
cation on the grounds that a single curfew violation was supported only by hearsay 
and that the child's truancy was due to circumstances beyond his control; the court 
noted that "the slightest technical violation" does not justify revocation and training 
school commitment, 512 S.W.2d at 791). See also In re E.B., 525 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1975) (discussing differing statutory rights of PINS and delinquents to 
trial by jury at probation revocation proceedings). 
47. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & lNsTNs. CoDE §§ 730 (West 1972), 727(c) (West 
Supp. 1976). 
48. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 7A-286(4) (Cum. Supp. 1975). 
49. See, e.g., .ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-221 (1964). 
50. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 169:14 (Supp. 1973) (after the child be• 
comes 17, "the court may, under its continuing jurisdiction, commit him either to the 
industrial school, house of correction, jail, or state prison, for all or any part of the 
term of his minority"); IDAHO CODE§ 16-1814(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (permits com-
mitment of a child to jail for up to 30 days if segregated from adult offenders). Cf, 
Long v. Powell, 388 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (three-judge court) (holding un-
constitutional as applied a Georgia statute permitting commitment of delinquent and 
unruly children to adult penal institutions, and further holding that juveniles not 
amenable to ordinary treatment and rehabilitation at juvenile training schools must 
be provided appropriate facilities). The judgment in this matter was vacated and re-
manded by the Supreme Court with directions to dismiss the case as moot. Powell 
v. Long, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). 
51. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 39G (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 13-
14-31(C), (D) (Supp. 1973). 
52. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CODE §§ 602 (West Supp. 1976), 730, 777 
(West 1972); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2320{d) (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT, § 7A-278(2) 
(1969). 
53. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-68 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 16-
1814 (Cum. Supp. 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 31-5-7-15 (Bums Cum, Supp, 
1975). 
54. See, e.g., CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-8-105(2) (1973) (initial commitment 
is indeterminate up to two years, and court after hearing may extend commitment 
for additional period of not more than two years); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN, § 17-
69 (Supp. 1975) (same); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 756 (McKinney 1975) (initial 
placement for 18 months which can be extended after court hearings for successive 
one-year periods). See People ex rel. Schinitsky v. Cohen, 34 App. Div. 2d 1020, 
312 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (2d Dept. 1970) {per curiam) (holding invalid mmc pro tu11c 
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other jurisdictions, a PINS child is formally committed until his or her 
majority, with early release dependent upon the discretion of the 
juvenile court or the correctional agency.55 Thus, depending on the 
jurisdiction and on the juvenile's age, a child may receive what 
amounts to a sentence of several years for running away from home. 56 
Although many PINS statutes are characterized by vague pros-
criptions, drastic sanctions can often be invoked for their violation. 
These two factors, among others, have combined to allow much 
misuse and abuse of the PINS jurisdiction. Despite attempts to 
abolish it, the PINS jurisdiction has displayed remarkable tenacity 
and longevity. Accordingly, methods should be developed to ensure 
at least that the court's awesome power is used sparingly and wisely. 
To that end, this article will, in Part II, outline the abuses and 
misuses of the PINS jurisdiction, and, in Part ill, discuss the chal-
lenges that have been raised against it. In Part N it explores the 
value of an adjudicatory hearing in combatting PINS abuses. Finally, 
Part V assesses the potential defenses and affirmative defenses57 
extension of a PINS child's placement; due to a clerical error, there was a ten-month 
delay in requesting the extension); People ex rel. Arthur F. v. Hill, 29 N.Y.2d 17, 
271 N.E.2d 911, 323 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1971) (holding unconstitutional an extension 
of placement without notice and a hearing). 
55. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 54.05(b) (1975) (until age 18); NEB. RBv. 
STAT. § 43-210.02 (1974) (until age 20); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 14-1-6 (1969) 
(until age 21). 
Children may be paroled from training schools prior to completion of the term 
stated in the commitment order. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERV-
ICES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE FAMILY CoURT IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, JUVENILE 
JUSTICE CONFOUNDED: PRETENSIONS AND REALITIES OF 'TREATMENT SERVICES 36 
(1972) [hereinafter JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED]. However, after release they 
remain subject to parole supervision and may be returned to the training school for 
parole violations. See People ex rel. Silbert v. Cohen, 29 N.Y.2d 12, 271 N.E.2d 
908, 323 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1971) (holding that parole of a delinquent may not be re-
voked without a hearing). 
56. See E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (Cadena, 
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970) ("Under our statute a child of ten 
may be deprived of bis liberty for a period of eleven years. Appellant here faces 
confinement for almost seven years"). 
57. In the criminal law context, the ultimate burden of persuasion beyond a rea-
sonable doubt is on the state in the case of a "defense," whereas an "affirmative de-
fense" must generally be proved by the defendant 
In those jurisdictions in which the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
is applicable in PINS proceedings, see note 122 infra, it is arguable that at least some 
of the defenses outlined in this article constitute material elements of the offense, 
the proof of which lies with the state. For example, the absence of contributozy neg-
lect by the parent, a defense described in the text at notes 256-83 infra, can be con-
sidered a material element of proof of the child's incorrigibility, the burden of which 
rests with the prosecution. Cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), holding 
unconstitutional a Maine statute which required the defendant to prove, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, the mitigating factors which would reduce a murder charge 
to manslaughter. 
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that are arguably available, but have been only sporadically asserted 
in PINS actions. 
Il. MISUSE AND ABUSE OF THE PINS JURISDICTION 
The potential for misuse of the PINS jurisdiction is illustrated by 
the following case history.58 A PINS petition was filed against a 
fourteen-year-old girl who had allegedly run away from her parents' 
home. Three months before being brought to court, the child, a 
product of "an unstable family situation,"G0 had attempted suicide by 
slashing her wrists. As a result of the PINS petition, she was 
committed for nine months to a state mental hospital, which delivered 
a diagnosis of "schizophrenic reaction, schizoaffective type."00 Upon 
her release from the hospital, she was found to be a PINS, and 
custody was transferred from her parents to an aunt and uncle. 
Within a month, she threatened a fellow student and was sent home 
from school. After being advised by her aunt that she might be 
returned to a detention center as a result of this incident, the child 
attempted suicide by taking an overdose of prescription drugs be-
cause, as she later stated, "it would be better to be dead than to be 
returned to the juvenile hall."61 Her probation officer filed a petition 
alleging that she was a delinquent because she attempted to do herself 
bodily harm, thereby violating the court's earlier PINS order. 62 At a 
judicial hearing, the child admitted the allegations of the petition, was 
found to be a delinquent, and was placed at the state training school. 
The appellate court reversed on the ground that there had been 
ineffective waivers of the right to counsel and the privilege against 
self-incrimination. The court further observed that a delinquency 
finding would be invalid because the suicide attempt was not "an act 
of disobedience" constituting a violation of a court order, but rather 
"a repeated manifestation of emotional disturbance."63 
This case suggests at least two ways in which the PINS jurisdic- , 
tion lends itself to misuse. First, the lower court classified a possibly 
58. In re Butterfield, 253 Cal. App. 2d 794, 61 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1967). 
59. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 795, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 875. 
60. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 796, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 876. 
61. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 796, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 876. 
62. Under CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CoDE. § 602 (West Supp. 1976), a juvenile de-
linquent is defined as a child who violates the criminal law or an adjudicated PINS 
who "fails to obey any lawful order of the juvenile court . . • ." Only delinquents 
and PINS whose dispositions have been modified after violation of a court order may 
be committed to the state training school. CAL. WELF. & lNSTNS, CODE §§ 730, 731, 
777 (West 1972). Other states have similar provisions. See text at notes 81-84 
infra. 
63. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 800, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 879. 
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neglected, emotionally disturbed girl as a PINS. Second, it later com-
bined the dubious PINS dispositional order with the renewed mani-
festation of the same emotional disturbance to convert the child's 
status to that of a delinquent, and thus to incarcerate her with 
juveniles who had committed crimes. 
In a substantial number of reported cases, children designated as 
PINS appear to be either neglected or the victims of parental inade-
quacies. Some opinions merely allude to such factors as prior find-
ings of neglect or dependency,64 an "unstable home situation,"65 
parental inability or unwillingness to care for the child66 or 
"maintain a well-kept home,"67 and juvenile misconduct that may 
have resulted from "traumatic situations initiated by the parent."68 In 
other cases, the courts have been more explicit, noting, in various 
instances, that a child had suffered from "poor nutrition and physical 
care,"60 that a "home was 'filthy with food, clothing and debris 
scattered about,' "70 and that a child's running away had "its genesis 
in unwholesome and often bizarre home environment and family 
tensions."71 Still more graphically, one court described a child "liv-
64. See In re Rita P., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 95 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1970); In re 
Elmore, 382 F.2d 125, 128 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also In re Henderson, 199 
N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972) (simultaneous findings of PINS and dependency). 
65. In re M.S., 129 N.J. Super. 61, 64, 322 A.2d 202, 204 (Essex County Ct. 
1974). See also In re K.E.S., 134 Ga. App. 843, 844, 216 S.E.2d 670, 671 (1975) 
(delinquency proceeding based on violation of PINS probation order, involving "fif-
teen-year-old girl, the product of an unstable home environment including tragic fam-
ily deaths and a mother who has been married six times"). 
66. In re Presley, 47 Ill. 2d 50, 52,264 N.E.2d 177, 180 (1970) (combined PINS 
and neglect petition alleging that the child left home and that her parents forced her 
to do so). See In re Potter, 237 N.W.2d 461, 462 (Iowa 1976) ("Parents experienced 
poor health and were unable to provide adequate supervision and guidance"; child 
ran away from several foster homes, was subsequently diagnosed as suffering from 
a" 'manic-depressive reaction'" and was placed at state training school). 
67. In re Mario, 65 Misc. 2d 708, 714, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659, 665 (Fam. Ct. 1971). 
68. In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 285, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585, 591 (1972). 
69. In. re L.L., 39 Cal. App. 3d 205, 207, 114 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13 (1974). 
Based on a dependency order entered against the child's parents, the trial judge com-
mitted a chronically depressed child to the state mental hospital; his alleged PINS 
conduct consisted of running away from the hospital and claiming he was not insane. 
39 Cal. App. 3d at 208 n.3, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 13 n.3. The appellate court granted 
the writ of habeas corpus, holding that the juvenile court act did not authorize place-
ment in a state mental hospital and ordering that the child's court record be ex-
punged. See note 74 infra and accompanying text. See also In re Michael E., 123 
Cal. Rptr. 103, 107, 538 P.2d 231, 234-35 (1975) (citing the L.L. case with ap-
proval). 
10. In re Paul H., 47 App. Div. 2d 853, 854, 365 N.Y.S.2d 900, 902 (2d Dept. 
1975) (per curiam) (child alleged to be truant; father who was unable to supervise 
his son adequately accepted most of the blame for son's truancy). 
11. In re Arlene H., 38 App. Div. 2d 570, 571, 328 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (2d Dept. 
1971). These "family tensions" included a mother with a history of mental instabil-
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ing in rooms. . reeking with the effluvia of neglect," whose parents 
were "inebriates" and whose mother "encouraged [him] in tru-
ancy."12 
In some of these cases, the neglected child has been adjudicated a 
PINS as a result of deficiencies in the state's placement procedures or 
facilities. For example, one neglected child ran away from a tempo-
rary shelter in which he had been kept for over a year, during which 
time the state could find no suitable foster home or facility.73 In 
another case, a dependent child, diagnosed as suffering from a "de-
pressive reaction, chronic," and placed in a state mental hospital, fled 
the institution because he allegedly had "been tied to his bed . . . for 
many weeks," and had "been administered . . . anti-psychotic and 
tranquilizing drugs against his will."74 Another dependent child was 
brought to court under a PINS petition for refusing to go to a foster 
home, the third in which she had been placed in as many years. 7G 
ity and shifting of the child's custody between separated parents for "seven or eight 
years." 38 App. Div. 2d at 571, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 252. 
72. In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 386, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1st Dept. 
1970). 
73. In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dept. 1970). Cf. 
In re Dennis M., 370 N.Y.S.2d 458, 82 Misc. 2d 802 (Fam. Ct. 1975), describing 
a retarded schizophrenic child who was adjudicated neglected, removed from his 
home, and was subsequently held in temporary shelters for four and a half years, 
because of an inability to find longterm placement for him. 'The evidence elicited 
in this case shows that Dennis is not the only child for whom the Commissioner 
has been unable to provide longterm care within a reasonable period of time." 370 
N.Y.S.2d at 462, 82 Misc. 2d at 806. See also Robinson v. Leahy, 401 F. Supp. 1027 
(N.D. Ill. 1975) (describing an adolescent child committed to the Department of 
Corrections on the basis of theft from his father; boy had been in residential centers 
and mental health facilities almost continuously since the age of three, when he was 
adjudicated a ward of court); JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, at 60-
64 (discussion of 95 PINS children placed with the Commissioner of Social Services; 
after nine months, 41 per cent remained in temporary shelter care and 25 per cent 
had been returned to court because they could not be maintained in the shelter). 
14. In re L.L, 39 Cal. App. 3d 205, 208, 209, 114 Cal. Rptr. 11, 13, 14 (1974), 
See also JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, at 67-87 (describing the 
paucity of services available for mentally disturbed children in New York City and 
in state hospitals); Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (three-
judge court) (holding as constitutional on their face, New York laws regarding re-
ligious matching of children placed with private institutions; plaintiffs claimed these 
statutory provisions discriminated against children who were Black and Protestant), 
15. In re Rita P., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 95 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1970). See In re 
Aline D., 14 Cal. 3d 557, 536 P.2d 65, 121 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1975), in which the 
court reversed the commitment of a delinquent to the state training school, on the 
ground that there was evidence that such placement would not be beneficial to the 
child. It is unclear whether the girl was adjudicated a delinquent on the basis of 
criminal acts or for violation of a court order. She was 16 years old, had an I.Q. 
of 67, and had been rejected by her mother and previously placed in many treatment 
facilities without success. The court remanded for reconsideration, stating that if it 
was determined that the child would not benefit from the training school and "if no 
appropriate alternative placement exists at that time, then the proceedings should be 
dismissed." 14 Cal. 3d at 566, 536 P.2d at 70, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 821. 
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Observations of the juvenile court at the trial leveF6 suggest that 
both tactical and psychological factors may influence juvenile court 
personnel to proceed against a child as a PINS, rather than against a 
parent for neglect. There is less hesitancy in prosecuting a neglect 
case if the child is young and the parent's misconduct overt, because 
no one in the juvenile court system is apt to attach blame to a small 
child or to identify with a parent who has evidenced aberrant be-
havior. 77 Moreover, proving neglect under these circumstances pre-
sents minimal difficulty. 
However, when older children are involved, judges and other 
court personnel are more likely to favor PINS proceedings. One 
possible explanation for this preference is that the individuals who 
comprise juvenile court systems tend to identify with a parent who has 
charged a teen-ager with misbehavior, since these individuals may 
also be struggling with adolescent rebelliousness in their own families. 
Another factor is the comparative difficulty of proving parental ne-
glect of older adolescents, which is often more subtle and passive than 
neglect of younger children. 78 If the parents secure attorneys who 
vigorously defend against the neglect charges, the proceedings will 
certainly be protracted, and the petition may eventually be dismissed. 
Juvenile court personnel will thus prefer PINS proceedings, which in 
all likelihood will be speedily concluded by admissions of "guilt" 
from the children. 79 As an additional incentive, the PINS finding 
76. Studies of juvenile cases at the trial level confirm that the foregoing appellate 
decisions, notes 64-75 supra and accompanying text, involving the adjudication of 
neglected children as PINS are not isolated instances or aberrations. See THE PINS 
CHILD, A PLETIIORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 30-31, 33-36 (pointing out that 
a majority of children alleged to be PINS had inadequate or neglectful parents); 
YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1392 n.67 (concluding that 50 per cent of the 
PINS children considered in the study were in fact neglected); E. WAKIN, supra note 
29, at 12-13, 69 (34-state study by the National Council of Jewish Women produced 
examples such as the following: a 15-year-old girl kept in detention because her 
father was charged with raping her; a 14-year-old boy brought to court by mentally 
disturbed parents for failure to take a bath). 
77. See, e.g., In re Fred S., 66 Misc. 2d 683, 322 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Fam. Ct. 1971) 
(involving serious physical injuries to infants). 
78. Cf. State v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 413, 464 P.2d 395, 399 (1970) ("Since 
the species of • . . [the mother's] neglect involved rather subtle psychological factors 
-interference with the adequate social, educational, and psychological adjustment of 
her children-justice requires that she be informed of the condition and be advised 
of appropriate remedial action. There was not a scintilla of evidence that the home 
itself 'cannot or will not correct the evils which exist'") (footnote omitted). 
79. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1393; cf. In re Mario, 65 Misc. 2d 
708, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Fam. Ct. 1971), involving the placement of a PINS child 
in the state training school. The court acknowledged generalized passive neglect on 
the mother's part. A neglect petition originally filed at the judge's direction was sub-
sequently withdrawn because the mother was participating in counseling services. 
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may permit placement in the state training schools if private facilities 
are unavailable. 80 
Another misuse of the PINS jurisdiction, which may also stem 
from a desire to increase placement options, is created by statutes that 
define delinquency to include the violation of probation or any other 
court order by a PINS child. 81 In one case, a fifteen-year-old Illinois 
girl was declared a PINS for "frequently absenting herself from home" 
and placed on probation. After she breached probation rules by 
playing truant, she was adjudicated a delinquent pursuant to a statute 
that forbade violation of "a lawful court [probation] order," and was 
committed to the state training school. 82 Other courts have reached 
similar results. 83 In contrast, a Colorado court construed a delin-
quency statute that forbade violation of a "lawful order of court" so 
as not to include violation of a term of probation by a PINS child. 
The court asserted that "it would be contrary to the obvious legislative 
intent to allow a child to be committed to an institution for juvenile 
delinquents where the only acts alleged were those which were not, in 
and of themselves, grounds for an adjudication of delinquency .... "84 
A similar statutory mechanism for adjudicating PINS children as 
delinquents on the basis of noncriminal behavior is to charge the child 
80. See notes 281-83 infra and accompanying text. 
81. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & JNSTNS. CODE § 602 (West Supp. 1976); GA. CoDn 
ANN. § 24A-40l(e)(2) (Supp. 1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1203(12)(b) 
(Cum. Supp. 1975). 
82. In re Sekeres, 48 Ill. 2d 431, 270 N.E.2d 7 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
1008 (1972). See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972). The Illinois 
statute has since been amended so as to preclude such a result. See ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 37, § 702-3(d) (Smith-Hurd 1972). 
83. See, e.g., Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Presley, 47 
Ill. 2d 50, 264 N.E.2d 177 (1970); In re Dowell, 17 N.C. App. 134, 193 S.E.2d 302 
(1972). See also In re William S., 10 Cal. App. 3d 944, 89 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1970) 
(PINS child's threat to violate court order held insufficient to constitute delin-
quency). 
84. In re D.R., 29 Colo. App. 525, -, 487 P.2d 824, 826 (1971). See In re 
Denise C., 45 Cal. App. 3d 761, 119 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1975) (per curiam) (holding 
that an adjudicated PINS cannot be made a delinquent and committed to the state 
training school on the basis of running away from a placement facility, unless the 
order of placement specifically directs the child not to do so, and unless there is a 
determination that the previous disposition completely failed to rehabilitate the 
child); In re A.L.H., 517 S.W.2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (construing a statutory 
provision so as to prohibit training school placement of a PINS child who had vio-
lated probation by further PINS conduct). The Texas Family Code has since been 
amended in a manner that permits training school placement of runaway and truant 
PINS who violate probation orders, provided such facilities do not also house delin-
quents. See Tux. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.03(a)(2), 51.03(b)(4), (Supp. 1975), 
Tux. CIV. STAT. art. 5143d, § 12(b) (Supp. 1975), amending TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 
§ 51.03 (1975). A similar result was achieved in New York by a process of judi-
cial and administrative action. Compare In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 
424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973), with In re Lavette M., 35 N.Y.2d 136, 316 N.E.2d 
314, 359 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1974), discussed in note 134 infra. 
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who runs away from a state PINS facility with the "crime" of escape. 
Courts upholding such delinquency adjudications reason that custody 
is essential for a child's treatment and rehabilitation and that this 
technique prevents children from flouting the judicial process. 85 
The results reached in these cases presuppose that a troubled, 
runaway child who is placed in a nonsecure PINS facility will not flee 
again, or that, in doing so, he or she realizes "the effect that flight 
will have on the exercise of judicial authority."86 Besides reflecting 
unrealistic expectations of child behavior, these statutes and decisions 
also appear to rest on the theory that the only way to deal effectively 
with children who repeatedly misbehave is to use force and secure 
detention. 87 
A third significant abuse of the PINS jurisdiction is its utilization 
85. In re M.S., 129 N.J. Super. 61, 322 A.2d 202 (Essex County Ct. 1974), atfd., 
139 NJ. Super. 503, 354 A.2d 646 (1976); see L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alas. 
1976) (Applying variant of the "crime" of escape theory, court held PINS child in 
contempt and adjudicated her a delinquent on basis of her having repeatedly run 
away from a nonsecure facility in violation of court order). Cf. State v. Wil-
liams, 301 S.2d 327, 328 (La. 1974) (holding that juvenile who fled from state 
training school could not be prosecuted as an adult for the crime of escape since 
juvenile's commitment is not tantamount to imprisonment and commitment not a sen-
tence); but see Le Vier v. State, 214 Kan. 287, 520 P.2d 1325 (1974) (affirming 
habitual offender sentence where one of the underlying felonies was defendant's es-
cape from the state training school when he was 15 years old; by statute, the legisla-
ture had classified such escapes as felonies and as not within the juvenile court's juris-
diction). 
86. In re M.S., 129 N.J. Super. 61, 69, 322 A.2d 202, 206 (Essex County Ct. 
1914), affd., 139 N.J. Super. 503, 354 A.2d 646 (1976). The court in the M.S. case 
reached this result even though the New Jersey statute defining delinquency did 
not include violation of a court order. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 4-44 (Cum. 
Supp. 1975). By treating departure from a juvenile facility as the crime of escape, 
the court in effect overruled the legislature's determination that disobedience of 
a court order (in this case an order remanding the child to a shelter) did not 
constitute delinquency. In coming to this conclusion, the New Jersey court mis-
takenly relied on Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972), which dealt 
with the Illinois juvenile statute that, unlike New Jersey's statute, specifically included 
violation of a lawful court order within the definition of delinquency. 129 N.J. 
Super. at 75, 322 A.2d at 210 (1974). 
87. See bz re M.S., 129 N.J. Super. 61, 74, 322 A.2d 202, 209, 210 (Essex County 
Ct. 1974), atfd., 139 N.J. Super. 503, 354 A.2d 646 (197<i). Cf. A Minor Boy v. 
State, 89 Nev. 564, 566, 517 P.2d 183, 185 (1973) (juvenile arrested for drinking 
beer, taken to county jail where he was forcibly held down while his long 
hair was cut; when put in a cell, he destroyed furnishing, for which he was 
adjudicated a delinquent and placed at training school; appellate court reversed, 
stating that destruction of furnishing "flowed from [state's] failure to observe 
the requirements of law"); Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.) (three-
judge court), affd. mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (upholding state statute permit-
ting corporal punishment of school children without parental consent, provided that 
it is not used initially to punish misbehavior and that the child is placed on notice 
as to conduct which will warrant whipping); N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1975, at 25, col. 
1 (late city ed.) (describing recently discontinued practice in Butte, Montana schools 
of locking retarded children in a coffin-sized box as punishment for violence). 
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as a substitute for a charge of delinquency where the alleged criminal 
act cannot be proved. In cases where there is insufficient proof of 
drug-related crimes,88 receipt of stolen goods,89 vehicular homicide,00 
reckless driving,91 assault,92 burglary,93 criminal mischief,94 or sex 
offenses,95 trial courts have instead made PINS findings.00 Perhaps 
88. See, e.g., In re William S., 10 Cal. App. 3d 944, 949, 89 Cal. Rptr. 685, 688-
89 (1970) (affirming PINS adjudication even though there was a failure of proof 
with respect to one of the underlying charges that was criminal in nature; child's 
presence in a home where marijuana was found was sufficient proof of his bad asso-
ciations); In re Daniel R., 274 Cal. App. 2d 749, 753 n.3, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247, 250 
n.3 (1969) (reversing on ground of insufficient corroboration PINS finding based on 
allegation that child admitted selling marijuana, but suggesting that "[t]he evidence 
would support findings that the minor had in his possession a substantial sum of 
money . • . and that he associated with persons engaged in the narcotics traffic, 
which latter fact, not being an act defined as a felony, might be shown by his admis-
sions"); In re Dudley, 310 S.2d 919, 920 (Miss. 1975) (dictum) (in reversing delin-
quency adjudication on other grounds, court observed that, although "being under the 
influence" of marijuana was not a crime under Mississippi law, "such conduct, when 
properly alleged and upon adequate proof," might afford a basis for a PINS adjudica-
tion). See cases discussed in note 215 infra, in which PINS findings were affirmed, 
even though there was insufficient evidence to prove possession of narcotics or nar-
cotics paraphernalia, or there was no criminal statute prohibiting use of particular 
drug. 
89. See, e.g., In re Simon, 295 S.2d 473, 477 (La. App. 1974) (trial court dis-
missed delinquency petition on the basis of determination that child did not know 
property in question was stolen, but proceeded to make PINS finding, which was re-
versed on appeal). 
90. See, e.g., In re Williams, 241 Ore. 207, 405 P.2d 371 (1965) (trial court dis-
missed delinquency charge based on vehicular homicide because there was no evi-
dence of recklessness, as required by state statute, but made PINS finding based on 
negligence, which appellate court reversed). 
91. See, e.g., In re Dahlberg, 184 Neb. 303, 167 N.W.2d 190 (1969) (affirming 
PINS finding that child deported himself so as to injure or endanger others, on the 
basis of evidence of malicious damage to a car and of assault). 
92. See, e.g., In re Mark V., 34 App. Div. 2d 1101, 312 N.Y.S.2d 983 (4th Dept. 
1970) (per curiam) (reversing PINS adjudication because there was only an isolated 
incident of misconduct and the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of delin-
quency based on a simple assault). 
93. See, e.g., In re Raymond 0., 31 N.Y.2d 730, 290 N.E.2d 145, 338 N.Y.S.2d 
105 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing a PINS adjudication based on a single act of 
criminal trespass, where the trial court had dismissed a delinquency petition alleging 
burglazy. The appellate court stated that it would have been permissible for the trial 
judge to find respondent guilty of a lesser included offense of burglazy, but that dis-
missal of the petition without such a finding deprived the court of jurisdiction). 
94. Cf. In re Helman, 230 Pa. Super. 484, 327 A.2d 163 (1974) (children 
charged with criminal mischief and adjudicated delinquents based on smoking cigars 
at scene of fire; reversed on the ground that evidence showed that they were at most 
guilty of criminal trespass, which was a summazy offense and not a crime). 
95. See In re Gladys R.., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 865-66, 464 P.2d 127, 135-36, 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 671, 679-80 (1970) (dictum) (reversing delinquency adjudication against 12-
year-old girl for child molesting because, inter alia, the trial court failed to consider 
whether she appreciated the wrongfulness of her act; court suggested, however, that, 
if there was no such proof, a PINS finding would nonetheless be appropriate); ac-
cord, In re Michael B., 44 Cal. App. 3d 445, 118 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1975); cf. Sorrels 
v. Steele, 506 P.2d 942, 943-44 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). 
96. See THE PflllS Cmu>, A PLETIIORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 45-47 
May 1976] The Stubborn and Rebellious Son 1117 
the most startling example of this abuse of the PINS jurisdiction 
involved two girls, ages eleven and thirteen, who had allegedly en-
gaged in sexual activities and drug abuse with adult men and wo-
men. 97 The adults were arrested and charged with statutory rape and 
sexual perversion, and the children were identified by the police as 
victims. Subsequently, the girls were charged not only as delin-
quents, but also as PINS. The evidence introduced at the adjudicatory 
hearing in the juvenile court included statements that the girls gave 
to the police in connection with the investigation of the adults and the 
testimony of one 'Of the girls, who, over her attorney's objection, had 
been called by the prosecutor at her own hearing. The trial judge 
made PINS findings against the children and placed them in the 
custody of the Department of Juvenile Services.98 With one judge 
dissenting, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the decision 
and held, on the basis of a strained interpretation of In re Gault,99 
that because this was a PINS proceeding in which the children were 
(finding that 16 per cent of the PINS children sampled allegedly used drugs and over 
one third were alleged to have stolen or to have committed assault); YALE PINS 
SnmY, supra note 33, at 1393-94 n.78, n.81 (indicating that 15-20 per cent of the 
PINS cases studied alleged criminal behavior and that such cases were processed as 
PINS to avoid burden of proof and evidentiary standards applicable in delinquency 
actions). 
Indeed, in one case, even though the legislature had mandated that the crime of 
statutory rape could be committed only by a person over 18, the court found that, 
while a 16-year-old juvenile could not be adjudicated delinquent on the basis of con-
sensual intercourse with a 15-year-old girl, he came within the statutory definition 
of "an unruly boy." In re J.P., 32 Ohio Misc. 5, 287 N.E.2d 926, 61 Ohio Op. 2d 
24 (1972); accord, In re M.K., 493 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. App. 1973). In another action, 
the court made a PINS adjudication that a 14-year-old boy was" 'in danger of leading 
an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life' by reason of the fact that he had commit-
ted . . . manslaughter and assault with a deadly weapon." In re Donnie H., 5 Cal. 
App. 3d 781, 791, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359, 365 (1970). This finding was entered after 
the juvenile court had dismissed a delinquency petition based on the same charges 
because the only supporting evidence was an illegally obtained confession. The appel-
late court reversed the PINS finding. 5 Cal. App. 3d at 788-91, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 
364-65. 
Section 601 of the California Code was amended effective Sept. 30, 1975, to 
eliminate juvenile court jurisdiction over minors who are "in danger of leading an 
idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life." See CAL. WELF. & INsTNs. CODE§ 601 (West 
Supp. 1976), amending CAL. WELF. & INSTNs. CODE § 601 (West 1972). While the 
statutory deletion would preclude a court from making a PINS adjudication similar 
to that of In re Donnie H., amended section 601(a) retains the "beyond control of 
the parent" provision. Accordingly, the prosecutor could argue that any child who 
commits manslaughter, or any other criminal act, is beyond the control of his or her 
parent or guardian. 
97. In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975). 
98. One of the girls was released after an intermediate appellate decision, and 
thus did not appeal to the state's highest court In re Carter, 20 Md. App. 633, 318 
A.2d 269 (1974). 
99. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The case is discussed in notes 117 and 118 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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not charged with criminal acts, the privilege against self-incrimination 
was inapplicable.100 
Use of the PINS jurisdiction in this manner is a device101 for 
stripping the child of constitutional rights guaranteed to delinquents 
under the Gault decision.102 It permits a PINS finding to be used as 
a "lesser included offense" of juvenile delinquency when there is a 
failure of proof in the underlying criminal charges.103 The effect is 
to circumvent the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt in delinquency cases, 104 because some states permit a 
lesser standard of proof in PINS cases, 105 and because minimal 
evidence of misbehavior can often satisfy vague PINS definitional 
statutes. If the child is in fact innocent of the underlying criminal 
charges, but is nonetheless adjudicated a PINS on the basis of the 
same allegations, the juvenile is punished for something he or she did 
not do.106 If, on the other hand, the juvenile is guilty of a crime, a 
PINS finding may result in placement of this child with PINS children 
who have never committed criminal acts.107 
100. The court's opinion makes it clear that the acts charged could have sup-
ported a delinquency adjudication; the court noted, however, that, since the appellant 
"was, in fact, a victim, the charge of delinquency in the petition must be regarded 
as simply an unexplained anomaly." 273 Md. at 708, 332 A.2d at 256. The court 
went on to observe that, ''with the elimination of the delinquency 'charge' • . . the 
claims of alleged 'criminal' conduct, on which it was premised, vanished with it." 
273 Md. at 709, 332 A.2d at 256-57. The dissenting judge pointed out that, "since 
criminal acts may be the basis for 'CINS' proceedings, and since an adjudication that 
a child is in need of supervision may lead to confinement in an institution for as 
long a period as an adjudication that he is delinquent, virtually all juvenile pro-
ceedings could be labelled 'CINS' by the authorities without significant consequences. 
Thus by using the right labels, i.e., 'victim' and 'CINS', the police and juvenile au-
thorities will be able to bypass the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court 
in Gault." 273 Md. at 716, 332 A.2d at 260. 
101. The device is rationalized in terms of the "best interests" doctrine. See note 
151 infra and accompanying text. 
102. See In re Donnie H., 5 Cal. App. 3d 781, 790, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359, 364-65 
(1970); In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 716, 332 A.2d 246, 259-60 (1975) (dissenting 
opinion). In In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19-29 (1967), and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 366-68 (1970), the Supreme Court rejected the "best interests" doctrine as a 
basis for denying fundamental constitutional rights, in adjudicatory hearings, to ju-
veniles accused of delinquent acts. 
103. See In re Simon, 295 S.2d 473, 481 (La. App. 1974) (dissenting opinion). 
104. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366-68 (1970). 
105. See note 122 infra and accompanying text. 
106. See, e.g., In re Donnie H., 5 Cal. App. 3d 781, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1970) 
(serious question as to whether death was brought about by the accused child or by 
the victim's parents); In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952) 
(unclear whether respondent was one of the eight or nine boys who assaulted the 
victim). 
101. See notes 274-83 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the appro-
priateness of commingling PINS children with neglected children as contrasted with 
the appropriateness of commingling those juveniles guilty of criminal offenses with 
PINS children. 
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Commingling of PINS and delinquent children also results from 
delinquency findings based merely on noncriminal violations of a 
court order or on escapes from PINS facilities. A legislative or 
judicial conclusion that such mixing is harmful to the PINS children 
is effectively thwarted by the use of legal fictions, however benevolent 
their purpose, to interchange PINS and delinquents.108 
Another abuse is the frequent invocation of the PINS jurisdiction 
to punish trivial misconduct.109 At best, these cases are a waste of 
the court's time and resources. At worst, the prosecution of some of 
these cases appears to have been racially motivated.110 Even where 
the alleged misbehavior is not trivial, the court has been used to 
enforce parental moral codes; in one such instance a mother sought to 
compel her daughter to consent to an abortion.111 Other parents 
utilize the PINS jurisdiction as a means of divesting themselves of the 
responsibility of caring for their children.112 
Perhaps the most alarming characteristic of the PINS jurisdiction 
is its disproportionate application to the children of the poor,113 the 
108. Cf. In re Jeanette P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (2d Dept. 
1970) (per curiam) ("The creation of the additional [PINS] designation ... repre-
sents enlightened legislative recognition of the difference between youngsters who 
commit criminal acts and those who merely misbehave. . . . However, the distinc-
tion becomes useless where, as here, the treatment accorded the one must be identical 
to that accorded the other solely because no other adequate alternative has been pro-
vided"). 
109. See text at notes 220-23 infra, discussing the de minimis defense. Cf. Peo-
ple v. Allen, 22 N.Y.2d 465, 470, 239 N.E.2d 879, 881, 293 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 
(1968) (in construing a "Wayward Minor" criminal statute, court notes that "par-
ticular care should be taken that the charge has substance based on acts which point 
to grave danger to youth and is not merely a compliance with form; and that the 
conduct inquired into is seriously harmful and not merely an exaggerated manifesta-
tion of intra-family parent-child conflict"). 
110. See M.S.K. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 1, 205 S.E.2d 59 (1974); Young v. State, 
120 Ga. App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969); In re McMillan, 21 N.C. App. 712, 205 
S.E.2d 541 (1974); see also In re Green, 203 S.2d 470 (Miss. 1967), cert. denied, 
392 U.S. 945 (1968); In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), affd. sub 
nom. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (prosecution of Black children 
based on participation in civil rights demonstration). 
111. See In re Smith, 16 Md. App. 209, 295 A.2d 238 (1972) (per curiam) (af-
firming PINS finding and reversing order compelling abortion). See also In re 
M.K.R., 515 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1974) (reversing juvenile court order authorizing ster-
ilization of mentally retarded girl); cf. Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371, 375 n.5 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (three-judge court), affd. mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972) (holding New 
York's "Wayward Minor" criminal statute unconstitutional; one of the plaintiffs was 
prosecuted after refusing to permit her out-of-wedlock child to be adopted and an-
other was proceeded against for defying her social worker's instruction to remain in 
a foster home). 
112. See, e.g., In re Presley, 47 Ill. 2d 50, 52, 57, 264 N.E.2d 177, 178, 180 
(1970). 
113. See Thomas & Fitch, An Inquiry into_ the Association Between Respondent~ 
Personal Characteristics and Juvenile Court Disposition, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
61, 77, 78, 83 (1975), in which the authors generally conclude, on the basis of a 
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economic class least able to effectuate improvements in the quality of 
juvenile court services and treatment facilities. Due to the accessi-
bility of alternative options for treatment, such as private schools or 
private psychiatric care, the affluent parent of a misbehaving child 
will not likely seek the services of the juvenile court. Any child from 
a wealthy family brought to court by a third party (i.e., the police or 
school officials) will probably be screened out by the intake adjust-
ment procedure because of the available parental resources. If the 
case is not diverted from the judicial process at this stage, affluent 
parents can offer treatment alternatives far superior to those of the 
state and thus obtain a favorable judicial disposition.114 
Because parents are the primary enforcers in PINS cases, and be-
cause most PINS statutes describe the condemned conduct in vague 
terms relating to loss of parental control, a disparate group of indi-
viduals has been vested with awesome prosecutorial discretion.110 
Thus, whether a child will be brought to court depends less upon his 
statistical analysis of 1522 Virginia cases, that the harshest juvenile court sanctions 
are applied to Blacks, school dropouts, children from broken homes, status offenders 
brought to court by their parents, and juveniles from low socioeconomic back-
grounds. 
114. For an interesting description of how wealthy parents can, by effective trial 
and appellate litigation, prevent their child's institutionalization, see In re J.F., 17 
Ohio Misc. 40, 242 N.E.2d 604, 46 Ohio Op. 2d 49 (1968). As a result of protracted 
appeals, the child, who was found guilty of arson, outgrew the court's jurisdiction, 
having spent a total of one hour in detention during the interim. 
115. In E.A.S. v. State, 291 S.2d 61 (Fla. App. 1974), the mother of a 15-year-
old girl called the police because her child refused to come out of the closet, When 
the girl declined to leave the closet to talk to two police officers, they dragged her 
out and, as a result, she allegedly kicked and scratched them. She was charged with 
resisting arrest and was adjudicated a delinquent. On appeal, with one dissent and 
one special concurrence, the adjudication was reversed on the grounds that there was 
no justification for the arrest and that in fact no arrest had been made. 
This case illustrates the ease with which the PINS jurisdiction can be abused, for 
it enabled the mother to summon the police to intervene in what was at most a family 
squabble. As the concurring judge stated, "I feel that •.. [the police] properly re-
sponded to the call by the child's mother and that they were within the bonds [sic] 
of their duties and responsibilities in attempting to induce the child to leave the closet 
and her room." 291 S.2d at 63. The girl spent almost one year in a juvenile deten-
tion center pending appeal. 291 S.2d at 63, Cf. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 
1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge district court), prob. juris. noted, 44 U.S.L.W. 
3531 (U.S. March 22, 1976) (No. 75-1064), in which the descriptions of children 
"voluntarily" committed by their parents to mental institutions bear a striking resem-
blance to many PINS children in juvenile court. Examples include commitment of 
a child who "interfered with the routine of the household and disturbed family mem-
bers" and commitment to prevent breakup of the parents' marriage. "Class members 
have also been committed to mental hospitals for running away, robbing a gas station, 
stealing in general, chasing and striking a girl, arson, delinquent behavior in gen-
eral, truancy •... " 402 F. Supp. at 1044. See also J.L. v. Parham, 44 U.S.L.W. 
2421, 2422 (M.D. Ga., Feb. 26, 1976) (three-judge district court) (the court noted 
that, "Unfortunately, the evidence indicates that there are some parents who .•• 
look upon mental hospitals as a 'dumping ground.' ") 
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or her conduct than upon the fortuitous circumstance of parental 
tolerance and maturity.116 
ill. CHALLENGES TO THE PINS JURISDICTION 
In view of the abuses that derive from the vagueness of many 
PINS statutes and from the extensive discretion granted to parents 
and courts, it is not surprising that a variety of attacks have been 
lodged against the PINS jursidiction. 
Although Supreme Court decisions during the past decade have 
established significant due process safeguards for allegedly delinquent 
children, that tribunal has not yet determined whether PINS have 
similar rights. In re Gault,117 decided in 1967, held that, during the 
adjudicatory phase of the proceedings, a youth who was charged with 
"delinquency" and subject to commitment to a state institution was 
entitled to notice of the charges, and was possessed of the right to 
counsel, the right to confrontation and cross-examination, and the 
privilege against self-incrimination.118 Three years later, in In re 
116. Rena Uviller, presently Director of the Juvenile Rights Division of the 
American Civil Liberties Union and previously a trial and appellate attorney for the 
Juvenile Rights Division of the New York City Legal Aid Society, has observed that 
PINS children placed in the state training school remain incarcerated for much longer 
periods than delinquents who commit serious crimes, because many parents of PINS 
children oppose their return to the home. Ms. Uviller advocates abolition of the 
PINS jurisdiction and the use of a graduated sentencing system for delinquents that 
reflects the gravity of the crime. See Letter to the N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1975, § 
6 (Magazine), at 22, col. 1 (late city ed.). See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1975, at 
1, col. I (late city ed.), describing a 15-year-old boy adjudicated delinquent for the 
murder (beating with a golf club) of a young girl; he was committed to a minimum 
security rehabilitation center for 18 months, but officials said that in all likelihood, 
he "will serve only six to eight months." The article noted that the boy had no prior 
criminal record and "lived with parents who cared about him." Id. Compare Lollis 
v. New York State Dept. of Social Services, 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), in 
which a 14-year-old PINS girl was committed to the state training school, released 
to her mother after ten months, and within two months, was recommitted on her 
mother's complaint. A few days later, the girl was implicated in a fight and confined 
for two weeks in an isolation "strip" room. The child's mother was subsequently 
charged with neglect of the girl's seven siblings. · 
117. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
118. Despite the far-reaching nature of its opinion, the Court did limit the appli-
cability of its holding: "We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. 
These relate to the proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a 
juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the conse-
quence that he may be committed to a state institution." 387 U.S. at 13. Some 
courts have seized upon this language to support rulings that Gault is inapplicable 
to PINS proceedings, since the latter do not involve criminal law violations. See, 
e.g., State v. Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972); In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 
332 A.2d 246 (1975). Such reliance seems misplaced, however, because: (1) al-
though Gerald Gault was adjudicated a "delinquent" on the basis of his having made 
obscene telephone calls, at the time he was tried, the Arizona Juvenile Code defined 
a delinquent child to include not only one who committed a criminal-law violation, 
but also one who habitually deported himself so as to endanger his morals or health, 
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Winship, 119 the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was 
constitutionally required to establish guilt in the adjudicatory stage of 
delinquency actions, but it specifically deferred decision as to whether 
that requirement was applicable in PINS cases.120 Although persua-
sive arguments can be made in favor of the extension of these rights 
to PINS proceedings, at least in those jurisdictions in which PINS 
may be committed to state institutions, 121 there are conflicts among 
the state court decisions on this question.122 
see 387 U.S. at 9 n.6; (2) the Arizona juvenile court judge found Gault guilty under 
both sections of the above statute, a fact specifically noted by the Supreme Court, 
387 U.S. at 8 n.5, 9, 34 n.54; (3) the Gault court was aware of the few recently 
enacted state laws establishing separate classifications for status offenders and knew 
that many "delinquents" were committed to state institutions for waywardness, 387 
U.S. at 24 n.31, 27; and (4) as in the case of Gerald Gault, many PINS actions 
involve conduct which is also criminal, see, e.g., In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 
A.2d 246 (1975). Moreover, in Gault, when the Court wished to make its decision 
applicable only to the adjudicatory phase of juvenile proceedings, it did so by spe-
cifically excluding the pre- and post-adjudicatory phases. 387 U.S. at 13, 31 n.48. 
Finally, the Court's awareness of the distinction between PINS and delinquency pro-
ceedings is illustrated by its decision in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), in which 
PINS cases were explicitly excluded from the holding. See notes 119-20 infra and 
accompanying text. This exclusion might be considered gratuitous, inasmuch as the 
New York statute involved established separate PINS and delinquency categories, and 
Samuel Winship was charged only with delinquency, i.e. the criminal act of larceny. 
397 U.S. at 359-60; see N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr §§ 712(a), (b) (McKinney 1963), 
as amended, N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr §§ 712(a), (b) (McKinney 1975). 
However, an additional basis for doubting the applicability of Gault to PINS cases 
may have been created by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Middendorf v. 
Henry, 44 U.S.L.W. 4401 (U.S. March 24, 1976) (Nos. 74-175, 74-5176), which 
held that there is no constitutional right to counsel in summary courts-martial. The 
Court cited Gault and emphasized the noncriminal nature of the charges against the 
servicemen, stating that "most of the plaintiffs were charged solely with 'unauthorized 
absence,' an offense which has no common-law counterpart and which carries little 
popular opprobrium." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4405. The case is distinguishable though, 
since the maximum punishment in a summary courtmartial proceeding is much shorter 
than the usual maximum sanctions applicable in PINS cases. 
119. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
120. 397 U.S. at 359 n.1. In re Ivan V., 407 U.S. 203 (1972) (per curiam) 
held that Winship was completely retroactive. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 
528 (1971), the Court determined that there was no right to trial by jury in the ad-
judicatory stage of juvenile delinquency proceedings. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 
(1975), the Court's most recent decision in the juvenile area, held that the double 
jeopardy clause applied to delinquency proceedings in juvenile court and prohibited 
retrial of an adjudicated delinquent in adult criminal court for the same underlying 
act. The Supreme Court has agreed to review the decision of a three-judge district 
court in Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Pa. 1975), that held unconsti-
tutional state statutory provisions authorizing "voluntary" commitment of children to 
mental hospitals upon parental application, on the ground that due process safeguards 
were inadequate. Kremens v. Bartley, 44 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. March 22, 1976) (No. 
75-1064). 
121. See note 118 supra. The possibility of confinement was one of the reasons 
given by the Court for its decisions in both Gault and Winship. See In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 367, 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 27 (1967). 
122. For courts that have declined to apply Gault and Winship in PINS cases, 
see State v. Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972) (in which a majority of the 
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In contrast to efforts to assure fundamental fairness in delinquency 
proceedings by means of procedural due process challenges, there 
have also been broad, frontal attacks on the very power of the state to 
assert jurisdiction over children on the basis of noncriminal status 
offenses. Specifically, litigants have argued: (1) that PINS legisla-
tion imposes sanctions on the basis of a status rather than any specific 
acts and thus constitutes cruel and unusual punishment;123 (2) that 
court appears to hold that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is inappli-
cable in PINS proceedings, but in which the court appears evenly divided as to the 
applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination in PINS cases); In re Potter, 
237 N.W.2d 461 (Iowa 1976) (reasonable doubt standard inapplicable in PINS pro-
ceedings); In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975) (holding fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to PINS proceedings); In re 
Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 191 S.E.2d 702 (1972) (right to counsel does not apply unless, 
at the time of the PINS adjudication, incarceration in a state institution is a possible 
disposition, even though a subsequent violation of the probation order issued pursuant 
to that original adjudication could, and in fact did, lead to commitment to a state fa-
cility). See also In re Donnie H., 5 Cal. App. 3d 781, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1970) (hold-
ing that an illegally obtained confession of manslaughter which could not be used in a 
delinquency proceeding was also inadmissible in a PINS proceeding based on the same 
underlying criminal charge, but declining to rule on whether an illegally obtained con-
fession of a status offense would be admissible in a PINS proceeding); Warner v. 
State, 254 Ind. 209, 214, 258 N.E.2d 860, 863-64 (1970) (dictum) (reasonable doubt 
standard inapplicable in PINS cases); In re Dahlberg, 184 Neb. 303, 167 N.W.2d 190 
(1969) (pre-Winship decision declining to determine appropriate standard of proof in 
PINS case because, on de novo review, court found there was proof beyond a reason-
able doubt); In re Geiger, 184 Neb. 581, 169 N.W.2d 431 (1969) (on de novo review, 
divided court found there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt and thus no necessity 
to determine appropriate standard of proof). 
In contrast, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that PINS 
children have the right to counsel. See State ex rel. Wilson v. Bambrick, 195 S.E.2d 
721 (W. Va. 1973). The New York courts have held that the reasonable doubt 
standard applies in PINS cases. See, e.g., In re Iris R., 3J N.Y.2d 987, 309 N.E.2d 
140, 353 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1974) (per curiam); In re Richard S., 27 N.Y.2d 802, 264 
N.E.2d 353, 315 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1970). 
Some statutes require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in PINS cases. See, e.g., 
CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-1-103(1), 104(1)(b) (1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 
119, § 39(b) (1975); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.17, 54.03(f) (1975). But see, 
e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2317(c)(2) (Supp. 1973) (preponderance standard of 
proof); MD. Crs. & Jun. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-819(d) (Supp. 1975) (preponderance 
standard of proof); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-229(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974) (clear and 
convincing standard of proof). 
Some authorities doubt the value of a stricter standard of proof where PINS stat-
utes include vague proscriptions, such as leading an immoral or dissolute life, because 
virtually any evidence will arguably be sufficient to sustain the burden. See Gon-
zalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971), at 11-12, vacated, 416 U.S. 
918 (1974); Note, Parens Patriae and Statutory Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 
YALE L.J. 745, 756 n.71 (1973). -
Many states have held the double jeopardy clause applicable in delinquency pro-
ceedings. See cases cited in District of Columbia v. I.P., 335 A.2d 224, 228 n.7 
(D.C. App. 1975). The court in the J.P. case stated, however, "We express no opin-
ion on the applicability of the double jeopardy clause to other juvenile adjudications 
such as 'child in need of supervision' or 'neglected child' cases." 335 A.2d at 229 
n.9. 
123. See Blondheim v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 874, 880, 529 P.2d 1096, 1101 (1975) 
(eighth amendment argument rejected); Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 
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PINS statutes deprive children of liberty without due process, since 
there is no evidence that PINS children will subsequently commit 
criminal acts (thus placing their conduct beyond the state's police 
power) or that the welfare of PINS children is being promoted by the 
state's rehabilitative efforts in its capacity as parens patriae;124 and 
(3) that, in sanctioning children for acts that would not be penalized 
if committed by an adult, the PINS statutes violate equal protec• 
tion.125 These arguments have been almost uniformly rejected by the 
courts.120 
Due process challenges against PINS statutes have also been 
based on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth. One argument is 
that amorphous prohibitions such as those against incorrigibility or 
leading an idle or dissolute life fail to give notice of the proscribed 
conduct. Another objection is that these statutes constitute an impro• 
per delegation of legislative authority to private parties and public 
officials, who are given virtually unlimited discretion to determine 
which children will be brought to court and what types of misbehav• 
ior will form the basis for PINS charges; moreover, the breadth of the 
-, 270 N.E.2d 389, 394-95 (1971) (argument that "stubbornness in a child 'may 
be symptomatic of a psychological defect'" rejected); cf. Mercado v. Rockefeller, 363 
F. Supp. 489,492 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), revd. in part, 502 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied sub nom. Mercado v. Carey, 420 U.S. 925 (1975) (district court dismissed 
complaint for failure to exhaust state remedies, and thus did not pass on plaintiff's 
eighth amendment argument; appeal to Second Circuit did not contest trial court's 
exhaustion ruling with respect to this claim; court of appeals decision discussed i11 
note 130 infra); Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (three-
judge district court), affd. mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972) (holding unconstitutional New 
York "Wayward Minor" statute, which was part of the state's criminal statutory 
scheme rather than its juvenile law). See also R.R. v. State, 448 S.W.2d 187, 190 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. Rios v. Texas, 400 U.S. 808 
(1970) (holding that commitment of delinquent to training school for a period longer 
than the maximum for adults who committed the same criminal act did not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment). 
124. See, e.g., S.S. v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 568 (Me. 1973); Commonwealth v. 
Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,-, 270 N.E.2d 389, 393-94 (1971); In re Morin, 95 N.H. 
518, 520, 68 A.2d 668, 670 (1949) (rejecting arguments that PINS statutes exceeded 
the state's police power or its power as parens patriae). 
125. See S.S. v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 510 (Me. 1973) (rejecting equal protection 
argument). Cf. Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 1972); People 
v. Sekeres, 48 Ill. 2d 431, 435, 270 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1008 
(1972) (no equal protection violation where state adjudicates as delinquents PINS 
who have disobeyed court orders). See also Smith v. State, 444 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1969) (commitment of delinquent to training school for a period longer 
than the maximum for adults committing the same criminal act did not violate equal 
protection). 
126. See cases cited in notes 123-25 supra. See also, Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 
9 (Pa. 1838). But see People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 8 Am. R. 645 
(1870). For an historical discussion of the juvenile court movement in the United 
States and early case law, see Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspec• 
tive, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970). 
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statutory definitions may authorize intrusion upon constitutionally 
protected behavior.127 Vagueness also permits arbitrary application 
of the statute by trial judges, with little opportunity for effective 
appellate review. Still, although a few courts have accepted such 
arguments and have struck down portions of PINS statutes, 128 most 
have rejected challenges based on vagueness and over breadth, 129 and 
127. See, e.g., Note, supra note 122, at 746-48; Note, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction 
over "Immoral" Youth in California, 24 STAN. L. REV. 568, 580-81 (1972). See 
generally Todd, Vagueness Doctrine in the Federal Courts, 26 STAN. L. REV. 855, 
857-58 (1974). Professor Todd's observation that vague statutory proscriptions can 
effectively undercut procedural due process guarantees seems particularly applicable 
to PINS cases. For example, if a child is accused of leading an immoral life, the 
right to notice of the "charges," as a means of preparing a proper defense, is of ques-
tionable value, since the finder of fact has virtually unfettered discretion to determine 
what conduct constitutes violation of the statute. This statutory vagueness may ac-
count in part for the overwhelming number of PINS admissions of guilt even in juris-
dictions granting PINS the same procedural due process rights as delinquents. See 
note 160 infra and accompanying text. 
It is difficult for appellate courts to limit the applicability of vague PINS statutes 
by reversals in individual cases, because the variety of misbehavior arguably falling 
within the scope of the statute is almost infinite. Indeed, in Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 
F. Supp. 371, (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (three-judge court), affd. mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972), 
which held New York's criminal "Wayward Minor" statute unconstitutionally vague, 
the court specifically noted that, since state court reversals "illustrate only a scant 
number of instances in which the [state] Court of Appeals believed the facts estab-
lished the juveniles were not included in the universe of 'morally depraved' children, 
they do not appreciably diminish the vagueness of the class of remaining cases that 
are included." (emphasis in original). 336 F. Supp. at 374 n.4. 
128. See Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971) (three-judge 
court), vacated, 416 U.S. 918 (1974); In re Brinkley, No. J. 1365-73 (D.C. Super. 
Ct., June 14, 1973), revd. sub nom. District of Columbia v. B.J.R., 332 A.2d 58 
(D.C. App.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975); In re Doe, 54 Hawaii 647, 513 
P.2d 1385 (1973) (curfew ordinance invalidated). Cf. State v. Hodges, 254 Ore. 21, 
457 P.2d 491 (1969) (criminal statutory-prohibition against contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor unconstitutionally vague as an improper delegation of legislative 
authority); In re Oman, 254 Ore. 59, 457 P.2d 496 (1969) (applying Hodges deci-
sion in a delinquency proceeding); State v. Flinn, 208 S.E.2d 538, 549 (W. Va. 1974) 
(portions of PINS statute unconstitutionally vague in the context of a criminal prose-
cution for contributing to the delinquency of a minor). See .also Alsager v. District 
Court, 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (finding the provisions of an Iowa parent-
child termination statute unconstitutional on vagueness, substantive and procedural 
due process grounds). 
129. See, e.g., bz re Napier, 532 P.2d 423 (Okla. 1975); Blondheim v. State, 84 
Wash. 2d 874, 529 P.2d 1096 (1975); In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 
432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, 
270 N.E.2d 389 (1971); E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), 
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970); Sheehan v. Scott, 520 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1975) 
(affirming dismissal of action challenging constitutionality of subsection of Illinois 
PINS statute dealing with habitual truancy; rejecting claims of vagueness, over-
breadth, and invasion of privacy, the court concluded that no substantial constitutional 
question was raised); cf. Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 
(M.D. Pa. 1975) (holding that, with the exception of a few words and phrases, ju-
venile curfew ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague; court also rejected first 
amendment, equal protection, and substantive due process arguments). In response 
to E.S.G. v. State and the dissenting opinion therein of Justice Cadena, 447 S.W.2d 
225, 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969), the Texas legislature enacted a highly specific PINS 
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the Supreme Court has thus far declined to decide the issue.130 
By far the most successful challenges in the PINS area have been 
rearguard attacks on institutional placements in individual cases,131 
and federal court class actions to compel adequate treatment and to 
prohibit inhumane punishments and conditions in the institutions 
statute. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03(b) (Supp. 1975), amending, True. FAM. 
CODE .ANN. § 51.03(b) (1973); see Dawson, Delinquent Children and Children in 
Need of Supervision: Draftsman's Comments to Title 3 of the Texas Family Code, 
5 TEXAS TEcH. L. REV. 509, 519 (1974). Thus, even if accepted, arguments based 
on vagueness and overbreadth would not result in the demise of the PINS jurisdiction, 
since such statutory infirmities are curable. 
130. In In re Negron, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972), the Supreme Court dismissed for 
want of a substantial federal question an appeal that challenged the New York PINS 
statute on a number of grounds, including vagueness. Thereafter, the Second Circuit 
held that this summary disposition constituted a decision on the merits of the vague-
ness issue and that it was binding on lower federal courts. See Mercado v. Rocke-
feller, 502 F.2d 666, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, sub nom. Mercado v. Carey, 
420 U.S. 925 (1975). As noted by the Second Circuit, however, the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that summary affirrnances, and presumably other summary disposi-
tions, " 'are not of the same precedental value as would be an opinion of this Court 
treating the question on the merits.' " 502 F.2d at 673, quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). But see McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commn., 
44 U.S.L.W. 3530 (U.S. March 22, 1976) (percuriam) (No. 75-783). 
Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424, (N.D. Cal., Feb. 9, 1971) (three-judge court) 
held void for vagueness and permanently enjoined enforcement of that portion of the 
California PINS statute directed at children "who from any cause • . . [are] in 
danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life." The suit was a class ac-
tion brought by nine children who were arrested pursuant to the above provision and 
against whom charges were dropped prior to the district court's decision. An appeal 
to the Supreme Court was docketed on April 9, 1971, 39 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S.) (No. 
70-120). Three years later, in Mailliard v. Gonzalez, 416 U.S. 918 (1974), the 
Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the case "for reconsideration of the 
injunction in light of" Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), and Zwickler v. 
Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), thus raising the questions of whether injunctive relief 
was improvidently granted and whether the case was moot. 
In State v. Mattiello, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507, appeal denied, 154 Conn. 
737, 225 A.2d 201 (1966), the Connecticut court rejected a vagueness challenge to 
that state's PINS statute. After noting probable jurisdiction, 391 U.S. 963 (1968), 
the Supreme Court subsequently dismissed for want of a properly presented federal 
question, presumably because there was an unappealed concurrent sentence under an 
analogous criminal statute, Mattiello v. State, 395 U.S. 209 (1969). 
The New York Wayward Minor Act was declared unconstitutional on vagueness 
and eighth amendment grounds by a three-judge district court in Gesicki v. Oswald, 
336 F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The decision was affirmed summarily by the 
Supreme Court, 406 U.S. 913 (1972). Because the statute was part of the state's 
criminal law dealing with older adolescents and permitted incarceration in adult cor-
rectional facilities, the decision has limited precedental value for PINS cases. 
131. See, e.g., People v. Grieve, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1078, 267 N.E.2d 19 (1971); 
In re John H., 48 App. Div. 2d 879, 880, 369 N.Y.S.2d 196, 198 (2d Dept. 1975) 
(per curiam) (reversing disposition because "placement in a State Training School 
is a drastic course of action that should, where there are suitable options, only be 
used as a last resort"); In re Jeanette M., 40 App. Div. 2d 977, 338 N.Y.S.2d 177 
(2d Dept. 1972) (per curiam); In re Stanley M., 39 App. Div. 2d 746, 332 N.Y.S.2d 
125 (2d Dept. 1972) (per curiam); In re Jeanette P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 662, 
310 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (2d Dept. 1970) (per curiam) (reversing training school 
placement where "the record contains positive evidence that [such] placement • . • 
would be harmful"). 
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themselves.132 Some state legislatures have also initiated reforms in 
the dispositional area by prohibiting the institutionalization of PINS 
altogether, 133 or by barring their placement in secure facilities or in 
facilities that house delinquents.134 
132. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 
(1974) (class action brought on behalf of boys aged 12-18 committed to the Indiana 
training school, one third of whom were PINS; court prohibited unsupervised, routine 
beating with thick paddles and the intramuscular administration of tranquilizers un-
less such tranquilizers specifically authorized by a physician; it also ruled that the 
juveniles had a right to individualized care and rehabilitative treatment); Morales v. 
Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973), 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), 
revd. on other grounds, Civil No. 74-3436 (5th Cir., July 21, 1976) (class ac-
tion brought on behalf of all juvenile delinquents, including PINS, incarcerated 
in the Texas training schools; the court found, inter alia, that the following prac-
tices were in use: persistent and sometimes bizarre physical abuse of juveniles by 
correctional officers, use of tear gas, extended solitary confinement for trivial of-
fenses, racial segregation, punishment for speaking Spanish, censorship of mail, pun-
ishment of children who fell asleep during the day even if they were taking sleep-
inducing medication, and severe limitations on family visitation; the judge enjoined 
or restricted the above practices, ordered the closing of two facilities, and directed 
that a treatment program for all children be established); Inmates of Boys' Training 
School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972) (class action brought on behalf 
of boys incarcerated in the Rhode Island training school as a result of "voluntary" 
commitment by parents, detention pending trial, or adjudication as a delinquent, 
PINS, dependent or neglected child; court found these children were subjected to pro-
longed isolation in cold, dark cells, transfers to adult prison, lack of proper medical 
care, education for only one and a half hours per day, and deprivation of food for a 
16-hour period each day); Lollis v. New York State Dept. of Social Services, 322 
F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (action to enjoin 
prolonged isolation of children, including PINS, committed to the New York training 
school). 
133. See ALAS. STAT. § 47.10.080(j) (1975), as interpreted in In re E.M.D., 
490 P.2d 658 (Alas. 1971). But see L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alas. 1976) 
(PINS child who violates court orders by repeatedly running away may be found 
guilty of criminal contempt and institutionalized in a secure facility which also 
houses less violent delinquents). 
134. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-2(1)(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); MASS. 
ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 39G (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-31 (D) (Supp. 1973); 
S.D. COMP. LAWS § 26-8-40.1 {Supp. 1974). 
See In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973) 
(prohibiting commitment of PINS children together with delinquents); In re Lavette 
M., 35 N.Y.2d 136, 316 N.E.2d 314, 359 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1974) (allowing placement 
of PINS children in state training school in which no delinquents were housed). 
Following the decision in In re Lavette M., a federal court class action was brought 
challenging the use of state training schools for PINS, contending that such place-
ments violate the eighth amendment, the equal protection clause, the rights of travel 
and association, and the right to treatment. See McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 
757 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing district court's abstention ruling, remanding for 
determination of the right to treatment issue, and finding plaintiffs' other constitu-
tional claims too insubstantial to warrant convening of three-judge district court). 
A recent study indicates that administrative officials have subverted the legislative 
distinction between PINS and delinquents and that, notwithstanding the establish-
ment of separate training schools for PINS children in New York, there has been 
no substantial improvement in their care and treatment, which differ little from that 
given delinquents. "[f]he newly reorganized training schools are separate but equal 
in all significant respects." INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE ELLERY C. 
DECISION: A CASE STUDY OF JUDICIAL REGULATION OF JUVENILE STATUS OFFEND-
ERS 42-47, 52-62 (1975). 
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Despite these procedural and dispositional reforms, many critics 
continue to question the wisdom of maintaining juvenile court juris-
diction over PINS cases.135 In their view, a court's PINS jurisdiction 
is both a vehicle for parents to coerce their children into adopting 
rigid codes of behavior and a dumping ground for the children of 
neglectful or unstable parents who wish to divest themselves of custo-
dial responsibility .136 Another criticism is that the court offers the 
illusion of assistance to indigent parents who cannot afford private 
schooling or psychiatric treatment for their problem children, but in 
reality provides junior jails and a paucity of other "resources."137 By 
stigmatizing these children as being "in need of supervision" and by 
institutionalizing them, the court reinforces a child's negative self-
image and may convert a rebellious adolescent, who could conceivably 
The Texas Family Code, effective September 1, 1973, arguably prohibited abso-
lutely the placement of truant and runaway PINS in state training schools. See TEX, 
FAM. CoDE ANN. §§ 51.03(a)(2), 51.03(b)(4), 54.05(g) (1973). Compare Daw-
son, supra note 129, at 517-20 (concluding that runaway and truant PINS could be 
placed at the state training school if such an adjudicated PINS child had violated 
probation for the third time) with Steele, The Treatment of Juveniles Under the 
Family Code: An Overview, 5 TEXAS TECH. L. R.Ev. 589, 590 (1974) (concluding 
that "[a] child can never be committed because of truancy or runaway"). 
By amendments effective September 1, 1975, however, Texas law permits place-
ment of truant and runaway PINS who subsequently violate court orders in desig-
nated state training schools that may not house delinquents. All other adjudicated 
PINS children (i.e., those who commit minor misdemeanors or who drive while intox-
icated) who subsequently violate probation may be committed to training schools to-
gether with delinquents. True. FAM. Com, ANN. §§ 51.03(a)(2), 51.03(b)(4) (Supp. 
1975), TEX. CIV. STAT. art. 5143d, § 12(b) (Supp. 1975). 
135. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 25-27; WHITE HOUSE CON• 
FERENCE ON CHrr.DREN, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 381-82 (1970); Bazelon, Beyond 
Control of the Juvenile Court, 21 Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 42 (1970); McNulty, The Right 
To Be Left Alone, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 141, 149-50 (1972); Stiller & Elder, PINS 
-A Concept in Need of Supervision, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 33, 59-60 (1974); YALE 
PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1405-07; E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 127-29; BOARD 
OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, Jurisdiction O1•cr 
Status Offenses Should Be Removed from the Juvenile Court, 21 CRIME & DELINQ, 
97 (1975); N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1975, Editorial, at 32, col. 2 (late city ed.). 
Most recently, the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, chaired by Chief Judge Ir-
ving Kaufman of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and co-
sponsored by the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Associa-
tion, has recommended, inter alia, that the PINS jurisdiction be abolished. This rec• 
ommendation will be submitted for adoption at the American Bar Association con-
vention in the summer of 1976. Inasmuch as this proposal is the outgrowth of a 
comprehensive five-year study of juvenile law by a highly prestigious body, there may 
be a greater possibility that it will influence state legislatures. See Kaufman, Of 
Juvenile Justice and Injustice, 66 A.B.A.J. 730, 731, 733 (1976); N.Y.L.J., Dec. 
1, 1975, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (late city ed.). 
136. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 27; E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 
128; Bazelon, supra note 135, at 43. 
137. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1399-1401; BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, supra note 135; cases cited in note 
132 supra. 
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outgrow the tendency toward misbehavior, into a young criminal.138 
To the extent that PINS children are either delinquent or neglected, 
they should be so treated by the court; attempting to classify other 
children as PINS and to provide services for them squanders the 
court's limited resources, which should be conserved for those who 
truly require judicial intervention.139 On the basis of such reasoning, 
commentators have suggested either partial or complete elimination 
of juvenile court jurisdiction over status offenses.140 
In the face of these repeated criticisms, the PINS jurisdiction 
survives in every state and in the District of Columbia. Although 
they are not always fully articulated, the reasons given for retention of 
the PINS jurisdiction are several: PINS behavior is an accurate basis 
for predicting delinquent conduct, and court jurisdiction allows timely 
action that may prevent future criminal acts;141 while many PINS 
children may in fact be neglected, proof is difficult to secure, and a 
PINS finding is an alternative means of enabling the court to help the 
child;142 at least some PINS children engage in life-threatening behav-
ior, making rapid judicial intervention imperative;143 the court should 
be available as a means of reinforcing parental authority and as a last 
resort when parent-child conflicts become irreconcilable, for even the 
child's mere awareness of the court's existence may prevent more 
serious overt misconduct.144 Finally, even those who acknowledge 
138. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26; YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 
33, at 1401; Bazelon, supra note 135, at 43 (1970); Gough, The Beyond-Control 
Child and the Right to Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. 
Loms U. L.J. 182, 191 (1971); cf. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 590-93 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
139. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1391-94; Stiller & Elder, supra note 
135, at 59-60. 
140. Compare TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26-27 (suggesting that, if 
retained, the PINS jurisdiction be limited to misconduct which "carries a real risk 
of long-term harm to the child"), with YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1406-
07 (advocating elimination of ungovemability jurisdiction, since "the failure to save 
a few unfortunate youths must be measured against the law's known and unavoidable 
negative consequences"). See also Dembitz, Ferment and Experiment in New York: 
Juvenile Cases in the New Family Court, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 508 (1963) (dis-
cussing the possibility of substituting a "no-fault" custody proceeding in place of 
PINS and delinquency actions). 
141. See S.S. v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 570 (Me. 1973); cf. Sheridan, Juveniles Who 
Commit Noncriminal Acts: Why Treat in a Correctional System?, 31 FED. PROBA-
TION 26, 30 (1967); but see E. ScHUR, ·RADICAL NoN-lNTERVENTION 46, 50, 51 
(1973). 
142. Cf. YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1392-93. 
143. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26-27; cf. Martin & Snyder, Jurisdic-
tion over Status Offenses Should Not Be Removed from the Juvenile Court, 22 
CRIME & DELINQ. 44 (1976). 
144. See District of Columbia v. BJ.R., 332 A.2d 58, 61, 62 (D.C. App. 1975); 
Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,-, 270 N.E.2d 389, 394 (1971); but see 
Bazelon, supra note 135, at 44. 
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systemic deficiencies claim that they can be remedied by an infusion 
of resources.145 
Judicial reluctance to sustain constitutional attacks on PINS stat-
utes and legislative disinclination to repeal such laws may well stem 
from a lack of awareness of the nature of PINS cases that make up 
the bulk of juvenile court dockets. The overwhelming number of 
guilty pleas or admissions to PINS charges and the dearth of appeals 
based on fully developed records effectively obscure the inherent 
deficiencies of the PINS jurisdiction.146 Since so few PINS cases are 
appealed, appellate courts may consider obvious injustices to be 
aberrations that can be easily remedied by individual reversals, 147 and 
may thus believe that drastic institutional reform through constitu-
tional invalidation of PINS statutes is unnecessary.148 Only by the 
emergence of an adversary system149 in which charges are closely 
scrutinized, facts vigorously contested, all available defenses asserted, 
and appeals taken in large numbers, can appellate courts and legisla-
tures be fully apprised of the endemic ills of the PINS jurisdiction.160 
145. See S.S. v. State, 299 A.2d 560, 570 (Me. 1973) ("We think no reasonable 
man would shoot a sound horse because his saddle stirrup needs repairs"); YALE 
PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1402 n.117. 
· 146. "By and large, the juvenile court system has operated without appellate sur-
veillance." TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 8, at 40. The paucity of appeals stems 
from the infrequency of contested PINS cases at the trial level. See YALE PINS 
STul>Y, supra note 33, at 1394 n.80; Stiller & Elder, supra note 135, at 39 n.35. 
147. See, e.g., Sorrels v. Steele, 506 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1973). In reversing an adju-
dication against a 14-year-old girl based on her having stayed out all night and hav-
ing had unlawful sexual intercourse, the court noted that the trial judge, inter alia, 
refused to give notice of the charges, permitted wholesale introduction of hearsay evi-
dence, and refused to appoint appellate counsel to represent the child. The appellate 
court observed: "Neither the record, nor the response filed by the [trial] court re-
flects any logical basis for the orders entered." 506 P.2d at 945. 
148. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). In rejecting appel-
lants' argument that jury trials were necessary to prevent prejudgment by juvenile 
court judges, the court said that such a contention ignored "every aspect of fairness, 
of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system con-
templates." 403 U.S. at 550. 
149. See In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Iowa 1972) (court noted dis-
approvingly that the child's attorney had joined in the state's brief instead of filing 
a separate independent brief on behalf of his client). See also Sorrels v. Steele, 506 
P.2d 942, 945 (Okla. 1973) (child's attorney prosecuted an appeal although not ap-
pointed by the trial court, and the appellate court stated that "[c]ounsel for appel-
lant is to be commended for his effort and persistence in pursuing justice in the best 
tradition of his profession"). Cf. Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220 (Alas. 
1975) (in mandamus action by child's attorney, court ruled that where interests of 
parent and juvenile in PINS case are adverse, child's right to attorney of her own 
choice rather than lawyer designated by her parents should have been respected). 
150. See generally A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JusncE (1967), discussing the "twi-
light of the adversary system" in adult criminal courts, id. at 26-31, and pointing out 
the manner in which the "ameliorative-therapeutic" techniques of the "socialized" ju-
venile courts have been appropriated by the criminal courts to induce guilty pleas, 
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IV. VALUE OF AN .ADJUDICATORY HEARING 
IN PINS CASES 
1131 
The potential of the adjudicatory hearing for combatting the 
abuses of the PINS jurisdiction has not yet been fully realized. 
Although there has been a systematic development of legal defenses 
for the adjudicatory phase of delinquency cases, there has been no 
comparable growth in the context of PINS proceedings. There are 
several related reasons for this disparity. 
First, because delinquency actions are based on penal law viola-
tions, 101 attorneys naturally perceived delinquency cases as junior 
criminal trials. Consequently, they readily applied the traditional 
defenses and procedural protections of adult criminal trials to juvenile 
court delinquency proceedings.152 In contrast, the allegations in 
most PINS cases concern intra-family and school conflicts that have 
no apparent relationshlp to the criminal law.153 Furthermore, there 
id. at 170-79, so that "much of the system's potential danger is hidden by secret nego-
tiations." Id. at 179. 
151. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text, illustrating how some delin-
quency statutes include noncriminal acts within their definitions, and some PINS 
statutory definitions include criminal acts. 
152. See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 370 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1967) (corrobo-
ration of extrajudicial confession); Smith v. State, 525 P.2d 1251 (Okla. 1974) (cor-
roboration of accomplice testimony); In re Roderick P., 7 Cal. 3d 801, 810-11, 500 
P.2d 1, 7, 103 Cal. Rptr. 425, 430-31 (1972) (Miranda rule); In re LB., 99 N.J. 
Super. 589, 596, 240 A.2d 709, 713 (Union County Ct. 1968) (search and seizure); 
In re Holley, 107 R.I. 615, 268 A.2d 723 (1970) (Wade-Gilbert lineup :rµle). 
153. Typical PINS charges such as truancy, incorrigibility, and running away 
from home have no criminal-law counterparts. Thus, it may be contended that tra-
ditional defenses and due process guarantees available in criminal cases (e.g., exclu-
sion of illegally obtained evidence or confessions, duress, self-defense) are inappli-
cable in PINS proceedings. There are, however, situations where such defenses can 
and should be used. For instance, if a girl runs away from home because she has 
been raped by her step-father, see, e.g., E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 12, even though 
he is not subject to criminal prosecution or conviction because there is a stringent 
corroboration requirement for rape in the particular jurisdiction, she should be able 
to assert self-defense or necessity as defenses to PINS charges. In states which clas-
sify runaways as PINS only when they have left home "without just cause," e.g., 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53(b) (Supp. 1975), the defense is statutory; but even 
in jurisdictions whose PINS statutes contain no such qualification with respect to run-
ning away from home, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-5(g) (Cum. Supp. 1975); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 62.040-l(b)(3) (1973), the rape should be available as a traditional 
criminal-law defense or as a basis for asserting that the child is neglected rather than 
a PINS. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-5(h), (i) (Cum. Supp. 1975); Nev. 
Rev. Stat.§§ 62.040-l(a)(2), (3) (1973). See text at notes 256-83 infra concerning 
the defense of "contributory neglect." 
Similarly, other situations may call for assertion of criminal law defenses. See, 
e.g., In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 281, 285, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588, 591 
(1972) (child alleged that he "acted involuntarily in self-defense" when his mother 
pulled his hair); In re D.L.S., 520 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (revoca-
tion of probation proceeding in which child asserted defense of duress against charge 
of running away from home; court assumed arguendo that the defense was available, 
but found it unsupported by the evidence). 
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is no obvious analogue in matters of civil law that could be easily 
adapted to provide defenses in ungovemability proceedings.11i4 
The criminal law exclusionary rules present special problems in PINS cases. For 
example, if a boy told his mother that he truanted, this "confession" would presum-
ably be admissible in a PINS action, since there is no custodial interrogation by an 
agent of the state. Cf. In re B.D.A., 524 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (reject-
ing juvenile's claim that confession of car theft to mother was inadmissible in delin-
quency proceeding). An argument could be made, however, that parental testimony 
disclosing the child's confidences should be excluded because it contravenes the pur-
pose of the juvenile code, which is "to preserve and strengthen the minor's family 
ties whenever possible." CAL. WELP. & JNSTNS. CODE§ 502 (West Supp. 1976). 
If the Gault decision applies in PINS cases, see note 118 s11pra, a similar admis-
sion made to a police officer who has taken the child into custody would be excluded 
if obtained without the appropriate Miranda warnings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 42-
57 (1967). Because Gault stressed the difficulties involved in obtaining waivers of 
the privilege against self-incrimination from children and focused on the "presence 
and competence of parents" as a factor in determining the validity of the waiver, 387 
U.S. at 55-56, some states in delinquency cases have required that both parent and 
child be advised of the child's right and consent to the waiver. See, e.g., In re Aaron 
D., 30 App. Div. 2d 183, 185, 290 N.Y.S.2d 935, 937 (1st Dept. 1968). In the typi-
cal PINS case, where the interests of parent and child are adverse, such parental con-
sent is not helpful in determining the validity of the waiver. Therefore, in such 
cases, the presence of the child's attorney appears to be necessary to assure the vol-
untariness of the waiver. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1967); see also 111 
re F.G., 511 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (construing statute, that was also 
applicable in PINS cases, so as to require concurrence of child's attorney in waiver 
of privilege against self-incrimination in delinquency proceeding; statute subsequently 
amended to eliminate this requirement, see TE.x. FAM. CooE ANN. § 51.09 (Supp. 
1975) ). 
Similar problems arise with respect to exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. 
See, e.g., Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (holding 
search and seizure in delinquency case by school principal acting in loco parentis was 
not within the protection of the fourth amendment; "[t]he same procedure employed 
by the principal, if used by the boy's father, would not violate security of appellant 
under the Fourth Amendment"); In re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); In re J.M.A., 542 P.2d 170 (Alas. 1975) (in delinquency 
case, foster parent held not agent of the state for fourth amendment purposes), 
154. While a superficial analogy may be drawn between PINS cases and custody 
matters, since each is concerned with placement of the child, the differences between 
the two are substantial. In the latter case, two or more parties, who are usually rela-
tives of the child, vie for his or her physical custody. In many PINS proceedings, 
petitioning parents or guardians are seeking to divest themselves of custodial duties, 
and the end result may be either institutionalization or placement of the child with 
strangers. Furthermore, in PINS cases jurisdiction is based on misconduct of the 
child, while in custody actions the focus of inquiry shifts to the relative suitability 
of opposing adults to care for the child. While parental misconduct may be relevant 
in both custody and PINS proceedings, it does not always constitute a defense to 
PINS charges, see text at notes 256-83 infra, and is only one facet of PINS law, 
whereas there are many points of congruence between criminal and delinquency law. 
Moreover, in custody actions, great weight is often given to the preferences of teen-
age children concerning the party with whom they wish to reside. See, e.g., 111 re 
Ross, 29 Ill. App. 3d 157, 170, 329 N.E.2d 333, 342-43 (1975). But in PINS cases, 
most of which involve midadolescents, see, e.g., YALE PINS STUDY, s11pra note 33, 
at 1386-87, the child's preference not to be placed outside the home is given little 
weight in the dispositional determination. 
Confusion about the similarities between PINS and custody actions may be fos-
tered by the fact that some PINS charges are brought by parents or other relatives 
as an expeditious means of securing custody of their child or of divesting other per-
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A second reason for the failure to develop PINS defenses is that 
attorneys are relative newcomers to the juvenile court. Only after the 
Gault decision in 1967 was there a massive infusion of attorneys into 
juvenile courts, 155 which had formerly been the virtually exclusive 
domain of judges and probation officers.156 Upon entering this new 
forum, attorneys were confronted by both customary and statutory 
decrees that the "best interests of the child" doctrine was to govern 
the mode of legal representation.157 As a result, some abdicated their 
traditional adversarial role and deferred to the recommendations of 
psychiatrists, social workers and probation officers.158 Attorneys 
sons of custodial rights; such actions are an obvious perversion of the PINS proceed-
ing. See In re Morris W., 79 Misc. 2d 567, 360 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Fam. Ct. 1974) (dis-
missing PINS petition brought by maternal great-grandmother alleging child left her 
home to live with his mother); cf. People v. Grieve, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1078, 267 
N.E.2d 19 (1971). 
155. A few jurisdictions provided the right to counsel for children in juvenile 
court prior to Gault. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 37 n.63, 38-41 (1967); N.Y. FAM-
ILY Cr. Acr §§ 241, 741(a) (McKinney 1975). 
156. See, e.g., L FORER, "No ONE WILL LISSEN" 11, 32-35 (1970); TASK FORCE 
REPORT, supra note 8, at 5, 6; Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, 
and Individualized Justice, 19 HARv. L. REV. 775, 796-99 (1966). 
In Gault, Justice Fortas observed that neither the probation officer nor the judge 
could act as counsel for or otherwise represent the child. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 
35-36 (1967). But cf. In re Anonymous, 110 Ariz. 98, 515 P.2d 600 (1973), appeal 
dismissed, 417 U.S. 939 (1974), holding that the trial judge's supervision of juvenile 
court staff did not prevent the judge from being an impartial trier of fact. 110 Ariz. 
at 100-02, 515 P.2d at 602-04. In dissenting from dismissal of the appeal, Justice 
Douglas asserted that "appellant was denied the right to jury trial and forced to trial 
before a judge with the duty of supervising the prosecutorial staff solely because he 
is a juvenile. . . • I can find no justification for this discrimination ..•. " 417 
U.S. at 941. See also In re G.K., 497 P.2d 914 (Alas. 1972) (holding that children 
were entitled to request disqualification of juvenile court judge on the ground of 
bias). 
157. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 13, § 351 (1959) ("The juvenile court shall have 
power . . . to make and enter such judgment and orders • • . as, in the judgment 
of the court will properly conserve and protect the welfare and best interests of such 
child"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-69(b) (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-286 
(Cum. Supp. 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-100(17) (1974); Sorrels v. Steele, 
506 P.2d 942, 944 (Okla. 1973) (appellate court in reversing adjudication quoted trial 
judge's statement that, "In a Juvenile Hearing we are all interested only in the welfare 
of the child, and the rules of evidence are somewhat relaxed"). See also In re Win-
ship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970) (rejecting, as a basis for depriving an alleged delin-
quent of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the New York Court of 
Appeals' view that "a child's best interest is not necessarily or even probably, pro-
moted if he wins in the particular inquiry which may bring him to the juvenile 
court"). Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILD 53-64 (1973), suggesting that, by the time a child's case finally reaches 
the juvenile court, it is impossible to act in his or her "best interests," and that the 
most the court can do is provide the least detrimental alternative. 
158. See A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS 163-75 (1969); Fox, supra note 126, at 
1237 ("There are, of course, institutional pressures on the lawyer to cooperate with 
court officials-to follow their views on what sorts of cases need to be tried and what 
rights to be asserted"). 
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whose concept of advocacy has been shaped by the "best interests" 
doctrine are unlikely to assert defenses that may result in a disposition 
contrary to the recommendations of "expert" court staff. Other 
lawyers, well aware that their clients are minors, substitute their own 
judgments as to what is best for the children.159 On yet another level 
are attorneys who actually identify with the complaining parents and 
in effect adopt their cause. In all these situations, the prospect for 
the assertion of defenses in a forceful and creative manner is bleak. 
A third reason for the dearth of acknowledged defenses in PINS 
proceedings is that in the vast majority of these cases there is no 
adjudicatory hearing.160 Instead, the child pleads guilty, in effect, by 
admitting the factual allegations of the petition or complaint, thus 
dispensing with the opportunity to raise legal defenses to the 
charges.161 After the child makes an admission, the court proceeds 
to the dispositional stage, which focuses on the appropriate treatment 
for the juvenile. Although relevant at the dispositional hearing, 
evidence relating to a defense such as parental provocation or miscon-
duct will generally affect the minor's placement rather than his or her 
status as an incorrigible.162 
159. See A. PI.Arr, supra note 158, at 167. 
160. See Stiller & Elder, supra note 135, at 39 n.35; Comment, In Re Gault: 
Children Are People, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1204, 1210 (1967); YALE PINS STUDY, supra 
note 33, at 1389 n.50, 1394 n.80 (even in New York, which has provided right to 
counsel since 1962, a random sampling of PINS cases in two counties showed full 
or partial admissions to the allegations in 100 per cent of the cases in one county 
and in 94 per cent of the cases in the other). 
161. See notes 39, 43-50 supra and accompanying text. In those jurisdictions re-
quiring a separate finding that the child is in need of care or treatment as an incorri-
gible, it is arguable that evidence establishing a defense would be admissible to prove 
that no such need existed and thus would defeat the juvenile's adjudication or dispo-
sition as a PINS. But see In re O.H., 512 S.W.2d 424 (Mo. App. 1974), a proceed-
ing alleging both PINS and delinquent conduct, based on the child's escape from the 
custody of juvenile officers. The court held that the boy's flight was sufficient to 
establish conduct "injurious to his welfare," and gave the court authority to proceed 
to disposition, noting that "[a] specific finding that the child is in need of care and 
treatment is unnecessary if the operative facts of injurious conduct are found." 512 
S.W.2d at 427. Cf. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974) (holding that 
under Federal Youth Corrections Act, in order to treat defendant as an adult, the 
district court is required to make an explicit finding that the youth will not benefit 
from treatment afforded under the Act, but is not required to give reasons for its 
finding). 
162. In Oklahoma, for example, there is explicit statutory recognition that a child 
who is the victim of parental misconduct may nonetheless be adjudicated a PINS. 
Thus, in entering a dispositional order placing the child in his or her home, "if it 
appears to the court that the conduct of such parent or guardian has contributed to 
such delinquency, or need of supervision, or dependency or neglect, the court may 
issue a written order specifying conduct to be followed by such parent or guardian 
with respect to such child." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1116(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 
1975). See also In re S.M.G., 291 S.2d 43 (Fla. App. 1974), in which, as part of 
an order of disposition against a delinquent girl, the court ordered her mother to par-
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There are several explanations for the omission of fact-finding 
hearings in an overwhelming percentage of PINS cases. One may 
reasonably infer from the numerous admissions in PINS cases that 
most of the children involved tell their attorneys that all or part of the 
charges against them are true.163 This fact, taken in conjunction 
with the pervasive influence of the "best interests" doctrine, leads 
some attorneys to feel ethically foreclosed from pursuing an adjudica-
ticipate in the daughter's drug rehabilitation program. When the mother refused to 
do so, she was adjudged in contempt of court. In reversing on the ground that there 
was no jurisdiction to enter such an order, the appellate court observed, "[I]bere 
are, as all know, bard core cases attended by recalcitrant or unfit parents, and there 
are those cases unfortunately for which there is no solution. In these latter cases 
even the possession of the statutory power over such parents would probably be self-
defeating and lead only to frustration and increase in the jail population." 291 S.2d 
at 44. The Florida law has since been amended to authorize court orders directing 
parents to participate in such family counseling programs. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11 
(8) (Cum. Ann. Supp. 1975), amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.11 (1961). 
It should also be noted that, in a PINS case, entry of a guilty plea or admission 
of the allegations may arguably be a bar to subsequent assertion of innocence based 
on affirmative defenses, since, at least in the criminal law context, an otherwise valid 
guilty plea, accompanied by evidence of the defendant's guilt, permits the court to 
impose sentence notwithstanding the defendant's claim of innocence. North Carolina 
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). A guilty plea in a criminal case also waives all ante-
cedent constitutional defects of a nonjurisdictional nature. Compare McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (if otherwise valid guilty plea, defendant waives 
right to assert that such plea was induced by a coerced confession), with Blackledge 
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (guilty plea does not waive due process claim that state 
bad no power to charge defendant at all on the particular offense, since defendant 
had been convicted of misdemeanor assault and when be appealed, the state charged 
him with felony assault based on the same act). Waiver by guilty plea in a criminal 
court has likewise been applied so as to bar a claim that a juvenile hearing resulting 
in transfer to the adult court did not comport with due process. See Harris v. Pro-
cunier, 498 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 970 (1974). Where, however, 
a state statute permits appellate review of constitutional claims after entry of a guilty 
plea, the plea is not a waiver of the right to assert such claims in federal habeas 
corpus proceedings. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). 
Applying the foregoing principles to the PINS context, one court has held that 
an admission does not waive the right to assert the unconstitutionality of the PINS 
statute, since this is a jurisdictional challenge. See Mercado v. Rockefeller, 502 F.2d 
666, 672 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Mercado v. Carey, 420 U.S. 925 
(1975); cf. Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (three-judge 
court), affd. mem., 406 U.S. 913 (1972). Moreover, in those jurisdictions that re-
quire a finding that the PINS child is in need of care and treatment in addition to 
the finding that he or she committed the acts alleged in the petition, it is arguable 
that, even if the juvenile admits the acts, he or she may assert affirmative defenses 
as a means of rebutting the assertion of a need for care and treatment. See note 
39 supra and accompanying text. Cf. Specht v. Patterson, 388 U.S. 605 (1967), 
holding that where conviction of a criminal act triggers commencement of a separate 
commitment procedure, whether labelled criminal or civil, which requires a new find-
ing of fact that defendant is either a threat to the community or a habitual offender, 
such a finding must be made at a due process hearing that includes the rights to coun-
sel and to cross-examination. But see In re O.H., 512 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Mo. App. 
1974), discussed in note 161 supra. 
163. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 33; cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILI1Y DR 7-102(A) (7), prohibits an attorney from assisting his client "in 
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent." 
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tory hearing because -it may result in a dismissal of the charges, a 
development that will supposedly foster in the children a belief that 
they can "beat the rap" and successfully thwart parental discipline.104 
Indeed, a child's lawyer may think that the decision of the office of 
probation not to adjust the case during the intake procedure indicates 
that experts have determined the complaint to be meritorious and the 
child to be in need of the court's help. 
Moreover, many PINS children come from low socioeconomic 
groups and do not relate well to middle-class attorneys.10G They may 
also be non-English speaking100 or inarticulate,167 reticent about 
airing family problems with a stranger, 168 or brain-damaged, retarded 
or mentally disturbed.169 When dealing with such children, attorneys 
164. See A. PLATI, supra note 158, at 167; Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, The 
Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 
375, 389-90 (1971). 
165. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 56-57 (1967); TASK 
FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, nt 41-42; L PORER, supra note 156, at 25-26; Fox, supra 
note 126, at 1236. See generally JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, at 
23-24. 
166. See Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166, 172-73 (E.D. Tex. 1973), revd. 
on other grounds, Civil No. 74-3436 (5th Cir., July 21, 1976) (challenging the con• 
ditions at certain juvenile correctional facilities; the court found that inmates' 
conversation in Spanish was discouraged or punished, even though almost a 
quarter of the juveniles were Mexican-American, some of whom could "speak little 
or no English"). See also In re Jose R., 49 App. Div. 2d 869, 376 N.Y.S.2d 906 
(1st Dept. 1975), reversing delinquency disposition on the ground, inter alia, that 
no Spanish interpreter was present at the hearing. 
167. See JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, at 24-25; L. PORER, 
supra note 156, at 36. 
168. For example, a child may be reluctant to tell the attorney that he or she 
stays away from home frequently because one or both parents are alcoholics. 
169. Many states recognize that mentally disturbed and retarded children are sub-
ject to the court's jurisdiction, and have statutory provisions for dealing with them. 
See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CODE § 6550 (West 1972); TEX. FAM, CODE ANN, 
§§ 55.01, 55.02, 55.03 (1975). See In re Kevin M., 44 App. Div. 2d 800, 369 
N.Y.S.2d 439 (1st Dept. 1975) (reversing a delinquency disposition to the state train-
ing school where the trial court refused to authorize neurological examination not-
withstanding mental health reports indicating the need therefor). See also Creek v. 
Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (appeal dismissed as moot, but court deter-
mined that child held in interim detention who requires psychiatric care is entitled 
to receive it). 
There is a conflict in the courts over the availability of the insanity defense in 
juvenile proceedings. Courts rejecting this defense have done so on the ground that 
rehabilitation, rather than punishment, is being provided. Compare In re Winburn, 
32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966) (accepting insanity defense), with In re 
H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. Morris County 1969) 
(rejecting insanity defense as a bar to an adjudication, but holding that it will pre-
clude imposition of penal sanctions). See Popkin and Lippert, ls There a Constitll• 
tional Right to the Insanity Defense in Juvenile Court?, 10 J. FAM. L. 421 (1971 ). 
Some states have enacted statutes specifically authorizing the insanity defense, See, 
e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 55.05(g) (1975). 
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must invest considerable time and patience if they are to elicit factual 
information sufficient for developing available defenses; unfortunately, 
some attorneys may be unable to make the requisite investment. 
Moreover, because they feel that these children will probably be 
disbelieved by the trier of fact, lawyers may also question the advisa-
bility of permitting their clients to testify. Under these circum-
stances, an attorney is likely to consider a fact-finding hearing value-
less. 
Certain perceptions of the parental role in the adjudicatory hear-
ing may also discourage attorneys from presenting vigorous defenses. 
A lawyer may feel that a fact-finding hearing would be futile because 
the types of allegations that form the basis of most PINS petitions are 
generally easy to prove with the testimony of parents or school 
officials.17° Furthermore, some attorneys wish to avoid a courtroom 
confrontation between parent and child because it may permanently 
damage the family relationship.171 From a practical standpoint, the 
child's lawyer fears that such a clash may so anger the parents that 
they will insist upon institutionalization of the minor, a demand that a 
court may feel itself obliged to honor.172 If a parent's desire to keep 
a child away from home will inevitably result in that child's place-
ment, an attorney may be disposed to forgo an adjudicatory hearing 
and contest only the type of facility to which the juvenile will be sent. 
Finally, many attorneys believe that if they bypass a PINS adjudi-
catory hearing, especially where there appears to be sufficient evi-
dence to sustain a finding against the youth, the judge will be more 
likely to render a favorable judgment as to disposition, because the 
child has admitted his or her wrongs and has not wasted the court's 
time. This belief is, in part, a carryover from experience in criminal 
courts, where approximately ninety per cent of all cases are disposed 
of through plea-bargaining.173 
However persuasive these considerations might appear, they do 
not justify a passive role for attorneys representing children in PINS 
proceedings. Thus, an attorney should not forgo a fact-finding 
hearing on the basis of the "best interests" doctrine. It is often 
170. For example, a prima facie case can often be established by use of parental 
testimony concerning the child's disobedience, or testimony of school officials con-
cerning the child's truancy. 
171. Cf. Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, supra note 164, at 390-91. 
172. See YALE PINS Snmv, supra note 33, at 1396. 
173. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 165, at 134-36; D. NEWMAN, CONVICI'ION: THE DETERMINA-
TION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT ThIAL 3 (1966); Alschuler, The Defense At-
torney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE LJ. 1179, 1206-07 n.84, n.85 (1975). 
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impossible for all concerned parties to agree that a particular course 
of action is most appropriate to resolve the complex intra-family 
conflict typically presented in a PINS case.174 In any event, when the 
prosecuting attorney, judge, probation officer and other court person-
nel all purport to act in the "best interests" of the child, defense 
counsel is rendered virtually superfluous if he or she attempts to per-
form under the same, ill-defined standard. The defense attorney's role 
in our legal system is properly that of an advocate, for "an adversary 
presentation counters the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly 
in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known."170 In-
deed, the dominance of the "best interests" doctrine may require 
zealous advocacy to ensure that judicial intervention in a child's life 
has an adequate basis in law and fact, and that it has not been 
triggered merely by generalized complaints, unsupported "expert" 
opinions or vague recommendations.176 
Other factors lead to the conclusion that attorneys must not 
abandon their traditional adversarial role. An attorney cannot, for 
example, assume that the intake procedure has screened out matters 
that do not belong in court, for there is evidence that the intake 
process is not fully effective, especially in PINS cases.177 Further-
more, although zealous advocacy would be appropriate even if states 
offered optimal care for PINS children, it becomes imperative in light 
of indications that the facilities to which the children are relegated 
may be far more destructive than the environments from which they 
came.11s 
174. See, e.g., In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 386, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 
(1st Dept 1970) (in reversing a training school disposition, court observed: "[T]he 
learned Family Court Judge was doing the best that be could for the appellant in 
a well-nigh impossible situation and one with which be never should have been faced. 
Frankly, we also are at a loss ... "). 
175. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIDILI1Y, EC 7-19 (footnote omitted), 
176. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967); Williamson v. State, 242 Ala. 42, 
43, 4 S.2d 734, 735 (1941) (mother charged daughter with using obscene language; 
court noted mother's "testimony indicates there was no foundation whatever for the 
charge"). 
177. See notes 231-36 infra and accompanying text. 
178. See the "right to treatment" cases cited in note 132 supra. There wil1 be 
instances in which the child requests placement because of intolerable home condi-
tions. Where such a desire is expressed, the attorney should explore the possibility 
of placement on the basis of a neglect petition, after making sure that the child is 
not simply expressing a transitory desire or seeking placement in retaliation against 
the parent. Finally, the attorney is obliged to explain to his or her client the realities 
of life at a state institution. See State ex rel. Wilson v. Bambrick, 195 S.E.2d 721 
(W. Va. 1973) (runaway girl given choice of returning home with parents or going 
to state training school, and she chose the latter alternative; subsequent writ of ha-
beas corpus granted because of failure to provide attorney at original proceeding); 
Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1220 (Alas. 1975) (14-year-old girl who left 
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Finally, the seemingly attractive rationale that a child can secure 
institutional benefits by making an admission is simply not supported 
by the facts. Although a defendant in a criminal court may admit 
guilt in return for a reduced sentence, there is no counterpart to this 
plea bargaining in the juvenile court system. In making dispositional 
determinations, the juvenile court judge places primary reliance on 
parental fitness, parental attitudes toward placement, and the proba-
tion recommendations as indicators of the child's best interests. Un-
like the district attorney in criminal court, the probation department 
has no vested interest in rewarding pleas of guilty as a means of 
reducing the number of trials; its recommendation is generally not 
influenced by whether a PINS finding is based on an evidentiary 
hearing or the entry of a plea.179 
Adherence by defense attorneys to a traditional adversary role can 
yield several positive benefits for children brought to court under 
PINS petitions. The most obvious is that vigorous advocacy during 
the fact-finding hearing may reveal defenses or expose defects in what 
might have originally seemed an airtight case against the child. But 
other, more subtle, benefits may also be realized by demands for fact-
finding hearings. Among these advantages are an alteration in the 
parental role in PINS hearings and a change in the kinds of cases that 
occupy juvenile courts. 
The probation intake procedure, with its informality, its pro-
parent orientation and its acquiescence to parental pressure that a 
petition be filed against a child, 180 may lead parents to expect that the 
judicial proceedings will be similarly informal and deferential to their 
preferences regarding the imposition of punishment. The absence of 
a fact-finding hearing reinforces the parents' perception that they are 
in control of the proceeding and their resulting belief that there can 
be no serious consequences without their consent. They may be 
shocked to discover that, once a court has made a finding against a 
child and has received a probation recommendation, the judge, not 
the parents, determines whether the child is merely reprimanded or 
home and sought help of police in obtaining foster placement was made a respondent 
in a PINS action when she refused to remain with her parents); THE PINS CmLn, 
A PLETHORA OF PROBLEMS, supra note 27, at 44 (eight per cent of PINS children 
in survey refused to return home to parents). 
179. In some instances, however, probation officers may consider the child's re-
fusal to admit his or her misconduct to be evidence of the need for a more restrictive 
disposition. This attitude may be a spillover from statutory provisions conditioning 
intake adjustment on an admission by the child. See, e.g., PA. STAT • .ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 50-304(b)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1975). 
180. See YALE PINS SnroY, supra note 33, at 1395. 
r 
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instead placed in the state training school.181 A fact-finding hearing, 
with its attendant formalities of sworn testimony and cross-examina-
tion, immediately puts the parents on notice that the proceedings are 
weighty, and that they lack control over the outcome. Accordingly, 
they may choose not to pursue the matter or, if they persist, to temper 
their accusations. Such circumspect parental behavior may well lead 
to a more favorable disposition for the child. 
Parents may also withdraw PINS charges when faced with the 
prospects of cross-examination, which can result in the exposure of 
their own inadequacies, and presentation of their child's perspective 
of the matters being considered by the court.182 Even if the parents 
do not withdraw the petition, the rules of evidence generally applica-
ble at fact-finding hearings will prevent them from heaping general-
ized abuse on the child. The prevalent relaxation of the rules of 
evidence at the dispositional hearing, however, encourages the receipt 
of such testimony.183 Thus, where there is no fact-finding hearing, a 
181. Reyna v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), is perhaps the ulti-
mate example of a case being taken out of the parent's control. There, a mother 
who thought she was filing a complaint against her daughter's seducer found herself 
the petitioner against the daughter, who was adjudicated a delinquent and committed 
to an institution over the mother's protest; the appellate court reversed. See also B. 
WAXIN, supra note 29, at 48 (father decided to teach his curfew-violating daughter 
a lesson by permitting the police to take her to a detention facility because she was 
"out of parental control." After attempting suicide as a means of securing release 
from the detention center, she was transferred to a mental hospital: "It took the 
girl's father three months to get her out"). 
182. In New York, a majority of parental PINS cases are withdrawn or dismissed 
prior to adjudication. YALE PINS Srul>Y, supra note 33, at 1389 n.47. One reason 
may be that in many instances attorneys for the children are able to persuade parent 
and child to seek help from community agencies rather than to pursue court action. 
Id. at 1399. Activities of this sort, which sometimes include realistic criticisms of 
the quality of the court's resources, may account for one family court judge's order 
prohibiting a child's attorney from interviewing the petitioner in a PINS case. See 
Rapoport v. Berman, N.Y.L.J., July 10, 1975, at 14, col. 8 (temporarily enjoining en• 
forcement of this order). The reason given by the juvenile court judge for his order 
was that PINS proceedings were civil in nature, and that consequently counsel was 
ethically prohibited from interviewing an opposing party. The above decision was re• 
versed on the ground that the controversy was "academic," since the family court 
judge had not issued a formal written order or directed the institution of contempt 
proceedings; the opinion stated, however, that the child's attorney in a PINS proceed-
ing has the right to interview prospective witnesses, including the petitioner, and that 
any alleged ethical improprieties should be referred to the appellate court. Rapoport 
v. Berman, App. Div., 2d Dept., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22, 1975, at 9, col. 2. 
183. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2316(b) (Supp. 1973) ("Evidence which 
is competent, material, and relevant shall be admissible at factfinding hearings, Evi-
dence which is material and relevant shall be admissible at . • . dispositional hear-
ings); ORE REv. STAT. § 419.500(2) (1974) ("For the purpose of determining proper 
disposition of the child, testimony, reports or other material relating to the child's 
mental, physical and social history and prognosis may be received by the court with-
out regard to their competency or relevancy under the rules of evidence"). See also 
PA. STAT • .ANN. tit. 11, 50-316(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (authorizing the court to ex-
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judge's perception of a child's behavior may be based largely on the 
parents' conclusory, exaggerated and self-serving charges. 
A vigorously contested adjudicatory hearing will sometimes 
produce evidence of parental wrongdoing or neglect, which, even if 
not sufficient for a dismissal of the proceeding, may result in a more 
favorable interim or final disposition for the child.184 For example, 
evidence showing that a child runs away from home because of 
arguments between parents may induce a judge to arrange for shelter 
care rather than secure detention, but such evidence is far less likely 
to come to the court's attention in the absence of formal fact-finding. 
A final possibility is that the confrontation between parent and 
child at an adjudicatory hearing can be a therapeutic rather than an 
injurious experience, if it is skillfully guided.185 Where there is a 
severe communication barrier between parent and child, 186 the hear-
ing may be the first opportunity for a focused dialogue before a 
neutral arbiter, with parent and child on a more or less equal foot-
ing.1s1 
elude a delinquent child, which includes PINS, during the dispositional hearing); 
MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-1221(2), (5) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (permitting the 
court to receive "social summaries" during a dispositional hearing, and giving the 
child and parent the right to cross-examine all persons preparing such reports, but 
allowing the court to exclude child and parent from the dispositional hearing); In 
re Sylvia J., 47 App. Div. 2d 905, 369 N.Y.S.2d 998 (2d Dept. 1975) (per curiam) 
(affirming 18-month placement of PINS in training school and finding that trial 
judge did not abuse discretion in denying' child's attorney access to probation report 
and permission to cross-examine probation officer); but see In re Cecilia R., 36 -
N.Y.2d 317, 327 N.E.2d 812, 367 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1975) (reversing placement of 13-
year-old PINS girl at training school on the ground that her absence from the dis-
positional hearing without sufficient cause violated due process). 
184. See, e.g., In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1972). 
185. It is doubtful that the courtroom confrontation between parent and child can 
cause any more harm to their relationship than the injury that has already occurred 
by virtue of the parent's bringing the juvenile to court and charging him or her as 
a PINS. The child plainly knows that but for the parent's charges he or she would 
not stand accused. Eliminating parental testimony against the child at an adjudica-
tory hearing or excusing the child from the courtroom during such testimony by the 
parent may indeed be more detrimental to the child than allowing the juvenile to hear 
the parental accusations, since the allegations imagined by the child may generate 
more anger and be more frightening to the youth than the charges that are actually 
made. 
186. See generally H. GINoTr, BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD 20-21 (1965) ("An 
interested observer who overhears a conversation between a parent and a child will 
note with surprise how little each listens to the other"). 
187. It may be argued that such a role is inappropriate and that it is an intoler-
able demand on the juvenile court judge to combine the functions of psychiatrist, so-
cial worker, and judge. Yet, it is this type of multifaceted person who was originally 
envisioned as appropriate for the position, and who is in effect called for by statutes 
in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 124 (McKinney 1975). To 
the extent that such judges are unavailable, the unique quality of the juvenile court 
is in large part lost, and there is less reason to retain it as a separate entity. 
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An increase in the number of fact-finding hearings in PINS cases 
and the introduction of more extensive factual probing at these 
hearings will necessarily affect the court's workload, which is already 
considered excessive by a number of observers.188 Although this 
increase will initially exacerbate the problem, it may also provide the 
impetus for long range reform, since bursting court dockets may force 
legislative action to curtail the PINS jurisdiction of juvenile courts.180 
At the least, more frequent and more probing hearings will compel 
judges to differentiate between transient, relatively trivial misconduct 
that is symptomatic of adolescence, such as staying out late, and 
serious life-threatening behavior, such as narcotics addiction.100 Thus, 
instead of scattering their resources over a wide spectrum of cases, 
juvenile courts would be constrained to dismiss cases of minor misbe-
havior at the adjudicatory stage, and to focus upon cases involving 
truly disturbed children. Indeed, it is possible that one reason for the 
heavy caseload of juvenile courts is the failure to cull out complaints 
that do not warrant judicial action. As one appellate court has 
observed, "The very presence of . . . [this] case upon the docket of 
the Juvenile Court, suggests some answer as to why those courts, 
nationally, are suffering under almost untriable caseloads . . . . The 
incident which gave rise to this case was, under any interpretation, a 
'schoolboy fight.' "101 
The court's power to dismiss unwarranted PINS petitions is not 
curtailed by a parent's adamant refusal to take his or her child home. 
Such intransigence on the parent's part can, in most jurisdictions, 
form the basis for a neglect petition.192 While it is true that some 
188. See, e.g., L. PORER, supra note 156, at 84-87 (referring to the "five-minute 
assembly-line hearing"); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 7 (citing studies indi-
cating that the average time spent on a juvenile proceeding is 10-15 minutes). 
189. "But it is of great importance to emphasize that a simple infusion of re-
sources into juvenile courts and attendant institutions would by no means fulfill the 
expectations that accompanied the court's birth and development." TASK FORCE RE• 
PORT, supra note 8, at 8. 
190. "[J]uvenile courts retain expansive grounds of jurisdiction authorizing judi-
cial intervention in relatively minor matters of morals and misbehavior, on the 
ground that subsequent delinquent conduct may be indicated, as if there were • • • 
reliable ways of redirecting children's lives." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 
9. 
191. In re Roberts, 13 Md. App. 644, 645, 284 A.2d 621, 622 (1971). Although 
this case involved a delinquency adjudication which was affirmed, and although the 
appellate court remanded only for further dispositional proceedings, the language 
quoted in the text is apposite to PINS cases, particularly in their adjudicatory phase. 
192. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 712A.2(b)(l) (Cum. Supp. 1975) 
(statutory definition of neglect includes refusal to provide the care necessary for the 
child's health, morals or emotional well being); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.13(l)(d) 
(1975) (similar provision). 
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parents are indifferent to the legal nomenclature and procedure by 
which custody of their children is transferred to the state, others will 
object if fault is placed upon them by a finding of neglect and may 
instead prefer to take their children home. In either case, the chil-
dren will avoid the stigma of a PINS finding, 193 and those who are 
unwanted at home will be placed in a shelter facility for neglected 
children, rather than in a secure institution for PINS and delinquent 
minors.194 
Insistence on a fact-finding hearing may instill in the child posi-
tive feelings toward the judicial process, whether or not the result is 
dismissal of the charges. A child's confusion about the legal system 
may be heightened where the process is truncated by elimination of 
the adjudicatory hearing. Even where the child's attorney has at-
tempted to explain the effect of entering a plea, the child may not 
understand the basis for judicial intervention in his or her life. A 
child may perceive the sanctions that follow an admission of guilt as 
punishment for honesty rather than for misdeeds.195 If, however, a 
finding is made against the child on the basis of extrinsic evidence 
193. See E.J. v. State, 471 P.2d 367, 370 (Alas. 1970) (holding that "termina-
tion" of a PINS adjudication did not moot the child's appeal because of "potential 
collateral disabilities" such as "availability of juvenile records to school authorities, 
military service or prospective employers"); Wagstaff v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 
1220, 1226 (Alas. 1975) (holding that, although PINS petition had been dismissed 
and child had left the state, case was not moot because issue of child's right to at-
torney of her own choice rather than lawyer designated by her parents was a recur-
ring question of broad public interest). Contra Brown v. Yeldell, 487 F.2d 1210 
(D.C. Cir. 1973); People v. T.B., 183 Colo. 310, 516 P.2d 642 (1973); cf. In re 
I.B., 287 A.2d 827 (D.C. App. 1972); In re Richard S., 32 N.Y.2d 592, 300 N.E.2d 
426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1973) (refusing to expunge police and court records of PINS 
child whose adjudication was reversed with instructions to dismiss the proceeding; 
court held that there was no legislative authority to expunge). See also TASK FORCE 
REPORT, supra note 8, at 9, 26 (discussing the stigma accompanying a PINS adjudica-
tion). 
In many jurisdictions, juvenile court records may be considered by adult criminal 
courts for purposes of sentencing. See, e.g., People v. McFarlin, 389 Mich. 557, 208 
N.W.2d 504 (1973); Taylor v. Howard, 111 R.I. 527, 304 A.2d 891 (1973); cf. 
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (refusal to permit cross-examination of witness 
in criminal trial concerning witness' delinquency adjudication violated defendant's 
sixth amendment rights). Contra, Lauen v. State, 515 P.2d 578 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1973). 
194. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2313(a) (Supp. 1973); cf. Martarella v. 
Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But see State ex rel. Harris v. Larson, 
64 Wis. 2d 521, 219 N.W.2d 335 (1974) (reluctantly approving confinement of adju-
dicated delinquents, PINS and neglected children in a detention facility for up to five 
days pending their transfer to placement facilities). 
195. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 51-52 (1967) ("[I]t seems probable that where 
children are induced to confess by 'paternal' urgings on the part of officials and the 
confession is then followed by disciplinary action, the child's reaction is likely to be 
hostile and adverse-the child may well feel that he has been led or tricked into con-
fession and that despite his confession, he is being punished") (footnote omitted). 
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introduced at a hearing, he or she is more likely to understand 
that prior misconduct rather than the admission of guilt was the basis 
for the court's action. Even when juveniles do not agree with the 
findings, they may appreciate that their side has been presented in 
court and that the judges have considered the evidence before render-
ing the verdict. If a child prevails and the petition is dismissed, a 
belief that the system can be circumvented is not necessarily engen-
dered; the child may instead emerge with positive views of the legal 
process. 
To be sure, there should be no rigid adherence to abstract princi-
ples concerning the value of a fact-finding hearing. For a variety of 
pragmatic considerations, insistence upon an adjudicatory hearing 
will not always be desirable.196 But the decision to waive a child's 
due process right to this hearing should not be made in the vacuum of 
the "best interests" doctrine. Wholesale waivers have not only in-
jured certain children who have been inappropriately designated as 
PINS; they may also have helped perpetuate a PINS jurisdiction that 
is arguably harmful to all children coming before the juvenile court. 
V. DEFENSES IN PINS CASES 
A. Statutory Construction: Isolated Incident, 
De Minimis, Condonation 
In view of the definitional language typically used in PINS stat-
utes, one might reasonably assume that only cases involving serious 
forms of persistent juvenile misconduct would be brought to court. 
Terms such as "incorrigible,"197 "habitually disobedient,"198 "beyond 
parental control,"199 and "in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd 
or immoral life,"200 suggest a child who is beyond restraint and on the 
196. For example, if insistence on a trial would cause the case to be adjourned 
and preclude its being heard by a judge known to be particularly understanding, an 
immediate admission may be preferable. See In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 96 
Cal. Rptr. 146 (1971), where the child admitted to having run away from home on 
one occasion, but denied that she was beyond parental control within the meaning 
of the PINS statute. After apparently exaniining the probation report, the trial judge 
made a finding against the girl that was reversed on appeal because of the possibil-
ity that such an examination had taken place. The appeliate court also noted that 
a single instance of running away was insufficient to sustain a PINS charge. An 
admission in these circumstances may thus have been based on sound strategic consid-
erations, since a plenary fact-finding hearing might have revealed additional evidence 
of misconduct sufficient to sustain a PINS finding. 
197. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-45 (Cum. Supp. 1975), 
198. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. CoDE § 31-5-7-4.l(b) (Bums Cum. Supp. 1975). 
199. See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT.§ 419.476(1)(b) (1974), 
200. See ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 350(3) (1958). See also MICH, CoMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 712A.2(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (leading an immoral life). 
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verge of criminality. However, many recent cases illustrate that the 
PINS jurisdiction is being invoked, at least at the trial level, 201 in 
response to relatively minor misconduct that does not appear to fall 
within the intended reach of the statutes. In reversing these findings, 
appellate courts have insisted upon a narrower interpretation of PINS 
definitional provisions. They have concluded that where the miscon-
duct involved was either insufficiently serious, or approved by the 
parents, or not repeated, it did not amount to "habitual disobedience" 
or "incorrigibility." The decisions of these courts provide authority 
for defending PINS actions by showing that statutory requirements for 
the exercise of the PINS jurisdiction have not been satisfied. 
The rationale most frequently offered in these cases is that an 
"isolated incident" of noncriminal misbehavior does not afford a 
basis for a PINS finding. Utilizing this theory, courts have dismissed 
charges where, on a single occasion, a child truanted, 202 refused to 
remain in a foster home, 203 ran away from home, 204 had an altercation 
with a parent, 205 or wandered the streets at night. 206 
In an analogous line of cases, the isolated incident theory has 
been used to overturn PINS findings based on allegations of a single 
criminal act. In these cases, the original petitions filed against the 
child charged delinquency based on such penal law violations as 
harassment, 207 assault, 208 and negligent vehicular homicide.209 At 
trial, however, a delinquency adjudication was precluded, either be-
cause the act alleged did not constitute a crime, 210 or because there was 
201. See, e.g., In re McMillan, 21 N.C. App. 712, 205 S.E.2d 541 (1974). 
202. See In re McMillan, 21 N.C. App. 712, 205 S.E.2d 541 (1974). See also 
Sheehan v. Scott, 520 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1975), described in note 129 supra; "Spo-
radic or occasional absence even though violative of the compulsory requirement of 
the law does not activate action under the state statute here challenged. That is only 
triggered by habitual truancy." 520 F.2d at 830. 
203. See In re Rita P., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 95 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1970). 
204. See In re D.J.B., 18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 96 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1971); Reyna 
v. State, 206 S.W.2d 651, 653-54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). 
205. See In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1972). 
206. See Ex parte Yelton, 298 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). 
207. See In re David W., 28 N.Y.2d 589, 268 N.E.2d 642, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845 
(1971) (per curiam); In re Anna A., 36 App. Div. 2d 1001, 321 N.Y.S.2d 59 (3d 
Dept. 1971) (per curiam); In re Richard K, 35 App. Div. 2d 716, 314 N.Y.S.2d 
1004 (1st Dept. 1970) (per curiam) (charge of harassment and loitering). 
208. See In re Mark V., 34 App. Div. 2d 1101, 312 N.Y.S.2d 983 (4th Dept. 
1970) (per curiam); In re Bordone, 33 App. Div. 2d 890, 307 N.Y.S.2d 527 (4th 
Dept. 1969) (per curiam) (unclear whether the original delinquency petition charged 
assault or harassment, although the acts alleged appear to have been sufficiently se-
rious to constitute assault). · 
209. See In re Williams, 241 Ore. 207,405 P.2d 371 (1965). 
210. See cases cited in note 207 supra. In New York, delinquency is defined as 
"any act which, if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." N.Y. FAMILY Cr. 
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insufficient proof that the child had committed the criminal act. 211 
The lower courts attempted to circumvent these evidentiary and legal 
obstacles by dismissing the delinquency charges and substituting 
PINS findings based on the original penal law offenses. 212 This 
subterfuge appears to have influenced appellate court reversals based . 
on the isolated incident theory. 213 
There are, however, limitations on the use of the theory as a 
defense to PINS charges. One court concluded that the California 
statute, which is directed against any child who "persistently or 
habitually refuses to obey [reasonable parental orders] . . . or who is 
beyond [parental] . . . control,"214 permits a PINS finding based on 
Acr § 712(a) (McKinney 1975). In the above cases, the original petitions charged 
the respondents with harassment and loitering, which, under the New York Penal 
Law, are mere violations rather than crimes. See N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 240.25, 240.35 
(McKinney 1967). An isolated act of harassment does not fall within the definition 
of PINS conduct, since the statute requires habitual disobedience. N.Y. FAMILY Cr. 
Acr § 712(b) (McKinney 1975). 
211. See In re Williams, 241 Ore. 207, 405 P.2d 371 (1965); In re Mark V., 34 
App. Div. 2d 1101, 312 N.Y.S.2d 983 (4th Dept. 1970) (per curiam). 
In the Williams case, the trial court dismissed the delinquency petition alleging 
negligent vehicular homicide because there was no evidence of reckless driving. The 
trial judge determined, however, that the child had driven negligently and made a 
PINS finding on this basis. The appellate court reversed, holding that a single act 
of negligent driving that violated no law was insufficient to sustain a PINS adjudica-
tion where there was no evidence of other driving violations or appearances in juve-
nile court. 
In Mark V., the appellate court reversed a PINS finding based on a single act 
of assault because there was no evidence of habitual misconduct, and also found that 
there was insufficient evidence to support a delinquency adjudication. In New York, 
the crime of assault requires physical injury, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 
1967), whereas harassment, a violation, requires only unauthorized physical contact, 
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25(1) (McKinney 1967). 
See also In re Raymond 0., 31 N.Y.2d 730, 338 N.Y.S.2d 105, 290 N.E.2d 14S 
(1972) (mem.) (reversing PINS finding based on a single act of criminal trespass, 
after trial court had dismissed a burglary charge against the child). 
212. See also Kahm v. People, 83 Colo. 300, 304, 264 P. 718, 720 (1928) (one 
instance of car theft held insufficient to sustain charge of "incorrigibility" or "grow-
ing up in idleness or crime"). 
There is no inconsistency in treating a single act as a sufficient basis for a delin-
quency finding yet not a sufficient predicate for a PINS adjudication, since the stat-
utes define delinquency as a single criminal-law violation and PINS as habitual mis-
conduct. Moreover, a single criminal act is, in many instances, serious enough to 
warrant judicial intervention, whereas a single act of noncriminal misbehavior is not. 
There are, however, certain criminal law offenses such as malicious mischief, see, 
e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 28.03(a), (b) (1), 12.23 (1974), that do not warrant 
this presumption. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1975) §§ 51.03(a), (b), which 
requires that a delinquency finding be based on the commission of felonies and se-
rious misdemeanors and includes as a basis for a PINS adjudication the commission 
of three minor misdemeanors. 
213. See text at notes 58-116 supra, discussing the abuse and misuse of the PINS 
jurisdiction, of which this is one example. 
214. CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CODE§ 601 (West Supp. 1976). 
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a single, sufficiently serious act of misconduct. 215 Rejecting the 
child's contention that the terms "habitually" and "persistently" modi-
fied the parental control clause of the statute, the court held that the 
legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" meant that "a single act, if 
sufficiently serious, would indicate that the minor was 'beyond 
control.' "216 
Another apparent limitation on the isolated incident theory 
emerges in those jurisdictions that define as PINS conduct the viola-
tion of a "law applicable only to a child,"217 such as juvenile curfew 
ordinances. One infraction of such an ordinance constitutes a PINS 
violation. Thus, even though the Ohio statute required "habitual 
truancy'' to sustain an "unruly child" adjudication, 218 a court upheld a 
finding that was based upon a single instance of truancy, because the 
same conduct was violative of a local misdemeanor -ordinance pro-
hibiting juveniles from being in the street during school hours. 219 
215. See In re David S., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 91 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1st Dist. 
1970), involving a 14-year old who lied to his mother, telling her he was going to 
spend the weekend with friends at a beach 40 miles from his home, and who there-
after did not return on time, but was instead apprehended 600 miles away at the Mex-
ican border. See also In re J.M., 57 N.J. 442, 273 A.2d 355 (1971) (affirming PINS 
adjudication based on possession of an eyedropper and a hypodermic needle); In re 
A.R., 57 N.J. 71, 269 A.2d 529 (1970) (upholding PINS adjudication based on sniff-
ing carbona); Rusecki v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 299, 201 N.W.2d 832 (1972) (affirming 
PINS adjudication where child was found "half naked and incoherent"; record indi-
cated that child was a drug abuser). 
216. In re David S., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 1127-28, 91 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263 (1st 
Dist. 1970); but see In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 284, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585, 
590 (2d Dist. 1972), discussed in notes 263-65 infra and accompanying text. In 
jurisdictions such as New York, where a PINS child is defined as one who is "habitu-
ally disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent," N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 
712(b) (McKinney 1975), the use of the conjunctive "and" would appear to preclude 
the type of statutory interpretation utilized by the court in the David S. case. See 
In re Bordone, 33 App. Div. 2d 890, 307 N.Y.S.2d 527 (4th Dept. 1969). See also 
In re Nelly 0., _ App. Div. 2d -, 381 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dept. 1976) (affirming 
PINS adjudication where girl struck her mother twice, ran away from home and from 
a shelter facility; such conduct was held not to be an isolated incident). 
217. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-401(g)(3) (Supp. 1975); Omo REv. CODE 
ANN. § 2151.022(G) (Page Supp. 1974); UNIFORM JUVENILE CoURT Acr § 2(4) 
(iii). 
218. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.022(B) (Page Supp. 1974). 
219. See In re Carpenter, 31 Ohio App. 2d 184, 287 N.E.2d 399 (1972). The 
District of Columbia statute also defines PINS conduct so as to include habitual tru-
ancy and "an offense commitable only by children," D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-2301 
(8) (A) (i), (ii) (Supp. 1973); it seems unlikely, however, that the District of Colum-
bia courts could reach the same result as the Carpenter court. Since the District 
of Columbia Code requires an additional finding that the child "is in need of care 
or rehabilitation" before a PINS disposition may be entered, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
2301 (8)(B), (17) (Supp. 1973), it is doubtful whether a single day of truancy would 
afford a basis for such a finding. See note 39 supra. But cf. In re Doe, 87 N.M. 
466, 535 P.2d 1092 (1975), reversing a delinquency finding based on the child's vio-
lation of a curfew ordinance and his possession of alcoholic beverages, because nei-
ther constituted a crime. The court intimated, however, that a PINS petition making 
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In dismissing charges based on relatively minor misconduct, 
courts have also interpreted PINS statutes so as to fashion a de 
minimi" defense which, unlike the closely related isolated incident 
theory, may be applied to either a single act or repeated misbehavior. 
Thus, because the throwing of a firecracker that resulted in the 
accidental injury of another child was considered a "boyish prank," a 
minor was not "without parental control" or "incorrigible."220 The 
use of vulgar and abusive language toward taunting schoolmates on 
several occasions was also deemed insufficient to prove that a child 
was "in need of supervision" or "in need of correction and training 
which the parents cannot provide."221 In reversing PINS findings 
based upon allegations that two boys had thrown stones at a house 
during the night, a Virginia court in effect combined the de minimis 
and isolated incident theories, noting, "There is nothing in the record 
to suggest that the accused were inherently vicious or incorrigible. To 
classify an infant as delinquent because of a youthful prank, or for a 
mere single violation of a misdemeanor statute . . . in this day of 
numberless laws and ordinances is offensive to our sense of justice. 
"222 
The use in the foregoing cases of terms such as "youthful prank" 
such allegations might not be "jurisdictionally defective." 87 N.M. at 468, 535 P.2d 
at 1094. In addition to requiring proof that the child committed the acts alleged, 
New Mexico law mandates a finding, supported by clear and convincing, competent 
evidence, that the child is in need of care and rehabilitation prior to entry of a dis-
positional order. N.M. STAT • .ANN. § 13-14-28(F) (Supp. 1973). In view of these 
statutory provisions, the court might merely have been saying that a PINS petition 
alleging such acts would not be subject to dismissal on its face. 
220. In re Alley, 174 Wis. 85, 182 N.W. 360 (1921). Cf. In re D.B.P., 512 
S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (no violation of a probation order in a delin-
quency case, where the child's truancy stemmed from circumstances beyond his con-
trol). See also Moore v. State, 111 Tex. Crim. 461, 14 S.W.2d 1041 (1929) 
(reversing PINS adjudication because, although there was proof that the girl was 
frequently seen on the streets at night, there was no evidence of an illegitimate pur-
pose on her part). 
221. Young v. State, 120 Ga. App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969); accord, M.S.K. 
v. State, 131 Ga. App. 1, 205 S.E.2d 59 (1974) (reversing adjudication of delin-
quency against 11-year-old boy for slight sexual molestation). In both of these cases, 
there are indications that the trial courts' adjudications were racially motivated. 
Compare E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 724, 725, 215 S.E.2d 732, 734 ( 1975) (affirm-
ing a delinquency adjudication based on "a long period of harassment • • ., entry on 
the property of another after strict orders to stay away, destruction of property, and 
an eloquent use of obscene language," and distinguishing the above Georgia cases on 
the ground that they involved "competing disciplinary claims" of the public schools), 
Cf. Gonzales v. School Dist., 8 Pa. Comrnnw. 130, 136-37, 301 A.2d 99, 103 (1973), 
where the court intimated that school tardiness and absences from class do not afford 
a basis for a PINS finding of incorrigibility. 
222. Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 343, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946). The 
court's opinion makes it clear that, under the Virginia statute in effect at the time 
of the Jones decision, delinquency included PINS activity. 
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suggests an additional prerequisite for a PINS finding. In commit-
ting the acts alleged, the child must be shown to have mens rea or 
some form of evil intent and must have strayed beyond typical 
juvenile acts of rebelliousness or mischief. As the Virginia court 
pointed out, a failure to distinguish between mischievous and evil 
intentions would result in "an inclusion of so many [children] in the 
[PINS] classification that the word would lose its accepted mean-
ing. "223 Thus, the absence of the requisite state of mind may provide 
a sufficient defense. 
A final defense based upon statutory interpretation has been 
established by court holdings that a child is not beyond parental 
control within the meaning of the PINS statute if the parent has 
approved or condoned the alleged misconduct. One court found that 
absence from school for fifty-seven days did not establish habitual 
truancy under the statute, because the absences were not "in defiance 
of parental authority" and in fact were "consented to by . . . [the 
child's] father."224 Another appellate tribunal reversed a finding 
that a child was beyond parental control because she frequented the 
headquarters of a radical group, wherein explosives were found, on 
the ground that she had received her mother's permission and full 
approval. 225 
223. 185 Va. at 343, 38 S.E.2d at 448; see Ossant v. Millard, 72 fyfisc. 2d 384, 
388, 339 N.Y.S.2d 163, 168 (Fam. Ct. 1972) ("[T]he basic principles of the crimi-
nal law are relevant in dealing with 'illegal' absentees. It is therefore, fundamental 
that the . . . absentee pupil must be found to have a conscious underlying intent . . . 
to violate the . . . Compulsory Education Law before such [PINS] sanctions may 
be invoked"); State v. Lefebvre, 91 N.H. 382, 386, 20 A.2d 185, 188 (1941) (chil-
dren of Jehovah's Witnesses suspended from school for failing to salute flag, adjudi-
cated PINS for failure to attend school, and placed in state training school; in revers-
ing, the court stated, "We find no intent of the legislature to treat as delinquents 
those who are excluded from attendance because they act in good faith from consci-
entious motives ... "). 
224. In re Alley, 174 Wis. 85, 90, 182 N.W. 360, 362 (1921); see Ossant v. Mil-
lard, 72 Misc. 2d 384, 339 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Fam. Ct 1972), dismissing a PINS peti-
tion founded on truancy, where the parents refused to permit their children to attend 
school because of a dispute with school authorities concerning the school bus route. 
But see T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 S.2d 15 (Fla. App. 1973) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 283 S.2d 564 (Fla. 1975), affirming a PINS finding based on truancy, even 
though the children were prevented by their parents from attending school because 
of the latter's view that "race mixing as practiced in the public schools was sinful 
and contrary to their religious beliefs." 273 S.2d at 16. Cf. In re Arnold, 12 Md. 
App. 384, 278 A.2d 658 (1971) (delinquency adjudication also involving PINS con-
duct such as minor misbehavior in school; although the court reversed the training 
school disposition because the trial judge read the probation report during the fact-
finding hearing, the record reveals that the parents were never notified about such 
misconduct, and thus there could be no finding that they failed to exercise appropri-
ate control). 
225. In re Slawson, 7 Ore. App. 317, 490 P.2d 1022 (1971). See also In re Mc-
Millan, 21 N.C. App. 712, 205 S.E.2d 541 (1974), in which the North Carolina 
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The cases discussed in this section illustrate that PINS statutes 
were not intended to remedy all instances of juvenile disobedience, 
even those involving repeated acts. PINS legislation should instead 
be construed to embody three substantive requirements: ( 1) that the 
acts_ of which the child is accused be of sufficient magnitude to cause 
substantial injury to the child or others; (2) that such acts be the 
result of intentional malevolence, rather than of mere mischievous-
ness; and (3) that persons in authority have been unable to deter this 
misconduct with substantial, good-faith efforts.226 
B. Exhaustion of Non-Judicial Remedies 
A persuasive argument can be made that a PINS action should be 
defeated by proof that the petitioning party has failed to utilize non-
judicial remedies, such as those available at community welfare agen-
cies, prior to commencement of court proceedings. A defense based 
upon the existence of non-judicial remedies may be raised regardless 
of the seriousness or the frequency of the alleged misconduct. 
A number of authorities have recognized that the PINS jurisdic-
tion should be exercised only as a last resort to remedy the most 
serious forms of continuing juvenile misbehavior. Thus, the Presi-
dent's Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency observed, "[E]specially in 
instances of conduct . . . [that] would not be criminal for an adult, 
it is of the greatest importance that all alternative measures be em-
ployed before recourse is had to court."227 Similarly, the 1962 
committee report that accompanied New York's innovative PINS 
legislation viewed the juvenile court as "essentially a last resort 
[whose] ... energies and processes should be reserved for children 
requiring -official supervision."228 A Georgia appellate court, in re-
versing a judgment committing a fourteen-year-old girl to a state 
agency until her twenty-first birthday for use of obscene language in 
school, noted: 
Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's finding that three siblings, aged nine, twelve 
and fifteen, were ''undisciplined" children because they had, with parental approval, 
been absent from school one day. 
226. See Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550, _, 270 N.E.2d 389, 393 
(1971), construing the state's stubborn child law so as to require proof that a person 
in authority gave a lawful and reasonable command, that the child's refusal to obey 
was "wilfull, obstinate and persistent for a period of time," and that there was an 
actual refusal to obey and not merely a difference of opinion or disagreement. 
227. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 26. Cf. Note, A Proposal for the 
More Effective Treatment of the "Unruly" Child in Ohio: The Youth Services Bu-
reau, 39 U. C!N. L. REV. 275, 282 (1970). 
228. REPORT OF JOINT LEGISLATIVE CoMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION, reprinted 
in McKinney's Session Laws of New York 3428, 3436 (1962). 
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[S]uch conduct as proved here is usually the subject of disciplinary 
action by school officials without the necessity of invoking the aid of 
the courts. . . . To bring all students accused of this or similar 
deeds of misconduct before the courts would be taking advantage of 
the real purpose of and necessity for the Juvenile Court Act and 
would place burdens on the courts which rightfully belong to parents 
and school officials. It is only when such corrective measures are 
totally without avail that the courts should be asked to invoke the 
sometimes awesome consequences of the Iaw.229 
Despite such conclusions, there are few reported PINS cases in which 
courts have required the parties to avail themselves of community 
resources as a prerequisite to judicial action. 230 
In an attempt to limit access to the juvenile court, over half of the 
states have established intake procedures for the adjustment of cases 
not requiring judicial intervention and, if necessary, for the referral of 
the parties to appropriate community agencies.231 Though some 
might argue that these intake procedures automatically exhaust non-
judicial solutions, the process in fact has serious shortcomings. These 
include insufficient staffing for conducting investigations,232 vague 
criteria for determining which cases warrant diversion, 233 restriction 
of the adjustment process to cases in which the child admits the 
misconduct alleged,234 the tendency of probation personnel to accede 
to parental demands, 235 and the power of the petitioning party to 
229. Young v. State, 120 Ga. App. 605, 606-07, 171 S.E.2d 756, 757 (1969); ac-
cord, M.S.K. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 1, 205 S.E.2d 59 (1974), discussed in note 221 
supra. Cf. E.S. v. State, 134 Ga. App. 724, 215 S.E.2d 732 (1975), discussed in 
note 221 supra. See also In re Alley, 174 Wis. 85, 182 N.W. 360 (1921); Ossant 
v. Millard, 72 Misc. 2d 384, 339 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Fam. Ct. 1972). 
230. See cases cited in note 229 supra. See also NEWSWEEK, Sept. 8, 1975, at 
72, col. 1, quoting retired New York juvenile court Judge Justine Wise Polier: "'par-
ents file status petitions only when they are at their wits end . . . [and] when they 
are terrified that the children are going to destroy themselves or commit a really se-
rious crime.'" This contention appears to be at odds with the Yale Law Journal 
study of the New York Family Court, which found, inter alia, that two thirds of the 
PINS cases analyzed were withdrawn or dismissed. YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 
33, at 1399. See also E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 12-13. 
231. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text. 
232. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 18; E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 101; 
see also L. PORER, supra note 156, at 67-83; Kelley, Schulman, & Lynch, Decentral-
ized Intake and Diversion: The Juvenile Court's Link to the Youth Service Bureau, 
27 JUV. JUSTICE 3 (1976). 
233. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17; E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 42. 
See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1399 n.107 ("Probation intake decisions 
and court dispositional decisions operate at irrational cross-purposes: Those factors 
at intake which are typically associated with a case sent to court are the same factors 
that characterize cases which are withdrawn or dismissed"). 
234. See, e.g., MoNT. REv. CODES .ANN. § 10-1210(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975); 
UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr § lO(a)(l); E. WAKIN, supra note 29, at 41-42. 
235. YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1395. 
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maintain a court action despite the intake department's contrary 
recommendation. 236 
Moreover, if statutory provisions for intake adjustment precluded 
assertion of the exhaustion defense, the result would be to insulate 
intake decisions from judicial review and thereby to circumscribe the 
power of the court to assure the correct application of the intake 
process in particular cases.237 The necessity for proper utilization of 
the intake procedure was recognized by a New York court in a recent 
case of first impression, In re Charles C .. 238 The court held that a 
juvenile charged with delinquency did not lose the right to intake 
procedures by his failure to appear at a probation interview. Con-
struing the statutory requirement that a child must be found "in need 
of supervision, treatment or confinement" before being adjudicated a 
delinquent, the judge in effect ruled that there could be no such 
finding or adjudication in this case in the absence of utilization of the 
intake procedure. The court thus held that, notwithstanding the 
victim's objection, it was empowered to refer the child to intake for an 
adjustment decision even after a petition had been filed against 
him.2a9 
The importance of the Charles C. case is that, on the basis of a 
statutory requirement that a child be "in need of supervision," it 
recognizes judicial power to review intake decisions. Although the 
court's ruling was in response to an intake determination based on a 
procedural default, ·the judge's decision required consideration of the 
merits of that default (i.e., whether the child's failure to appear for the 
intake interview was excusable). This power of review could readily 
be extended to permit courts to pass on whether an intake depart-
236. See note 32 supra. 
237. The argument that intake procedures provide an effective screening mecha-
nism for minor misconduct is controverted by such cases as Young v. State, 120 Ga, 
App. 605, 171 S.E.2d 756 (1969), and M.S.K. v. State, 131 Ga. App. 1, 205 S.E.2d 
59 (1975), discussed in note 229 supra and accompanying text, inasmuch as Georgia 
law included intake adjustment provisions. See GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1001 (Supp, 
1975). See also Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 55 (Alas. 1971) (concluding that delin-
quents were not entitled to grand jury indictments, the Alaska court noted that the 
intake adjustment process was more advantageous to the child, but was constrained 
to observe that there was no evidence it had been utilized in this case: "Our state-
ment here that the [intake] ... procedures offer a more than adequate substitute 
for grand jury indictment indicates how important it is that these procedures be fol-
lowed in every case"). 
238. 371 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Fam. Ct. 1975). 
239. 371 N.Y.S.2d at 587, construing N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 734 (McKinney 
1962), as amended N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr § 734 (McKinney 1975). For reasons 
beyond his control, the child did not appear for his original intake interview, which 
resulted in a petition being filed and an arrest warrant being issued. 
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ment's refusal on substantive grounds240 to adjust a case was appro-
priate. Because intake departments serve as mechanisms for the diver-
sion of juveniles from the court to community agencies, judicial power 
to review their decisions on the merits would in effect constitute 
recognition of the exhaustion defense. 
Inasmuch as the Charles C. decision was based on construction of 
language commonly found in PINS statutes, even courts that are in 
jurisdictions without intake procedures could conclude that a child 
was not "beyond parental control," "incorrigible," or "in need of 
supervision" within the meaning of the particular state's statute, 241 
unless the parent had previously attempted to exercise his or her 
authority by using community-based facilities for coping with intra-
family conflicts. 242 
The utilization of an exhaustion requirement would accord well 
with the strong preference, reflected in legislation and case law per-
taining to juveniles, for selection of the dispositional alternative that 
least restricts a child's freedom. Numerous statutes provide that it is 
preferable for treatment of the child to be "in his own home,"243 
240. For example, that a court hearing -would be in the interests of the public 
and child. See Tux. FAM. CODE ANN. § 53.03(a) (1) (1975). Indeed, the Charles 
C. court did consider such substantive factors as the child's age, prior record, and 
home and school life. 371 N.Y.S.2d at 587. 
241. See e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(8) (1973) (defining a PINS child as 
one who is habitually disobedient and in need of care or rehabilitation); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 43-201(5)(a) (1974) (including as a PINS child one who is not controlled 
by his or her parents). The Nebraska statute also includes in its statement of pur-
pose the following: ''To provide for the intervention of the juvenile court in the in-
terest of any child who is within the provisions of this act, with due regard to 
parental rights and capacities and the availability of non-judicial resources." NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 43-201.01(2) (1974). 
242. Legislation in a number of states requires school officials to make reasonable 
efforts to correct the situation before a PINS application based on truancy can be 
made to the juvenile court See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & lNSTNS. CoDE § 601(b) (West 
Supp. 1976); LA. REV. STAT. § 17:233 (West Supp. 1975); S.C. LAws ANN. § 21-
766 (1962) (requiring the truant officer to contact parents "with the object in mind 
of interesting nonattending children in school work, and influencing them by means 
of persuasion to attend school regularly"). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 26-
27, 26-28 (Smith-Hurd 1962); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 340.739 (1967) (requiring 
that notice be given to parents of truant children). Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565 (1975) (requiring notice and hearing prior to suspension of children from school 
for ten days or less); In re John R., 79 Misc. 2d 339, 357 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (Fam. Ct. 
1974) (evidence relating to suitability of children's school and extent of psycho-
logical counseling offered them before truancy petitions were filed held admissible at 
dispositional hearing but not at fact-finding hearing). 
243. E.g., GA. CoDE ANN. § 24A-101 (Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
801 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-63 (1974) ("It is the purpose of this act to 
secure for each child coming before the juvenile court such care, guidance, and con-
trol, preferably in his own home, as will serve his welfare, and the best interests of 
the state; to preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible •.. "). See also 
UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 1 (3). 
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while other legislation requires that, before a more restrictive disposi-
tion can be entered, there be a finding that "community resources" or 
"community-level alternatives" have been "exhausted."244 Similarly, 
appellate courts have reversed, or directed reconsideration of, training 
school placements where the trial courts had failed to consider less 
onerous alternatives.245 Finally, a concept analogous to an exhaus-
tion requirement is reflected in the practice of allowing the waiver of 
an alleged delinquent into an adult criminal court only after a finding 
that the child cannot benefit from the services available to the juvenile 
court. 246 Thus, requiring the exhausion of non-judicial remedies as a 
prerequisite for assumption of PINS jurisdiction is, in a sense, a 
logical extension of current juvenile court practices in selecting dis-
positional alternatives. 
It is also significant that judicial creation of an exhaustion re-
quirement in the absence of explicit legislation is not unprecedented. 
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, for example, 
"had its origin in a discretionary rule adopted by courts of equity to 
the effect that a petitioner will be denied equitable relief when he has 
failed to pursue an available administrative remedy by which he 
might obtain the same relief."247 The administrative law require-
ment of exhaustion has particular force where utilization of agency 
expertise is important for resolution of the controversy. 248 Another 
244. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.185 (subd. l)(c)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1975); N.C. 
GEN STAT. §§ 7A-286 (4), (5)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975). See also Aruz. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 8-261 to 8-265 (1974), establishing "family counseling programs" that the 
court may order both parents and children to attend, either before or after entzy of 
judgment. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-263(A) (1974). 
245. See, e.g., In re William S., 10 Cal. App. 3d 944, 950-51, 89 Cal. Rptr. 685, 
689 (1970); In re Wooten, 13 Md. App. 521, 284 A.2d 32 (1971); In re Jeanette 
P., 34 App. Div. 2d 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dept 1970) (per curiam); In re 
John H., 48 App. Div. 2d 879, 369 N.Y.S.2d 196 (2d Dept. 1975); Hill v. State, 
454 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). 
246. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Atkins v. State, 259 
Ind. 596, 290 N.E.2d 441 (1972); J.E.C. v. State, 225 N.W.2d 245 (Minn. 1975). 
In Atkins, the court reversed a waiver to the criminal court that had been entered 
because the minors were too old for commitment to the state training school, and 
in so doing observed that the statute, "in addition to creating a presumption in favor 
of disposing of juvenile matters within the juvenile system, also creates a presumption 
in favor of using the least severe disposition available to the juvenile court which 
will serve the needs of the case." 259 Ind. at 602, 290 N.E.2d at 445 (emphasis 
original), 
247. Smith v. United Sates, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952); see Myers v. Beth-
lehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). 
248. See, e.g., McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1971); McKart 
V. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197-99 (1969). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAw TEXT§ 20.02 (3d ed. 1972). . 
A collateral benefit of such an exhaustion requirement is that it "tends to ensure 
that the agency have additional opportunities 'to discover and correct its own errors,' 
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judicial creation249 with a similar rationale is the doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction, which applies where the court and an administrative 
agency have concurrent original jurisdiction, and which generally 
requires the court to defer action where the expertise of the agency is 
of particular value. 250 Primary jurisdiction has been characterized as 
"a device to prepare the way, if the litigation should take its ultimate 
course, for a more informed and precise determination by the Court 
of the scope and meaning of the statute as applied to ... [the] 
particular circumstances."251 In a similar fashion, an exhaustion 
requirement in PINS cases would allow the juvenile courts to defer, 
whenever possible, to the expertise of community agencies. 
In determining whether the exhaustion requirement has been met, 
courts might consider the following factors at a pre-trial hearing:252 
1. the amount of time that has elapsed since the child's misbehavior 
began; 
2. the steps taken by the parent to attempt to resolve the problem 
within the family (e.g., discussions between parent and child, rep-
rimands, sanctions); 
3. the agency or agencies from which the parent sought assistance 
when the foregoing steps were unsuccessful; 
4. the length of time spent with the agency, and the procedures it 
utilized to resolve the problem; 
5. the reasons consultation with the agency was terminated; and 
6. the relief the parent is requesting from the court. 
Consideration of these factors would lead to dismissal in many in-
and thus may help to obviate all occasion for judicial review." McGee v. United 
States, 402 U.S. 479, 484. Cf. PepsiCo, Inc. v. F.T.C., 472 F.2d 179, 185 (2d Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973) (construing section l0(c) of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act that permits judicial review of "final agency action," and sug-
gesting that "[m]any of the considerations supporting the final judgment rule with 
respect to appeals from decisions of lower courts are equally present in the case of 
agency action: ..• the case may be settled; the reviewing court, in any event, will 
be in a better position to assess the matter when all the cards have been played"). 
249. See K. DAVIS, supra note 248, at § 19.02. 
250. See, e.g., United States v. Western Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956) 
(exhaustion doctrine "applies where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an 
administrative agency alone; judicial interference is withheld until the administrative 
process has run its course. 'Primary jurisdiction,' on the other hand, applies where 
a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforce-
ment of the claim requires the resolution of issues which . . • have been placed 
within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial 
process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for 
its views") (citations omitted). 
251. Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 498-99 (1958). 
252. It would appear preferable to present evidence on the exhaustion issue at 
a pre-trial hearing rather than at the adjudicatory hearing itself, because of the possi-
bility that some of the evidence offered will be hearsay and thus possibly inadmissible 
at a fact-finding hearing. 
1156 Michigan. Law Review [Vol. 74:1097 
stances. For example, if a parent brings a child to court immediately 
after the alleged misbehavior, or without having talked to the child, or 
without having gone to any community agency, the petition should be 
dismissed. Similarly, if, after having sought community assistance, 
the parent terminates consultation because the agency views the prob-
lem as familial or parental and recommends therapy for both parent 
and child, dismissal would also be warranted. 
Adoption of such an exhaustion requirement would, in addition 
to providing children with a defense to unnecessary PINS actions, 
clearly improve the operation of the juvenile court system. It can 
limit access to the juvenile court to mature and responsible parents 
who have diligently attempted to resolve intra-family conflicts by the 
use of alternative methods, and will thus screen out parents "who too 
frequently find . . . [the court] a convenient method both of evad-
ing their own responsibilities and of venting their hostility toward their 
offspring."253 Thus, the juvenile courts will reinforce the principle that 
the primary responsibility for rearing a child belongs not to the state, 
but to the parents. 254 Moreover, if care is taken to assure that the 
parent does not make only a formal, perfunctory use of the com-
munity agency, the juvenile court can limit its caseload to the most 
serious forms of juvenile misconduct, since minor infractions and nor-
mal adolescent rebelliousness will generally be resolved at the agency 
level.255 Finally, if the exhaustion requirement is met in all PINS 
cases, the court will have the views and recommendations of expert 
community agencies to inform its judgment as to the appropriate 
interim and final dispositions of every case. 
C. "Contributory Neglect' by Parent 
Legislation and judicial decisions in a number of states suggest 
that failure of parents or guardians to care properly for their children 
may constitute a complete or partial defense to PINS charges. Many 
PINS statutes, by their own terms, incorporate defenses based on 
parental inadequacies. For example, a number of jurisdictions classify 
253. TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 8, at 27. Refusal of a parent to utilize 
community-based facilities should result in dismissal of the PINS petition. Where, 
however, the child's behavior is life-threatening and necessitates immediate judicial 
action, parental refusal to seek treatment in the community could be the basis of a 
neglect proceeding. 
254. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 157, at 7-8. Cf. 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923). 
255. If the parent refuses to be cooperative or makes unreasonable demands upon 
the child, the agency's report to the court noting that fact should result in dismissal 
of the PINS case. 
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runaways as PINS only when they have left home "without just 
cause."256 In other states, the PINS statutes proscribe disobedience 
only if the parental commands in question are "reasonable and law-
ful"257 or "reasonable and proper."258 The Maryland statute is still 
more emphatic, prohibiting only juvenile disobedience that occurs 
"without substantial fault" on the part of a child's parents. 259 
Yet many of these same statutes also include a separate provision 
that classifies any juvenile misbehavior, whether precipitated by par-
ental deficiencies or not, as PINS conduct.260 In the California 
statute, for example, although one clause prohibits refusal to obey 
"reasonable and proper [parental] orders," it is followed by a sepa-
rate clause that permits a child to be adjudged a PINS if he or she is 
"beyond the control" of the parent.261 Statutes of this type are 
internally inconsistent, 262 inasmuch as the "reasonable and proper" 
provision can be used to exclude from the PINS jurisdiction behavior 
that is related to parental fault, while the "beyond control" category 
can be used to condemn the child for the same conduct regardless of 
parental blameworthiness. 
A California court has suggested an appropriate resolution of this 
apparent statutory inconsistency. The trial court in a PINS case had 
refused to hear certain evidence tending to show a mother's instability 
and the propriety of her child's absences from home, although other 
admitted evidence indicated that the mother may have provoked an 
assault upon her by the child. 263 The appellate court refused to 
sustain a PINS finding where "the breakdown in parental control 
256. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1975); ME. REv. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, § 2552 (Supp. 1975). 
251. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-40l(g)(2) (Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 712A.2(2) (a) (2) (Cum. Supp. 1975); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT 
§ 2(4)(ii). 
258. See CAL. WELF. & INsTNs. CODE § 601 (a) (West Supp. 1976). 
259. Mo. CTs. & JUD. PRo. ConE ANN.§ 3-801(e)(2) (Supp. 1975). 
260. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-53(b), (c) (Supp. 1976); KAN. 
STAT. ANN.§§ 38-802(d)(l), (2), (3) (1973); Omo REV. CODE ANN.§§ 2151.022 
(A), (C) (Page Supp. 1974); S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 15-1103(9)(b), (d) (1962); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-4(3 ), (5) (1966). 
261. CAL. WELF. & INsTNs. CODE§ 601(a) (West Supp. 1976). 
262. Prior to its amendment in 1975, the internal inconsistency of the California 
statute was even more glaring, because, in addition to the provisions noted in the 
text, the statute permitted PINS adjudications against children "who from any cause 
• . . [are] in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life." CAL. 
WELF. & INSTNs. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1975) (emphasis added), as amended, 
CAL. WELF. & INSTNS. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1976). 
263. In re Henry G., 28 Cal. App. 3d 276, 104 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1972); but see 
In re David S., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1124, 1127-28, 91 Cal. Rptr. 261, 263 (1970); dis-
cussed in notes 214-16 supra and accompanying text. 
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[was] because of failings in the parent rather than in the minor,"2M 
and, accordingly, it reversed the decision: 
We do not at all intimate that Henry's mother was the one at fault 
but his counsel should have been allowed to try to show that fact. 
Precluding the attempt might well create a situation where the "be-
yond the control" provisions of ... [the: PINS statute] are used to 
avoid the more stringent language of that section relating to one who 
persistently or habitually refuses to obey a parent's reasonable and 
proper orders or directions. 265 
Courts that are confronted with similar statutory inconsistencies 
should follow the lead of the California court in disallowing the use of 
an open-ended provision to justify a PINS finding based upon con-
duct that is defensible under the terms of the more specific prohibi-
tions. 
The neglect or dependency laws of the various states may also 
afford a defense based on parental inadequacies. In some jurisdic-
tions, the statutory definition of a neglected child embraces those who 
are also described by the PINS and delinquency provisions, but 
"whose conduct results in whole or in part from parental neglect."266 
In many states, the same conduct may be the basis for either a PINS 
or a neglect action. For example, a child's failure to attend school can 
result in a PINS action, 267 a neglect or dependency proceeding, 268 or 
( 
264. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 285, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 590. 
265. 28 Cal. App. 3d at 285, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 590. See also In re Elmore, 
382 F.2d 125, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (in the context of a PINS right to treatment 
case, appellate court suggests that, on remand, the juvenile court consider whether 
its finding that the child was beyond parental control conflicted with its other finding 
that the child was without adequate supervision; juvenile court had previously denied 
motion by child's attorney to treat the child as neglected rather than as a PINS). 
266. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260-015{l){h) (Cum. Supp. 1975); See Wis. STAT. 
ANN. § 48.13(1) (j) (1957). See also AlUz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201.I0(c) (1974), 
treating a child under eight who commits a delinquent or PINS act as a dependent 
child. Although very few states prescribe lower age limits for PINS children, see 
notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text, there are relatively few PINS cases involv-
ing extremely young children. See YALE PINS STUDY, supra note 33, at 1387 n.25. 
When such cases arise, failure of the parent to exercise appropriate control when the 
child is so young (e.g., ten years old or less) should afford a strong basis for urging 
that PINS charges be dismissed and a neglect petition substituted. 
261. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 45-403(3)(a) (Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1976) ("habitually truant"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-
03(b) (Smith-Hurd 1972); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.03(b){2) (Supp. 1975). 
Compare Ossant v. Millard, 72 Misc. 2d 384, 339 N.Y.S.2d 163 (Fam. Ct. 1972), 
with T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 S.2d 15 (Fla. App. 1973) (per curiam), cert. de-
nied, 283 S.2d 564 (Fla. 1975), discussed at note 224 supra. 
268. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-403(4)(b) (Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 17-53 (Supp. 1976) ("being denied proper care and attention, physically, edu-
cationally, emotionally, or morally"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-4{1)(a) (Smith-
Hurd 1972) ("who is neglected as to ••• education as required by law"); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 51.02(1)(H)(i) (Supp. 1975). See In re Pima County Juvenile Ac-
tion, 18 Ariz. App. 219, 501 P.2d 395 (1972); Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 
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a complaint against the parent under the compulsory education law.269 
A similar overlap is found in states where a juvenile whose "behav-
ior or condition" is injurious to his or her welfare may be adjudicated 
a PINS, while one whose "environment" produces such injury is 
deemed neglected. 270 The manner in which courts reconcile these 
two groups of statutes will determine whether a child may successfully 
urge parental neglect as a defense to a PINS petition. 
The reported decisions in cases where a child could arguably be 
classified as either a PINS or neglected reflect disparate positions on 
the proper exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction. Some courts believe 
that if the juvenile misconduct technically falls within the ambit of the 
PINS statute, then PINS adjudications are proper, even where paren-
tal neglect is causally related to this behavior. A Florida court, for 
example, affirmed PINS findings of truancy against two children who 
did not attend school solely because of their parents' religious belief 
that racial integration of schools was sinful. 271 Similarly, a delin-
quency finding that was based on the theft of a bag of potato chips 
and resulted in a training school commitment was affirmed, even 
though the child had previously been adjudicated dependent and had 
committed the theft to feed himself. The child's defense based on his 
parent's neglect was dismissed as a "specious argument which has no 
basis in law."272 
S.W.2d 816 (1964); cf. Galloway v. State, 249 Ala. 327, 31 S.2d 332 (1947); In 
re Davis, 114 N.H. 242, 318 A.2d 151 (1974) (original charge was both PINS and 
neglect). 
269. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1502 (1960); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
10-184, 10-185 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 26-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962); TEX. 
EDUC. CODE§ 4.25 (1972). See also Commonwealth v. Ross, 17 Pa. Commnw. 105, 
330 A.2d 290 (1975); cf. Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964) (par-
ents had been fined on three occasions for refusing to vaccinate their children so 
that they could attend school; their continued refusal resulted in this neglect and 
guardianship proceeding). 
270. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-802(d)(l), (g)(3) (1973); S.C. CODE 
ANN. §§ 15-1103(9) (j), (ll)(i) (1962); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 26-8-6, 26-
8-7.1 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.12 (Cum. Supp. 1975), 48.13(1)(f) 
(1957). See State ex rel. Wiley v. Richards, 253 Iowa 679, 113 N.W.2d 285 (1962) 
(sisters eight and twelve years old adjudicated dependent and neglected on the basis 
of conduct that other courts might have classified as PINS-use of vulgar language 
and roaming the streets at night). Cf. In re Chandler, 230 Ore. 452, 370 P.2d 626 
(1962) (13-year-old girl's running away from home results in neglect adjudication). 
271. See T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 S.2d 15 (Fla. App. 1973) (per curiam), 
cert. denied, 283 S.2d 564 (Fla. 1975). See also In re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683, 
16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1961). 
212. In re Blakes, 41 Ill. App. 3d 567, 572, 281 N.E.2d 454, 457 (1972). See 
In re Henderson, 199 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1972); In re Gamer, 230 Pa. Super. 476, 
326 A.2d 581 (1974) (simultaneous adjudication of child as both PINS and neg-
lected). In Commonwealth v. Brasher, 359 Mass. 550,-, 270 N.E.2d 389, 395 n.2 
(1971), the child alleged she was denied equal protection of the law because she was 
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Other courts, adopting a middle ground, have concluded that, 
while p~ental inadequacies do not bar a PINS finding, these deficien-
cies must be considered in determining the appropriate disposition, at 
least insofar as the neglect is related to the child's misbehavior. Thus, 
in a case where a girl had left home because of a "bizarre home 
environment and family tensions," an order for placement in a train-
ing school was reversed, with directions that she be afforded treat-
ment in a more suitable environment.273 
Finally, some courts reverse PINS findings where parental neglect 
is present, even though the particular juvenile misconduct technically 
violates the PINS statute. These courts attempt to determine whether 
parental neglect is causally related to the juvenile misconduct in 
question, and, on the basis of this inquiry, make either a PINS finding 
or a finding of neglect. 274 This approach renders PINS and neglect 
findings mutually exclusive and precludes PINS findings where par-
ental neglect has directly contributed to the PINS behavior. Thus, a 
PINS finding based on truancy and disobedience to the child's father 
was reversed, and a neglect finding substituted, where the probation 
report indicated that the boy's home was filthy and that, because of ill 
health, his father was unable to exercise proper supervision.276 An-
brought to court as a PINS rather than as a neglected child; the court rejected this 
argument, holding that there was a reasonable distinction between PINS and neg-
lected juveniles. Accord, In re Jackson, 6 Wash. App. 962, 497 P.2d 259 (1972). 
273. In re Arlene H., 38 App. Div. 2d 570, 328 N.Y.S.2d 251 (2d Dept. 1971). 
Cf. People v. Grieve, 131 Ill. App. 2d 1078, 267 N.E.2d 19 (1971). In In re Mario, 
65 Misc. 2d 708, 317 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Fam. Ct. 1971), the court indicated that the 
parent's inadequacies are a defense to PINS charges only where they have a direct 
causal connection to the juvenile misbehavior, and that generalized passive neglect 
does not bar either a PINS finding or placement in a state training school if the 
child's conduct otherwise warrants such a disposition. Cf. In re Kenneth S., App. 
Div., 2d Dept., N.Y.L.J., May 13, 1976, at 11, col. 6 (remanding a case in which 
the child had been adjudicated both a PINS and a delinquent, with direction that the 
trial court conduct a supplemental hearing as to whether the child should be placed 
in a facility for delinquents or one for PINS; by analogy, this case lends support to 
the dispositional modification approach for "neglected PINS" discussed in text accom-
panying this note). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1116(a)(l) (Cum. Supp. 
1914), quoted in note 162 supra. 
274. If there is insufficient evidence to sustain either a PINS or a neglect finding, 
the case can simply be dismissed. See In re Pima County, 18 Ariz. App. 219, 501 
P.2d 395 (1972); In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. App. 1953). See generally RBVI• 
SION COMMITIEE NOTE, 1955 to WIS, STAT. ANN. §§ 48.13(i), (j) (1957). 
215. In re Paul H., 47 App. Div. 2d 853, 365 N.Y.S.2d 900 (2d Dept. 1975) 
(per curiam). Under New York law, the court on its own motion may, at any time 
in the proceedings, substitute a neglect petition for a PINS or delinquency petition, 
N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr § 716(b) (McKinney 1975). See In re Richard C., 43 App. 
Div. 2d 862, 352 N.Y.S.2d 15 (2d Dept. 1974) (per curiam), reversing a training 
school placement of an adjudicated delinquent on the ground, inter alia, that it was 
an abuse of discretion not to substitute a neglect petition when child's mother repeat-
edly failed to appear at the dispositional hearing. 
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other appellate court ruled that the habitual absence of a fifteen-year-
old boy from a shelter for neglected children did not warrant a 
finding of ungovernability because the child, who had previously been 
declared neglected, left only to visit his mother; the court therefore 
reversed both the PINS finding and the boy's placement at the state 
training school. 276 
The third approach is preferable, 277 since it avoids attaching the 
stigma of a PINS finding to a child whose parent is at least partially to 
276. In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dept. 1970). See 
P.S.M. v. State, 469 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), reversing a PINS finding on 
the technical ground that, although the petition alleged that the child left home with-
out permission of her "parents," there was no evidence of lack of consent by the 
father. The court described in considerable detail the lack of parental supervision, 
referring to the girl's alcoholic father, mentally disturbed brother, and mother who 
was away working all day. In remanding, the court noted, "[T]he evidence has not 
been fully developed. • • • It is obvious that appellant's case requires the attention 
of the Juvenile Court." 469 S.W.2d at 15. 
277. Although this approach may result in the placement of PINS children whose 
misbehavior was the result of parental inadequacies with neglected children who have 
engaged in no overt misconduct, there is no inconsistency between this position and 
the view expressed in the text at note 107 supra that PINS and delinquent children 
should not be commingled. Placement of PINS and neglected children together 
would seem to create little danger that the neglected juvenile will be led astray or 
harmed by the PINS child, since the latter's conduct is confined to behavior that is 
recognized as a child's method of externalizing problems and as a form of juvenile 
rebelliousness. In contrast, delinquents have by definition crossed the line of crimi-
nality, and there probably is a greater likelihood of inciting emulation of this adult 
form of antisocial conduct, e.g., there is a certain panache about following the lead 
of a local Bonnie or Clyde that is not present with respect to truancy and staying 
out late without permission. Commingling of PINS and delinquents, which most 
often takes place in maximum security facilities, also effectively labels the PINS child 
as one who is so bad that he or she must be confined with those who have commit-
ted crimes. See generally LEAA .ANNOUNCEMENT ON DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, 
supra note 2, at 5-8, 10; STONE COMMISSION, AN INQUIRY INTO TilE JUVENILE CEN-
TERS OPERATED BY TiiE DEPARTMENT OF PROBATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 11-14 
(1971 ). 
Although it might be argued that some PINS children have in fact perpetrated 
criminal acts and thus present the same sort of dangerous influence to neglected chil-
dren as delinquents do to PINS, this danger is diminished because there bas been 
no formal recognition of criminality through a court adjudication to that effect. To 
the extent that children's perceptions of their peers are influenced by adult labelling, 
the absence of a delinquency finding increases the likelihood that these children will 
be viewed merely as braggarts and that they will have little power to sway other juve-
niles in the direction of criminality. The potential for influence may be heightened, 
however, where the PINS finding is predicated solely on a criminal act. See gener-
ally Werthman, The Function of Social Definitions in the Development of Delin-
quent Careers, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 155. 
While it is true that neglected, PINS and delinquent children are sometimes 
placed together in nonsecure, private residential treatment facilities, the labelling 
process is not nearly as severe in such situations. The fact that placement is not 
in a maximum security center generates an understanding that the children are there 
for treatment of juvenile problems rather than for punishment of crimes in a jail-
like setting. Cf. Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 590-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
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blame for the juvenile's misconduct. 278 Furthermore, it requires the 
trial court to make a broad inquiry into the causes of the child's 
misconduct, and thus ensures a judgment that is based on an assess• 
ment of the blameworthiness of both parent and child. 270 This may 
be contrasted to the narrow focus of the first approach, which, like a 
criminal proceeding, restricts the relevant inquiry to the question of 
whether the accused committed the acts alleged. 280 Moreover, the 
first two approaches, by reserving the neglect category for children 
who passively internalize parental abuse, in effect penalize those who 
manifest their feelings of rejection in overt misbehavior. 
The third approach will also inhibit the unwarranted exercise of 
discretion by which judges, aware of the dearth of residential treat• 
ment centers yet assured of the availability of training school facili• 
ties, make PINS findings despite the presence of parental neglect. 281 
To the extent that a PINS adjudication is predicated on the existence 
of resources rather than on the child's needs, the courts are allowing 
fiscal constraints to influence and distort the determination of culpa• 
bility.282 By acquiescing in these constraints, the courts reduce pres• 
278. See notes 8, 193 supra, discussing the stigma accompanying a PINS adjudica-
tion. 
279. See In re LJoyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 387, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419, 421 (1st Dept. 
1970) (after a Jengthy recitation of the facts, the court concluded, "A careful review 
of this record indicates that this appellant is a 'neglected child' rather than 'a person 
in need of supervision'. . • . While there is ample support for the finding that ap-
pellant habitually absented himself from the Children's Center, this conduct does not 
warrant a finding that he was habitually disobedient or ungovernable"). 
280. See In re Blakes, 4 Ill. App. 3d 567, 571-72, 281 N.E.2d 454, 457 (1972). 
281. See LEAA ANNOUNCEMENT ON DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION, supra note 2, at 
8; JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, at 13, 105. State Jaw generally 
prohibits the placement of neglected children in state training schools. See, e.g., 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-24l(A) (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-321(b) 
(Cum. Supp. 1975). The Pennsylvania statute provides: "Unless a child found to 
be deprived is also found to be delinquent, he shall not be committed to or confined 
in an institution or other facility designed or operated for the benefit of delinquent 
children." In Pennsylvania, PINS are included within the delinquency classification. 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 50-102(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975). See also Galloway v. State, 
249 Ala. 327, 31 S.2d 332 (1947); In re Slay, 245 Miss. 294, 147 S.2d 299 (1962); 
cf. Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.!. 1972) 
(right-to-treatment case involving placement of delinquent, PINS and neglected chil-
dren together in secure detention facilities). For additional reasons prompting judi-
cial preference for treatment of children as PINS rather than as neglected, see notes 
76-80 supra and accompanying text. 
282. Compare In re Blakes, 4 Ill. App. 3d 567, 281 N.E.2d 454 (1972) (affirm-
ing placement in state training school on the ground, inter alia, that the cost of pri-
vate placement was prohibitive), with City & County v. Juvenile Ct., 182 Colo. 157, 
161, 511 P.2d 898, 900 (1973) (denying writ of prohibition in action brought by 
Welfare Department to vacate juvenile court order placing PINS child in a particular 
private facility; one of the arguments raised by petitioner was that "the City had no 
money allocated for this particular placement"). See also In re L., 24 Ore. App. 
257, 546 P.2d 153 (1976) (state contended it had insufficient funds to provide 
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sure for the creation of sufficient facilities for neglected problem 
children. 283 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The deficiencies of the PINS jurisdiction can be mitigated if, at 
adjudicatory hearings, there is vigorous assertion of defenses such as 
contributory neglect and failure to exhaust non-judicial remedies, as 
well as defenses, based on strict adherence to statutory requirements, 
that seek exclusion of conduct which is de minimis, condoned or 
isolated. Utilization of these defenses by zealous advocates may 
render the PINS jurisdiction nugatory just as analogous defenses 
developed in the Talmud284 prevented enforcement of the Biblical 
sanction against "stubborn and rebellious" sons. 285 
According to the Talmud, the son286 was subject to prosecution 
only if he had defied both father and mother, and only if both parents 
proper care for neglected child who repeatedly ran away from placement facility; 
court ordered termination of state agency's custody if it was unable to provide ap-
propriate treatment). See generally JUVENILE JUSTICE CONFOUNDED, supra note 55, 
at 37, pointing out that the median annual cost per child at the New York State 
Training School during 1970-1971 was $10,008. 
283. Cf. In re Lloyd, 33 App. Div. 2d 385, 308 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1st Dept. 1970), 
discussed in note 276 supra and accompanying text The court observed that "the 
provision of proper facilities is the responsibility of the legislature and the legislative 
failure in that regard does not warrant circumvention of the statute." 33 App. Div. 
2d at 387, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 421. 
284. The Talmud consists of interpretations and elaborations of the Mishnah, 
which is in tum a commentary on the Old Testament and a codification of basic 
Jewish law. The Mishnah was completed circa 200 C.E. and the Talmud, circa 500 
C.E. ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY OF JUDAICA 419, 585 (Wigoder ed. 1974); see 
generally 15 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, TALMUD BABYLONIA 755-71 (1971). While we 
are not suggesting that resort to the Talmud is necessary to validate any of the de-
fenses discussed in this article, it is instructive to examine the manner in which this 
ancient counterpart of the PINS statute was restrictively construed, even though 
framed in mandatory terms. Reference to the Talmud as an aid to interpretation of 
contemporary law is not unprecedented. See In re Juan R., N.Y.L.J., Oct 28, 1975, 
at 9, col. 4, where a New York Family Court Judge utilized Talmudic principles of 
statutory construction to avoid a determination of unconstitutionality with respect to 
a paternity law. 
285. See generally F. LUDWIG, supra note 22, at 12-13. 
286. Daughters appear to have been exempted from the law. BABYLONIAN TAL-
MUD, SANHEDRIN 8:1, at 473 (Soncino ed. 1935) [hereinafter SANHEDRIN]. In con-
trast, today a majority of girls in the juvenile court are referred on the basis of PINS 
charges. See, e.g., TEXAS Youm COUNCIL, TEXAS JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS FOR 
1973, at 10 (1975) (52.6 per cent of girls referred to court for disobedience, 1.8 per 
cent for immoral conduct); YALE PINS SnmY, supra note 33, at 1387 n.26 (62 per 
cent of PINS cases in New York study were brought against girls). It would appear 
that statutes providing higher age limits for girls than for boys subject to the court's 
jurisdiction are unconstitutional. See, e.g., In re Patricia A., 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 
N.E.2d 432, 335 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1972); cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). 
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concurred in the prosecution. 287 Through the restrictive interpreta-
tion of the word "son," whose meaning was limited to one who was 
thirteen and thus sufficiently mature to bear criminal responsibility, 
but not yet old enough to be a "man," the period of indictment was 
limited to three months following the thirteenth birthday.288 
The offense consisted of two elements: (1) repeated defiance and 
reviling of the parents, and (2) gluttony and drunkenness. 280 The 
latter element could only be satisfied by consumption of specified 
minimum amounts of food and drink;200 because these quantities were 
so large that a child could not afford to purchase them, the law was 
further interpreted to require that the son have stolen money from his 
father for that purpose. 201 Thus, while the Talmud recognized that 
the son's behavior would be predictive of future criminal conduct, 
that recognition was based on a finding of a criminal act by the son 
against the father and on a determination that his addictive gluttony 
could only be appeased by further criminal acts against his parents 
and others.292 
Moreover, prosecution was not allowed if the parents possessed 
certain characteristics. A son was not to be deemed stubborn and 
rebellious "if his mother [was] not fit for his father," as in the case of 
violation by the mother of the laws against incest. 203 Thus, it can be 
inferred that if the parents had set a bad example for their son by 
themselves acting unlawfully, they were barred from levelling charges 
287. SANHEDRIN 8:4, at 482-83. If one parent was dead or refused to join in the 
charges, the son could not be prosecuted. "Either of them could condone the offense 
and withdraw the complaint at any time before the conviction." M. ELON, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAw 492 (1975). Compare the condonation defense discussed 
in notes 224-25 supra and accompanying text. 
288. SANHEDRIN 8:1, at 465-68. Under an alternative interpretation, the indict-
ment period was extended to six months after the thirteenth birthday. M. ELON, 
supra note 287, at 491. Compare the mens rea defense discussed in note 223 supra 
and accompanying text and the infancy defense discussed in notes 22, 266 supra. 
289. M. ELON, supra note 287, at 491-92. Compare the isolated incident defense 
discussed in notes 202-19 supra and accompanying text. 
290. SANHEDRIN 8:2, at 473-75, 479-81. 
291. SANHEDRIN 8:3, at 482. Raschi, who lived in the 11th century and was a 
leading commentator on the Bible and Talmud, wrote, "A stubborn and rebellious 
son is not culpable until he has stolen and eaten half a manah of meat and has drunk 
half a log of wine." THE PENTATEUCH AND RAscm's COMMENTARY: DEUTERONOMY 
196 (Ben Isaiah & Sharfman ed. 1949). 
292. SANHEDRIN 8:5, at 488, states: "Did the Torah {the first five books of the 
Old Testament] decree that the rebellious son shall be brought before Beth din [the 
Jewish court of law] and stoned merely because he ate ... [and drank too much]? 
But the Torah foresaw his ultimate destiny. For at the end, after dissipating his 
father's wealth, he would still seek to satisfy his accustomed gluttonous wants but 
being unable to do so, go forth at the cross roads and rob." (footnote omitted). 
293. SANHEDRIN 8 :3, at 482-83. 
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of illegality against him. In addition, a complaint of rebelliousness 
was precluded if the parents were not "alike in voice" when they 
admonished their son. 294 This can be interpreted to mean that if the 
mother and father gave the son inconsistent directions, they were 
failing to provide him with a cohesive and disciplined home life, and 
that this parental shortcoming could be a defense to the charge that 
he was stubborn and rebellious. 295 
Even if the son had committed all the elements of the "crime" and 
the parents were in no way deficient, he was brought first before a 
three-judge court where, upon conviction, he was flogged and warned 
of the consequences if he persisted in such conduct.296 It was only if 
he thereafter continued to violate the law that he could be brought 
before the elders of the city, which was a court of twenty-three 
persons, and be made subject to the death penalty.297 
There appears to be no recorded instance of the execution of a 
stubborn and rebellious son. 298 
294. Id. at 483. 
295. Compare the defense of contributory neglect discussed in text at notes 256-
83 supra. Some of the Talmudic interpretations concerning parental traits are rather 
artificial and appear to have been added to restrict the law's applicability. For ex-
ample, the son of a parent who had no hands was exempt because of the Biblical 
requirement that the parents "lay hold on him." SANHEDRIN 8:4, at 484. 
296. SANHEDRIN 8:4, at 484-85, 
291. Id. "He is admonished in the presence of three and flagellated. If he trans-
gresses again after this, he is to be tried by a court of twenty three and cannot be 
sentenced to stoning unless the first three are present. ... " Witnesses to the admo-
nition were required, since the son could not be executed on the basis of only his 
parents' testimony. Id. at 484-85. Compare the defense of exhaustion of non-judi-
cial remedies, discussed in text at notes 227-55 supra. 
298. SANHEDRIN 8:3, at 483. ''There never has been a 'stubborn and rebellious 
son,' and never will be. Why then was the law written? That you may study it 
and receive reward." Id. (footnote omitted). 
